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Aims and outline 
 
 
 
Why do some people experience depressive episodes and other 
individuals never have to deal with this condition? Why do some 
individuals suffer from depressive episodes that seem to endure longer? 
These questions probing the mechanisms underlying depression have 
been puzzling investigators for decades and have given impetus to a 
myriad of research that identified biological, cognitive, and social 
factors that put people at risk to develop and/or maintain symptoms 
of depression (Dobson & Dozois, 2008). Numerous studies on 
cognitive risk factors have shown that emotional biases in cognitive 
processes such as attention, interpretation, and memory are closely 
linked to one’s emotional state (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 2005). At present, however, it remains unclear how these 
emotional biases in cognition operate together to affect emotional 
well-being: How do emotional biases in attention mechanisms 
regulate what is remembered? How does emotional long-term 
memory in turn guide attention? How does interpretation comes into 
play in the attention – memory interaction? How do multiple cognitive 
biases in combination predict the course of depressive symptoms over 
extended periods of time? 
The general objective of this doctoral research was to advance 
understanding of the mechanisms through which one cognitive bias 
influences another bias via systematic study of relations among 
depression-modulated biases in attention, interpretation, and memory. 
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Investigation of such multi-componential processes and their 
interactions requires a methodological approach with complementary 
research designs (see chapter 1). By triangulating empirical 
observations from cross-sectional (chapters 2 and 3), cognitive 
training (chapter 4), and longitudinal investigations (chapter 5), we 
aimed to map out parts of the potential interactions among processing 
biases in individuals with minimal as well as subclinical symptom 
levels of depression. The chapters included in this dissertation present 
a selection of theoretical and empirical efforts undertaken. 
Molding a new line of investigation benefits from a thorough 
review of what has been learned from prior research to reveal what 
remains to be discovered about the relations among cognitive biases. 
In chapter 1, we first summarize prior research on the (causal) risk 
status of emotionally biased cognitive processes in depression and 
introduce the ‘combined cognitive biases hypothesis’ (Hirsch, Clark, & 
Mathews, 2006) in the context of depression. Next, we present a 
selection of cognitive frameworks that could guide research on 
interactive cognitive biases and discuss past research testing relations 
between biased cognitive processes. We conclude this first chapter by 
outlining the major theoretical and clinical implications of potential 
advances in knowledge gained from this type of integrative research. 
The empirical research presented in the following chapters 
can be organized into three core areas related to the combined 
cognitive biases hypothesis. There are cross-sectional studies 
investigating associations between cognitive biases (chapters 2 and 3), 
cognitive training studies testing hypothesized causal relations 
between these processes via experimental manipulation (chapter 4), 
and longitudinal studies examining the predictive value of multiple 
cognitive biases in combination (chapter 5). 
The first series of experiments: how does emotional attention 
control and is controlled by long-term memory? In chapter 2, we 
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report three cross-sectional studies focusing on how individuals with 
varying depressive symptom levels attend to and remember emotional 
material. The first two studies examine how emotional attention 
during encoding regulates emotional biases in interpretation and 
explicit long-term memory. We hypothesized that explicit long-term 
memory for emotional material is directly related to biases in 
sustained attention and indirectly related to attentional selection via 
its relation with interpretation bias. In a third study, we aimed to 
further understanding of the role of attention bias during retrieval of 
emotional information. Based on basic cognitive research, we 
hypothesized that attentional mechanisms regulate emotional memory 
during controlled and not during automatic retrieval of emotional 
material.  
Building on this work, in chapter 3, two experiments examine 
how emotional long-term memory representations guide attention. 
The first experiment tested whether attention is guided by emotional 
memory and if individual differences in depressive symptom levels 
modulate attentional guidance by positive versus negative associations 
in memory. The second experiment examines which attention 
operations are controlled by emotional memory as well as the 
temporal profile of memory-based attention bias. We hypothesized 
that emotional memory has the ability to guide attention toward 
congruent material, mainly affecting early attentional operations. 
In chapter 4, we follow up on the cross-sectional research 
observations by a series of three experiments attempting to 
manipulate emotional biases in attention to investigate its assumed 
causal impact on affective task-switching ability and interpretation 
bias. We hypothesized that training attention allocation toward 
emotionally positive or negative material modulates the flexibility of 
switching between emotional and non-emotional features of non-
trained stimuli and alter subsequent interpretation of emotional 
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material in a training-congruent manner. Based on observations from 
the first three experiments, we sought to gain a better understanding 
of the nature of attention and interpretation biases typically targeted 
by cognitive bias modification procedures. Here, we modeled relations 
between depression levels, attention bias, and interpretation bias 
while distinguishing between processing tendency and ability 
processes. We hypothesized that attention bias mediates the relation 
between depressive symptoms and interpretation for both tendency 
and ability processes. 
The empirical studies presented in the previous chapters 
tested interactive cognitive biases in relation to depressive symptoms 
within a proximal timeframe, leaving unanswered how cognitive 
biases in combination impact the longitudinal course of depressive 
symptoms. In chapter 5, we investigate different integrative 
approaches that model the combined impact of multiple biases in the 
prediction of prospective changes in depressive symptoms over a 
follow-up period of one year. Specifically, we explore the predictive 
value of additive (i.e., negative cognitive biases have a cumulative 
effect) and weakest link (i.e., the dominant pathogenic process is 
important) approaches in interaction with perceived stress. 
What is the increment in knowledge this PhD research 
provides to the literature on emotional biases in cognition? In the last 
chapter of this dissertation, the general discussion, we summarize the 
little parts of the complex interactions among cognitive biases that we 
have unlocked and discuss their implications for cognitive theory, 
research, and clinical practice. It will be clear that research integrating 
multiple cognitive biases is at an early stage and that the insights 
gained here raise more fascinating empirical questions. We conclude 
by outlining recommendations and directions for future study to 
deepen our understanding of cognitive risk factors in depression. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Combined Cognitive Biases in 
Depression1 
 
 
 
Major depression is a highly prevalent and recurrent 
psychiatric illness with a severe personal and societal burden (Kessler 
& Wang, 2009). Despite efficacious psychological and pharmacological 
treatment strategies (National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 
2010) there is ample room for improvement: relapse and recurrence 
rates of depression remain high after recovery and a considerable group 
of individuals does not respond to treatment (Boland & Keller, 2009). 
This indicates that current therapies do not sufficiently target the 
(causal) risk factors for this burdensome disorder. Efforts to identify the 
mechanisms involved in the onset and maintenance of depressive 
symptoms are particularly pressing to further understanding of 
depression and how best to prevent and treat this condition.  
Intensive research has been successful in identifying cognitive 
risk factors for depression. Apart from a large body of research 
examining depressive cognitive content as a vulnerability factor (e.g., 
                                                             
1 Based on Everaert, J., Koster, E.H.W., & Derakshan, N. (2012). The combined cognitive 
bias hypothesis in depression. Clinical Psychology Review, 32(5), 413-424. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2012.04.003. 
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negative thoughts, dysfunctional attitudes), a promising line of 
investigation highlights the role of emotionally biased cognitive 
processes in the onset and maintenance of depression (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Research efforts in this 
area have typically focused on processing abnormalities in attention, 
interpretation, and memory, which are considered to be instrumental 
in the understanding of the processes involved in cognitive biases. More 
recently, there is growing interest into cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying cognitive control impairments, which may 
operate across a variety of cognitive biases. Indeed, a substantial 
number of studies on emotional processing in depressed samples 
provide evidence that depression is characterized by negative biases in 
basic cognitive processes such as attention, interpretation, and memory. 
This research has been guided by comprehensive cognitive frameworks 
of depression (D. A. Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Ingram, 1984; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988, 1997) and have led to the 
development of specific cognitive science approaches to depression 
(Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009; Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007). 
Cognitive Biases as Causal Risk Factors 
What are the main findings on cognitive processing biases in 
depression? First, research on emotional biases in attention has shown 
that at-risk (e.g., subclinically or remitted depressed) and clinically 
depressed individuals show an attention bias favoring negative material 
and do not have a bias toward positive material typical for non-
depressed individuals (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Depression-
related biases in attention toward negative material are thought to be 
characterized by impaired withdrawal of attention from processing 
negative material rather than facilitated attention toward negative 
stimuli (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Second, at the level of interpretation, 
subclinically and clinically depressed individuals tend draw more 
negative interpretations on ambiguous information. The current 
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research evidence suggests that ambiguity resolution is negatively 
biased during the effortful generation of interpretations and selection 
of a certain interpretation as most likely applicable to an ambiguous 
situation (Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011; Hindash & Amir, 
2012; Sears, Suzie Bisson, & Nielsen, 2011; Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2010; Wisco, 2009). Third, research on emotional memory has reliably 
demonstrated that depression is marked by biases in explicit memory, 
with depressed individuals remembering generic and more negative 
events than specific and positive experiences compared with non-
depressed individuals (Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992; Williams et 
al., 2007). A recent meta-analysis revealed that depressed individuals 
have also an implicit memory bias. Compared to non-depressed people 
who have an implicit recall bias, depressed people implicitly recall more 
negative self-relevant stimuli when encoding and retrieval match in 
terms of perceptual and conceptual processing demands (Gaddy & 
Ingram, 2014; Phillips, Hine, & Thorsteinsson, 2010). Finally, recent 
studies also point toward depression-related impairments in cognitive 
control. Depressed individuals have difficulties in inhibiting negative 
information (De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; 
Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006; Gotlib et al., 2004; 
Joormann, 2004), shifting, and updating emotional and non-emotional 
representations in working memory (De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Levens 
& Gotlib, 2010; Lo & Allen, 2011; Yoon, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2014). 
Longitudinal research and cognitive bias modification studies 
(i.e., experimental manipulation of emotional processing biases) 
suggest that cognitive control deficits (Calkins, McMorran, Siegle, & 
Otto, 2014; Demeyer, De Lissnyder, Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; 
Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, Mobbs, & Dalgleish, 2013; Siegle, 
Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), biases in 
attention (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Browning, Holmes, 
Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012; Wells & Beevers, 2010; Yang, Ding, 
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Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2014), interpretation (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; 
Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & 
Holmes, 2012; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014; Rude, Durham-Fowler, 
Baum, Rooney, & Maestas, 2010; Rude, Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 
2003; Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002), and memory 
(Asarnow, Thompson, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2014; Bellew & Hill, 1991; 
Johnson, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2007; Raes, Williams, & Hermans, 2009; 
Reilly-Harrington, Alloy, Fresco, & Whitehouse, 1999; Rottenberg, 
Joormann, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 
2010; Van Daele, Griffith, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2014) can 
predict and contribute to the onset and maintenance of depressive 
symptoms. Moreover, these emotionally biased cognitive processes are 
associated with emotional responses to stressors (Clasen, Wells, Ellis, 
& Beevers, 2013; Ellenbogen, Schwartzman, Stewart, & Walker, 2002; 
Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013) and have been 
observed in never-depressed at-risk (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; 
Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; Kujawa et al., 2011; Taylor & Ingram, 
1999) and in remitted depressed (Fritzsche et al., 2010; Gilboa & Gotlib, 
1997; Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Romero, 
Sanchez, & Vazquez, 2014) samples.  
Although several recent studies did not report evidence for the 
role of cognitive biases in depression (Kruijt, Putman, & Van der Does, 
2013; Onraedt & Koster, 2014; Wisco, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2012), the 
accumulated research data yields strong evidence for depression-
related cognitive biases in different cognitive processes and indicates 
that these processing biases are not merely mood-dependent correlates 
of depression. Rather, cognitive biases may to increase risk for 
depression. It has been argued that these cognitive biases are 
vulnerability mechanisms or causal risk factors through which 
depressive symptoms develop and are maintained. 
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The Interplay Among Cognitive Biases 
A major limitation of previous research is that cognitive biases 
in depression have been mostly studied in isolation. While this 
approach has some advantage in improving our understanding of how 
a specific cognitive bias affects behavior, it is limited in that it does not 
inform on how multiple cognitive biases interact or how these processes 
are linked to higher-order factors (e.g., negative schema’s, see below). 
Also, a focus on individual biases provides a limited understanding of 
the relative importance of how various biases in combination may 
influence the onset, maintenance, and/or relapse of depression. A 
comprehensive understanding of depression-linked cognitive biases 
can only be gained by investigating relations among emotional biases in 
multiple cognitive processes. 
This review applies the combined cognitive biases hypothesis 
(Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006) to the study of depression. We 
attempt to frame how cognitive biases operate in concert and elaborate 
upon the main empirical questions arising from the combined cognitive 
biases hypothesis. We follow by discussing predictions from key 
theoretical frameworks that can inform upon the interplay among 
cognitive biases, guiding future research in this area. Then, we draw 
upon empirical studies that have directly examined links between 
multiple cognitive biases. We conclude with theoretical and clinical 
implications of the current findings and propose a number of ways in 
which this new area of research can be taken forward.  
The Combined Cognitive Biases Hypothesis 
Although many cognitive models of psychopathology assume 
interactions among cognitive biases, their take on this assumption has 
been relatively limited (see theoretical accounts section). It is only 
recently that specific ideas and hypotheses regarding the interplay 
between emotionally biased cognitive processes in emotional disorders 
have begun to emerge in clinical cognition research (Hertel, 2004). In 
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a paper focusing on bidirectional relations between interpretation bias 
and imagery, Hirsch et al. (2006) elaborated upon the notion of 
distorted cognitive processes working in concert and formulated the 
combined cognitive biases hypothesis (CCBH). It was argued that 
“cognitive biases do not operate in isolation, but rather can influence 
each other and/or can interact so that the impact of each on another 
variable is influenced by the other. Via both these mechanisms we argue 
that combinations of biases have a greater impact on disorders than if 
individual cognitive processes acted in isolation” (p. 224). Although 
framed within research on social anxiety disorder, the CCBH can be 
applied to healthy and emotionally disordered cognitive functioning. 
 
Table 1. Research questions originating from the combined cognitive biases 
hypothesis. 
Category Description 
Association  
Questions probe associations among emotional biases in components 
and systems of cognitive control, attention, interpretation, and 
memory. 
Causal  
Questions concern the causal direction of observed associations 
between cognitive biases: have biases unidirectional and/or reciprocal 
relations? 
Predictive 
magnitude  
Questions involve how multiple biases in combination (e.g., via 
weakest link, additive, interactive effects) influence the depression 
course. 
 
There is an upsurge of research on relations between cognitive 
biases related to depression (see empirical data section). However, this 
research is at the beginning stages and several open questions need 
future investigation. We have identified three broad categories of 
research questions originating from the CCBH, namely association, 
causal, and predictive magnitude questions. Table 1 summarizes the key 
features within each type of research questions. 
Combined cognitive biases in depression 13 
 
Association Questions 
A first category of questions concerns what we refer to as 
‘association questions’. These questions address whether cognitive 
control impairments and emotional biases at the levels of attention, 
interpretation, and memory are related. Although several studies 
drawing from ‘association questions’ (e.g., “are negative attention 
biases associated with enhanced memory for similar information?”) 
have been published (see empirical data section) many potential 
linkages have not been systematically explored. For example, no 
published research reports data on the relation between emotional 
biases in attention and interpretation in depression, though influential 
cognitive models (e.g. Beck’s schema theory; see below) assume that 
there is a link. In addition, current research is highly underspecified 
with regard to the cognitive processes under study in that only broad 
relations between measures of the constructs of ‘attention’ and ‘memory’ 
were investigated, though these cognitive processes are not unitary 
entities (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). Attention involves 
multiple components or operations (e.g., selective orienting, sustained 
attention) and multiple systems comprise memory (e.g., working 
memory, explicit and implicit memory long-term memory). 
Interactions between emotionally biased cognitive processes may occur 
among different components and systems at different processing stages 
(i.e., encoding, (re)consolidation, and/or retrieval of emotional 
material). Hence, the complexity of the distinct components and 
systems of cognitive processes should be integrated into tests of the 
CCBH. Accordingly, findings from studies examining association 
questions can provide detailed insights about various functional 
relations among multiple biased cognitive processes.  
Causal Questions 
The direction of the hypothesized influence of one cognitive 
bias on another process are the focus of causal questions. Within this 
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category, there are two issues that deserve future empirical scrutiny. A 
first issue concerns the chain of effects. It has not been tested yet 
whether multiple cognitive biases operate in succession (i.e., 
unidirectional effects) with one bias influencing another process which 
in turn could affect a third process. For example, biases in attention may 
alter interpretation which may in turn regulate memory. Alternatively, 
cognitive biases may operate constantly and in parallel across multiple 
processing stages. For example, emotional biases in attention may not 
only regulate memory via their impact on encoding, but may also bias 
memory via its influence on retrieval of emotional information. A 
second issue within the category of causal questions is whether there 
are reciprocal relations between different biases. For example, 
emotional biases in attention (e.g., a critical remark of a loved one) may 
lead to negative interpretations of the attended material (e.g., “she/he 
does not love me anymore”), which may in turn guide attention to 
similar material (e.g., other signs of disapproval) to strengthen the 
initial interpretation (e.g., “he/she hates me”).  
In investigating association and causal questions, it is 
important to consider whether the interplay among distorted cognitive 
processes has differential effects depending on the depression phase 
(i.e., at a non-depressed at-risk, subclinical, clinical, or remitted stages). 
As we discuss later, the strength of processing abnormalities may 
partially depend on depression severity levels and the number of past 
depressive episodes, suggesting that interactions between cognitive 
biases may not be static over time but change across stages and over the 
course of multiple depressive episodes. This warrants research 
scrutinizing association and causal questions in samples of at-risk and 
currently depressed individuals. 
Predictive Magnitude Questions 
While the first two types of questions concern relations among 
depression-linked cognitive biases within proximal timeframes, 
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predictive magnitude questions address the influences of single versus 
multiple cognitive biases in combination on the longitudinal course of 
depressive symptoms (i.e., a distal timeframe). At present, it remains 
unknown whether depressive symptoms are exacerbated or maintained 
by single or multiple cognitive biases, and which (combination of) 
biases yield the greatest potency in predicting the symptom course over 
time. Some cognitive biases (e.g., attention) could be a proxy risk factor 
via its influence on another process (e.g., memory) which in turn 
predicts the course of depressive symptoms. Some cognitive biases (e.g., 
interpretation) could mediate or moderate effects of one bias (e.g., 
attention) on changes in depressive symptoms. Alternatively, multiple 
cognitive biases could be overlapping risk factors individually 
predicting fluctuations in depression (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, 
& Kupfer, 2001). Of particular interest to predictive magnitude 
questions are research questions probing whether cognitive biases have 
additive (i.e., cognitive processes have a cumulative effect) effects on 
the course of depressive symptoms or whether the weakest link (i.e., the 
dominant pathogenic process is important) is the best marker of future 
depression, and if the predictive effect of such integrative models 
extends beyond effects of a single cognitive bias.  
Addressing predictive magnitude questions is essential to 
improve insight into the multifactorial risk processes involved in 
depression. It seems plausible that multiple risk factors may increase 
the probability of developing a disorder whereas an individual factor 
may not. Applied to the topic under study here, individual biases have 
only small to moderate explanatory power and it is likely that multiple 
interactive cognitive biases explain a larger proportion of variance in 
longitudinal fluctuations in depressive symptom severity. 
As argued in the context of each category of questions, we 
propose that instead of examining biases as independent, isolated 
factors, mutual influences among multiple cognitive biases need to be 
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taken into account to improve understanding of each individual 
cognitive bias and depression-linked distortions in cognitive 
functioning as a whole. Later in this article, we review current empirical 
research per category of CCBH questions. We first consider theoretical 
predictions on the CCBH in depression, as they can guide future 
empirical research in this area. 
 
 
 
Cognitive Frameworks of Depression 
Various cognitive frameworks of depression assert that biases 
in attention, interpretation, memory, and cognitive control play a 
crucial role in the onset, maintenance, and relapse of depressive 
symptoms. In this section, we briefly describe the most influential 
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cognitive models with their shared and unique predictions with respect 
to the different categories of CCBH questions. Figure 1 provides a 
schematic outline of the distinct models.  
Beck’s Schema Theory 
One of the most influential cognitive accounts of depression is 
Beck’s schema theory (Beck & Haigh, 2014; D. A. Clark et al., 1999). The 
theory asserts that depression-prone individuals hold negative schemas 
or dysfunctional memory representations about the self (i.e., on themes 
of personal loss, failure, or deprivation), that are developed through a 
complex interaction between genetic factors, selective attention, and 
memory with adverse life events. When schemas are activated by 
stressful life events (e.g., a relationship breakup, an oral exam), its 
content interacts with processing biases in attention, interpretation, 
and memory in a schema-relevant manner. An example: a student with 
a history of failing oral exams might be more attentive for social cues of 
disapproval during new exams (e.g., an examiner frowning his 
eyebrows). The student may interpret such cues in a negative manner 
(e.g., “I must have given a stupid answer”) and recall negative memories 
about past failures (e.g., experiences associated with previous times 
failing an exam). These cognitive biases are assumed to occur 
interactively and concurrently during automatic and strategic 
processing (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Although this prediction is relevant 
to association questions, the theory does not provide a detailed account 
of testable hypotheses on causal relations among specific cognitive 
biases. Regarding fluctuations in the relations among biases across 
different depression phases, the theory asserts that the magnitude of 
negative biases in attention, interpretation, and memory are a linear 
function of depressive symptom severity (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). It is 
hypothesized that a cognitive shift occurs from a positivity bias in 
healthy people to facilitated processing of negative information in 
clinically depressed people.  
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Whereas Beck’s cognitive model predicts emotional biases 
across all cognitive processes (i.e., attention, interpretation, memory 
biases) at both automatic and strategic processing levels, other 
cognitive theorists (Ingram, 1984; Williams et al., 1988, 1997) have 
proposed a more specific set of predictions regarding relations among 
depression-linked cognitive biases. 
Enhanced Elaboration Accounts 
Ingram’s information processing analysis 
Ingram (1984) attributes a central role to biased elaboration 
and memory in maintaining depression (association question). 
Drawing on Bower’s theory (Bower, 1981) on mood and memory, the 
model assumes that when depressive memory networks are activated 
by appraisals (interpretations) of life events, individuals elaborate 
extensively upon information that is congruent with the triggered 
negative cognitions. In keeping with the previous example, a student 
may appraise certain cues (e.g., frowned eyebrows, crossed arms) as 
signs of failure (e.g., “my answer is not correct”) which may activate 
corresponding memory networks resulting in a thorough evaluation of 
the attributes and implications of the situation (e.g., “I did not 
understand the theory very well, I will not pass the exam, I am stupid”). 
It is hypothesized that this selective processing style activates 
connected memory networks via associative linkages, which may 
contain negative cognitions that are related to past feelings of sadness 
or depression (e.g., “I screwed up my romantic relationships, I am a 
loser”). Activation of such connected networks maintains biased 
elaboration on negative material (causal question). As a result of this 
process of recycling of negative cognitions through various memory 
networks, the elaborated material is encoded more deeply into the 
memory networks increasing the likelihood that this negative memory 
content becomes activated in the future. The elaboration – memory 
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interaction heightens the vulnerability for depression and predicts 
future depressive episodes (predictive magnitude question). 
Williams et al.’s cognitive framework 
According to Williams et al. (1988) depression is characterized 
by negative biases in elaboration and not in priming processes of 
attention and memory (association question). While priming refers to 
automatic processes involved in strengthening representations to make 
them more accessible, elaboration refers to strategic processes that 
form or strengthen relations between activated representations (Graf & 
Mandler, 1984). Two mechanisms are proposed to underlie these 
negative biases: the affective decision mechanism (ADM) and the 
resource allocation mechanism (RAM). When incoming information is 
evaluated as negative (e.g., frowned eyebrows), as assessed by the ADM, 
more attention resources are allocated to negative material (e.g., the 
examiner rolling his eyes, crossed arms) resulting in enhanced 
elaboration (RAM). For example, the student may think “I must have 
given a wrong answer, I am not capable of passing the course”. Such 
depression-related elaborations are encoded into memory, enhancing 
later recall of this material (causal question). Based on the available 
empirical data, Williams et al. (1997) concluded that depression is not 
featured by mood-congruent biases in attention (association question), 
in that way contradicting predictions by Beck’s model. According to the 
reformulated model, depressed individuals engage in strategic or 
biased elaboration upon negative material during memory retrieval. 
This enhanced elaboration results in improved memory for negative 
material and the products of the elaboration process serve as mnemonic 
cues at later points in time (causal question). 
Impaired Cognitive Control Accounts 
Executive control has been proposed as an overarching 
mechanism operating across cognitive biases at various processing 
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stages (Hertel, 1997; Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007; Joormann, 2010). 
The impaired cognitive control account by Joormann and colleagues 
specifies a causal chain linking deficits in cognitive control to cognitive 
biases (causal question). The model hypothesizes that depressed 
individuals have difficulties in limiting access of irrelevant negative 
information into working memory (WM) and removing negative 
content from WM that is no longer relevant. This means that negative 
cognitions remain active in WM (e.g., “I failed last time, why would I 
succeed now”) and may interfere with the current performance on a 
task (e.g., when one is preparing for the next exam). These deficits in 
cognitive control are assumed to underlie difficulties in disengaging 
attention from negative information resulting in enhanced elaboration 
on this material. As a result, negative elaborations or interpretations are 
stored into long-term memory which sets the stage for memory bias. 
The causal relations among cognitive biases put forward by the 
impaired cognitive control account are different from assumptions by 
Beck’s cognitive model and enhanced elaboration accounts. Whereas 
theories by Beck and Ingram predict that cognitive biases are produced 
by cognitive schemas as higher-order factors, Joormann et al. predict a 
chain of biases driven by cognitive control processes. 
Summary 
Cognitive frameworks stipulate that emotionally biased 
cognitive processes are central mechanisms in the onset, maintenance, 
and relapse/recurrence of depressive symptoms, however, the theories 
differ in the extent to which they integrate multiple biased cognitive 
processes, elaborate on the interplay among these factors, and make 
specific predictions regarding pathways through which cognitive biases 
in combination impact the course of depressive symptoms over time. 
Hence, the CCBH can be applied to examine the competing hypotheses 
arising from these different theoretical frameworks. Yet, despite 
meaningful shared and differential predictions, the existing models are 
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often ambiguous and underspecified as far as the dynamic interplay 
among cognitive biases is concerned (recall that attention and memory 
are not unitary entities). The sections below provide an overview of 
current research reporting data relevant to the CCBH.  
Empirical Research on Combined Cognitive Biases 
There is increasing research studies investigating relations 
among emotional biases attention, interpretation, and memory in 
various depressed samples. Below we review the research findings per 
CCBH research question. 
Association Questions  
Empirical research relevant to association questions has 
exclusively focused on emotional biases in attention and explicit 
memory. A seminal investigation (Gotlib et al., 2004) explored 
correlations between these biases in a sample of clinically depressed 
patients and never-disordered control individuals. In this study, 
participants started with an encoding task prompting them to evaluate 
the self-relevance of positive, negative, and neutral words, which was 
followed by an incidental free recall task to test memory for the encoded 
items. Next, to measure attention biases toward sad, angry, or happy 
material, participants completed a dot probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986) in which emotional – neutral face pairs preceded the 
presentation of a probe (the target) which spatial location had to be 
detected. Results showed that depressed individuals had an attention 
bias for sad faces and recalled more negative words, however, there 
were no correlations between the cognitive bias indices suggesting that 
attention and memory biases operate independently. In line with these 
initial observations, a recent investigation adopting a similar study 
design in a sample of non-depressed and formerly depressed 
individuals under mood induction also found no significant 
correlations between attention and memory biases (Vrijsen, Van 
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Oostrom, Isaac, Becker, & Speckens, 2014). Note, that these studies 
examined correlations between attention and memory using unrelated 
tasks and different stimulus materials, and as such did not test the 
dependence between these cognitive processes. Therefore, these studies 
provide a limited test of the core predictions by the CCBH. 
Other studies have used similar stimulus materials across 
cognitive tasks and bias measures. A first study investigated whether 
attention biases at different levels of elaboration are associated with 
memory biases (Koster, De Raedt, Leyman, & De Lissnyder, 2010). 
Emotional attention was examined via a spatial cueing task (Posner, 
1980). On each trial, the task presented a neutral or an emotional cue 
word followed by a target in the same or opposite location of the cue, 
and the cue target onset asynchrony (CTOA; the time between onset of 
cue and onset of target) was manipulated to study the time course of 
attention bias. After the attention task, explicit memory for previously 
presented words was tested in an incidental free recall task. The results 
revealed that subclinically depressed individuals had an attention bias 
toward negative words only under the conditions that allowed elaborate 
processing (longer CTOA) and this predicted recall of negative words. 
The dependence of memory bias on attention is further substantiated 
by observations from a study in which healthy and subclinically 
depressed individuals first viewed slides depicting negative, neutral, 
and positive words in a passive viewing eye-tracking task. This was 
followed by an incidental recognition test of the displayed words. It was 
found that the absence of attention bias for positive words, 
characteristic for subclinically depressed individuals, predicted less 
accurate recognition of these emotional stimuli (Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 
2011). 
Further support for attention – memory bias relations comes 
from studies linking explicit memory bias to controlled attention (Ellis, 
Wells, Vanderlind, & Beevers, 2014) and attentional breadth (Wells, 
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Beevers, Robison, & Ellis, 2010). To study memory in relation to 
controlled attention (i.e., ability to orient attention to task-relevant 
material and inhibit irrelevant material), clinically and never depressed 
individuals were presented with positive and negative word pairs 
prompting them to orient attention to one word (the target) and to 
ignore the other item (the distracter) while their gaze behavior was 
recorded. This was followed by a free recall task to test memory for the 
encountered stimuli. The results revealed that attention toward 
negative targets mediated the relation between diagnostic status and 
memory for negative words, with a stronger relation between attention 
and memory in clinically depressed individuals (Ellis et al., 2014). 
Another study linked attentional breadth to recognition memory (Wells 
et al., 2010). For this purpose, subclinically depressed and non-
depressed individuals viewed a series of happy, sad, angry, and neutral 
facial expressions in an eye-tracking task and completed a subsequent 
incidental recognition task to assess memory for the faces. The data 
showed a broader attention focus for angry faces (indexed by larger 
inter-fixation distances upon viewing these slides) in subclinically 
depressed compared with non-depressed participants, which was 
correlated with enhanced recognition of similar faces. 
In sum, the current findings suggests that emotional memory 
can be explained by congruent biases attention when depressed people 
are exposed to emotional material. However, several studies also 
reported no evidence for such correlations between attention and 
memory biases in clinically and formerly depressed samples.  
Causal Questions  
Attention bias regulates interpretation and memory 
One line of studies investigated effects of attention focus via 
thought-induction procedures (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004) and cognitive bias modification (CBM) procedures 
(Blaut, Paulewicz, Szastok, Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013). In a two of 
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experiments by Hertel and El-Messidi (2006) attention focus was 
manipulated via a procedure that required participants to elaborate on 
the meaning of a series of self-focused and other-focused items (e.g., 
“my character and who I strive to be”, “the physical sensations in your 
body”). In experiment 1, participants completed an interpretation task 
in which they created sentences with serially presented homographs 
(e.g., loaf, reflect) after a self versus other attention focus manipulation. 
The results indicated that subclinically depressed individuals created 
sentences revealing more negatively interpreted homographs in the 
self-focus than in the other-focus condition. In experiment 2, 
participants were again subjected to the attention focus manipulation 
after which they were presented with homographs prompting them to 
report the first words that came to mind. This was followed by an 
incidental free recall test of the homographs. Subclinically depressed 
individuals interpreted the homographs more often as personal and 
also recalled more personally interpreted homographs in the self-focus 
than in the other-focus condition. The data of the two experiments 
suggests that heightened self-focused attention in subclinically 
depressed people leads to more negative and personal interpretations 
of ambiguous information which transfer to explicit memory.  
Another study manipulated attentional focus to investigate the 
consequences for autobiographical memory specificity in depressed 
patients (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Attention was focused on either 
the experience (experiential condition) or causes and consequences 
(analytical condition) described in the focus-induction items (e.g., ‘‘the 
physical sensations in your body’). Before and after the attention 
manipulation, participants completed an autobiographical memory test 
(Williams & Broadbent, 1986) in which they were required to generate 
a specific personal memory in response to positive and negative cue 
words. It was found that depressed patients engaging in an experiential 
self-focus (considered as adaptive) recalled less overgeneral memories 
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after the manipulation procedure, whereas the overgeneral memories 
persisted in depressed patients engaging in an analytical self-focus 
(considered as maladaptive). 
Taken together, the findings from research manipulating 
attention focus via thought-induction procedures provides support for 
the causal influence of attention on interpretation and memory. 
However, an important limitation of this attention manipulation is that 
inducing self-focus could also trigger processes such as self-critical 
thinking that could contribute to the observed relations. More 
rigorously controlled manipulations of attention focus are required to 
investigate effects of attention bias on other cognitive processes.  
In a recent study by Blaut et al. (2013) participants were either 
trained to orient attention away from negative words or received no 
training to test the influence of attention bias on memory. The attention 
manipulation involved a training variant of the dot-probe task in which 
a probe (the target) consistently replaces the neutral stimulus, instead 
of the equal replacement probability in the standard task design 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). It was 
found that individuals with higher depression levels did not exhibit a 
memory bias for negative words when they were trained to orient 
attention away from negative words, whereas a typical memory bias 
occurred in the no-training control group. These findings suggest that 
attention bias has a causal influence on memory. 
Interpretation biases and explicit memory 
A second line of research investigated how experimentally 
induced negative and positive interpretation biases affect memory. A 
first study tested whether memory for prior ambiguous events change 
by subsequently established biases in interpretation (Salemink, Hertel, 
& Mackintosh, 2010). Participants were first presented with ambiguous 
social scenarios asking them to generate at least one ending for the story. 
Next, either a positive or a negative interpretation bias was induced 
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using a bias modification procedure presenting a series of ambiguous 
stories ending with a word fragment for participants to complete. 
Completion of this word fragment resolved the ambiguous story in 
either a positive or negative manner (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
After the training, participants completed an incidental cued recall task 
to test memory for the initial scenarios and their endings. Results 
showed training-congruent effects on recall of endings of ambiguous 
scenarios that were presented before the interpretation bias training. 
Participants trained to interpret ambiguous information as negative 
recalled more negative scenario endings reflecting their own 
interpretations prior to the training, and vice versa for positive material.  
These observations were extended in another study (Tran, 
Hertel, & Joormann, 2011). In this study, participants were first 
subjected to a positive or negative interpretation bias training (similar 
to Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), followed by an encoding task in 
which they solved word fragments of ambiguous stories that remained 
ambiguous after completion. A subsequent recall task tested 
participants’ memory for the ambiguous scenarios. It was found that 
trained positive or negative interpretation biases resulted in a training-
congruent memory bias for the ambiguous scenarios encountered after 
training.  
A recent study partially replicated these results in a sample of 
individuals diagnosed with major depression. Employing the same 
study design as in Tran et al. (2011), it was found that only induced 
positive interpretation bias had training-congruent effects on the recall 
for endings (interpretations) of ambiguous scenarios (Joormann, 
Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015).  
As a whole, research on the dependence of memory on 
interpretation bias suggests that memory is regulated by interpretative 
biases at encoding and by biases acquired after encoding. 
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Predictive Magnitude Questions 
To date, one study investigated whether prospective changes in 
depressive symptomatology and recovery status are predicted by 
multiple cognitive biases in a clinically depressed sample (Johnson et 
al., 2007). It was found that neither attention nor memory bias was 
related to recovery status at 9 months follow-up, and only memory for 
positive information at baseline –and not attention– was associated 
with lower symptom severity at follow-up. Depressed patients who 
recalled a higher proportion of positive words at baseline reported less 
severe symptoms nine months later. These observations suggest that, 
in the presence of multiple cognitive biases, only some biases (e.g., 
memory bias) hold promise in predicting depressive symptoms 
prospectively, whereas other processes (e.g., attention) may be 
redundant. Although this study examined the predictive value of 
multiple biases individually, their combined effect was not tested using 
integrative models (e.g., weakest link, additive models). 
Summary 
Increasing research on the interplay between emotionally 
biased cognitive processes has revealed an interesting pattern of 
findings. First, the dependence of memory on emotional biases in 
attention is evidenced by observations from cross-sectional research in 
subclinically and clinically depressed individuals (Ellis et al., 2011, 2014; 
Koster et al., 2010; Wells et al., 2010) and cognitive training research 
manipulating attention bias (Blaut et al., 2013). However, under certain 
conditions, attention and memory biases may operate in parallel 
without mutual relations in clinically and formerly depressed samples 
(Gotlib et al., 2004; Vrijsen et al., 2014), and could differentially affect 
the longitudinal course of depression (Johnson et al., 2007). Second, 
heightened self-focused attention alters interpretations of ambiguous 
information which transfer to memory in subclinically depressed 
individuals (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006) and an analytical self-focus 
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disturbs memory specificity in clinical depression (Watkins & Teasdale, 
2004). Third, acquired interpretation biases influence memory for past 
ambiguous information and memory for subsequently encountered 
information (Joormann et al., 2015; Salemink et al., 2010; Tran et al., 
2011). 
Although considerable progress has been made, research in this 
area is at an early stage and further investigation adopting such an 
integrative perspective is necessary to advance current knowledge on 
how multiple biases interact to impact depressive symptoms. First, 
whereas past studies focused on relations between two cognitive biases, 
future research will have to integrate a broader set of variables to unlock 
the complex interplay among processing biases (e.g., how does 
attention affect interpretation and regulate memory). Second, future 
research will also have to increase specificity regarding the components 
and/or systems of the cognitive biases under study (e.g., dependence of 
implicit memory on attention operations) and study these aspects at 
different processing stages (e.g., encoding, retrieval). Third, there is no 
research that has investigated how multiple cognitive biases are 
modulated by cognitive control difficulties (inhibition, updating, and 
shifting). Future research may test whether cognitive control acts as an 
overarching mechanism across multiple cognitive biases at different 
processing stages. Fourth, there is a need for longitudinal research to 
investigate the combined impact of multiple processing biases on the 
course of depressive symptoms. Finally, more integrative research 
testing association, causal, and predictive magnitude questions should 
be conducted in a variety of samples, such as in clinically or formerly 
depressed samples. 
Theoretical and Clinical Considerations 
Cognitive Frameworks of Depression 
Cognitive models of depression are expected to consider 
interactions among cognitive biases given the empirical evidence for 
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relations among emotionally biased cognitive processes. The presented 
empirical findings have several implications. As predicted by most 
cognitive models (Beck & Haigh, 2014; D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 
1984; Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988), current 
research confirms the hypothesized relation between attention and 
memory bias. The data suggests that attention biases at later and not at 
early processing stages are linked to congruent biases in memory. This 
finding contradicts predictions by Williams et al. (1997) that depression 
is not characterized by attention biases and are at odds with Beck’s 
claim that biases emerge also at automatic levels of information 
processing (Beck & Haigh, 2014; D. A. Clark et al., 1999). 
Research showing that negative and positive interpretive biases 
regulate memory for emotional information suggests that biased 
information processing could contribute to the consolidation and 
elaboration of negative schema-content in memory (Ingram, 1984; 
Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988, 1997). However, it 
is not clear whether the elaborative processing of negative information 
is driven by improved quality of encoding of negative information, as 
predicted by the enhanced elaboration accounts (Ingram, 1984; 
Williams et al., 1988), and/or to impairments in cognitive control, as 
predicted by impaired cognitive control accounts (Hertel, 1997; 
Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007). The current results suggest that 
emotional biases in attention and interpretation influence emotional 
memory, which is in line with the idea that cognitive biases maintain 
negative self-schemas in memory (Beck & Haigh, 2014; D. A. Clark et 
al., 1999; Ingram, 1984). It is noteworthy, however, that it is still unclear 
whether there are long-term influences of attention and interpretation 
bias on memory for emotional information (e.g., how is differentially 
encoded emotional material consolidated in memory). 
As noted earlier, current studies in support of associations 
between cognitive biases have been conducted mainly in subclinically 
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depressed samples and findings from research in clinical samples 
yielded inconsistent results. The present state of the literature only 
allows researchers to draw conclusions regarding the interplay among 
cognitive biases at subclinical depressive symptom levels. 
State and Trait Effects 
As studies on the interplay between biased cognitive processes 
have been conducted in subclinically, clinically depressed samples, and 
in formerly depressed people under mood induction, it cannot be 
determined whether the observed interrelations are trait- or state-
dependent effects of depression (i.e., cognitive schemas, personality 
factors versus mood). Although schema-congruent processing models 
of depression (Beck & Haigh, 2014; D. A. Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 
1984) assume a direct impact of schemas on cognitive biases, there is 
also evidence for effects of mood on negative cognitions and cognitive 
biases. For instance, a study examining diurnal mood variation in 
relation to autobiographical memories (D. M. Clark & Teasdale, 1982), 
observed that depressed individuals were more likely to recall unhappy 
memories at times that are typically associated with more depressive 
complaints (e.g., mornings). Another study also found that never 
depressed and formerly depressed individuals in a neutral mood have a 
positive attention bias, whereas this bias disappeared in formerly 
depressed individuals in a sad mood (McCabe, Gotlib, & Martin, 2000). 
These findings suggest that mood state is important in understanding 
the interplay between cognitive biases in that mood may potentiate trait 
effects on the interplay between cognitive biases.  
To disentangle state from trait factors, the interplay among 
processing biases can be studied in remitted or formerly depressed 
samples. In this regard, different cognitive formulations of depression 
predict that cognitive biases emerge only under certain conditions in 
this population. Schema models (Beck & Haigh, 2014; D. A. Clark et al., 
1999; Ingram, 1984), for example, propose that after a depressive 
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episode negative schemata remain latent but can be activated at any 
point in time by distressing situations (e.g., failing an exam). 
Consequently, remitted depressed individuals will not exhibit biases in 
attention, interpretation, or memory when not distressed. Impaired 
cognitive control accounts (Joormann, Yoon, et al., 2007), by contrast, 
do not specify that negative mood is required to observe biases. This 
model states that cognitive biases operate as long as cognitive control 
impairments persist. Indeed, several studies found cognitive control 
difficulties in formerly depressed individuals (Joormann, 2010) and 
thus interacting cognitive biases are expected to emerge without 
induced negative mood states. Future investigation of cognitive biases 
in remitted depressed people with and without (naturally occurring) 
negative mood would allow a test of the differential predictions by these 
cognitive models. 
Methodological Considerations 
A number of methodological issues seem relevant to the study 
of the CCBH. The overview of empirical studies shows that present 
research has investigated interrelations primarily using cross-sectional 
study designs that include a limited set of cognitive processes, and have 
applied basic statistical techniques to test relations. Thorough 
examination of the CCBH requires statistical testing and modeling of 
direct and indirect relations between multiple variables (e.g., cognitive 
biases) and latent constructs (e.g., negative schemas). Structural 
equation modeling, for example, enables theory-driven tests of 
predictions between multiple variables using methods such as path 
analysis and structural regression models (Hoyle, 2012). Also data-
driven approaches (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Hsieh et al., 2010) allow 
investigation of relations among multiple variables. Here, information 
is obtained about the structure (i.e., associations among variables) and 
dynamics (i.e., clusters of variables) of the system in a stepwise manner 
starting from pairwise correlations between variables.  
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Another issue concerns the reliability of the experimental 
paradigms to study emotionally biased aspects of information 
processing in depression. Several studies examining psychometric 
properties have provided little support for the reliability of commonly-
used cognitive tasks. The dot-probe task, for example, has a low split-
half and test-retest reliability, and the attention bias indices drawn from 
different versions of this task are not always related (Salemink, Van Den 
Hout, & Kindt, 2007; Schmukle, 2005). Regarding the construct 
validity, several cognitive tasks that aim to measure the same construct 
(e.g., attention) are often not correlated (Dalgleish et al., 2003; Mogg et 
al., 2000). For example, Gotlib et al. (2004) found correlations close to 
zero between attention bias indexes from a dot probe and emotional 
Stroop task. By contrast, some studies documented acceptable 
psychometric features for some tasks (Berna et al., 2011; Griffith et al., 
2012; Salemink & van den Hout, 2010). In sum, these observations raise 
concerns about the psychometric properties of popular cognitive tasks 
and their bias indexes. Future empirical work should investigate 
particular task features (e.g., intra-individual variability in voluntary 
responses on reaction time tasks) and/or the nature of cognitive process 
(e.g., flexible prioritizing of attention on a trial-by-trial basis depending 
on thoughts that come to mind) as factors that may account for the poor 
psychometric properties (Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 2014).  
Another issue that demands closer attention is medication use 
in depressed samples under study. Depressed people, especially in 
clinical studies, often receive psychopharmacological treatment which 
could modulate individual cognitive biases (Harmer, Goodwin, & 
Cowen, 2009). Recent findings indicate that depressed patients taking 
antidepressant medication have a greater attention bias toward positive 
stimuli (Wells, Clerkin, Ellis, & Beevers, 2014) and have better memory 
for positive information (Harmer, O’Sullivan, et al., 2009). Via 
promoting processing of positive material, it seems plausible that 
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medication use alters the interplay among cognitive biases, for example, 
by disrupting a downward spiral with negative content circling through 
multiple cognitive processes. Hence, researchers need to consider 
potential effects of antidepressant use when studying interactions 
between cognitive biases. 
Predicting Future Depression 
Longitudinal studies have found that biases in cognitive control 
(Demeyer et al., 2012; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011), attention (Beevers 
& Carver, 2003; Wells & Beevers, 2010), interpretation (Rude et al., 
2010, 2003, 2002), and memory (Asarnow et al., 2014; Bellew & Hill, 
1991; Johnson et al., 2007; Reilly-Harrington et al., 1999; Rottenberg 
et al., 2005; Sumner et al., 2010) are predictive of future depressive 
symptoms and clinical depression. It is notable that in most studies the 
proportion of variance explained by these individual cognitive 
processes is rather small. However, we expect that that cognitive biases 
have substantial effects on depressive symptoms through their mutual 
relations and interaction with stressful live events, affecting emotional 
reactivity to emotional information that may lead to depressive 
symptoms. Research on the combined impact of multiple cognitive 
biases on depressive symptoms is currently absent. Future studies on 
this topic should be take into account several issues: (1) variations in 
the interplay among cognitive biases across different stadia of the 
depression course, (2) emotion regulation strategies through which 
multiple cognitive biases may affect depression levels, and (3) 
interactions with biological vulnerability factors. These issues are 
discussed in turn. 
Variations in the interplay 
In examining the predictive value of cognitive biases, potential 
differences in the interplay between biases across stadia in the course 
of depression over time should be taken into account. It is plausible that 
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cognitive biases and their interactions are not static over time. The 
experience of becoming and being depressed (e.g., increasing sad affect, 
negative cognitions), for instance, might affect the predictive 
magnitude of one or more cognitive biases (e.g., memory) and cognitive 
biases may be more closely connected with an increasing number of 
depressive episodes (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Some studies indicate 
that the strength of cognitive biases differs in function of depression 
severity. One study that directly compared the strength of attention 
biases in individuals with minimal, mild, and moderate to severe 
depressive symptoms found showed that maintained attention toward 
negative information was associated with moderate to severe 
depressive symptom levels (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2010). Also, the 
impairments in cognitive control may depend on the depressed sample 
tested. Prior studies have documented valence-specific deficits in 
cognitive control in a subclinically depressed sample (Koster, De 
Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2013), whereas clinically depressed people had 
global impairments (De Lissnyder et al., 2012). Future longitudinal and 
cross-sectional research will need to compare the interplay among 
cognitive biases across different samples corresponding with the phases 
of the depression course to advance our understanding of how risk 
factors for depression work together. 
Emotion regulation strategies 
Current research has generally focused on cognitive biases in 
relation to emotional reactivity and hallmark symptoms of depression, 
such as the persistence of sad mood (Clasen et al., 2013). It remains 
unclear, however, whether emotionally biased cognitive processes have 
direct effects on depressive symptoms or indirect effects via emotion 
regulation. The regulatory strategies people use to repair their mood 
when they experience sadness seems key in differentiating healthy from 
depressogenic emotional functioning. Depressed individuals tend to 
ruminate more in response to sad mood or stress, reappraise a 
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situation’s meaning less frequently relative to healthy people, and have 
difficulties using mood-incongruent recall to repair negative mood 
(Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). Rumination involves repetitively 
analyzing personal concerns, the causes, implications, and meanings of 
sad mood and distress (Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). Although 
depressed people do not consider rumination to be unwanted, it 
worsens mood, impairs stress recovery, and maintains depression 
(Radstaak, Geurts, Brosschot, Cillessen, & Kompier, 2011; Watkins, 
2008). Reappraisal involves altering a situation’s meaning 
(interpretation) to minimize its negative impact. This strategy reduces 
negative affect and is related to better stress recovery (Jamieson, Nock, 
& Mendes, 2012; Urry, 2009). Moreover, the accessibility and recall of 
positive memories is related to higher emotional well-being (Charles, 
Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007; 
Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Philippe, Lecours, & Beaulieu-Pelletier, 
2009). 
Novel theoretical models have hypothesized that individual 
differences in cognitive biases affect the use and effectiveness of 
regulating strategies to repair or reverse a mood state (Joormann & 
D’Avanzato, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). 
To date, studies have mainly demonstrated that healthy people differ 
from depressed people in their cognitive biases and emotion regulation, 
and very few studies have explicitly linked depression-related cognitive 
biases, emotional experience and regulation. One exception has shown 
that the relation between cognitive control and depression levels is fully 
mediated by rumination in remitted depressed individuals (Demeyer et 
al., 2012). Discovering the mechanisms through which interacting 
cognitive biases influence emotion regulation strategies and depressive 
symptoms presents an important goal for future research. 
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Biological vulnerability factors 
Biased cognitive processes are expected to interact with genetic 
and biological factors (Belzung, Willner, & Philippot, 2015; De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010; Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011). Genetic risk 
factors, such as variations in the serotonin transporter gene (5-
HTTLPR), are associated with risk for depression through their effects 
on social cognition (Homberg & Lesch, 2011). It has been argued that 
genetic factors are associated with higher levels of vigilance for signs of 
social threat, which has been found both at the neurobiological (e.g., 
enhanced amygdala activity on presentation of fearful faces) (Hariri, 
2005) and cognitive level (Beevers, Gibb, McGeary, & Miller, 2007; 
Disner, McGeary, Wells, Ellis, & Beevers, 2014). In addition, genetic 
factors in interaction with stressors have been linked to reactivity in 
neural substrates (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006) with a correspondence 
between abnormalities at the neural system level and distortions in 
cognitive processes observed in depressed samples (De Raedt & Koster, 
2010). For instance, it has been found that upon encountering negative 
material the increased activation in limbic regions (e.g., amygdala, 
hippocampus) is related to a reduced activity in specific regions of the 
prefrontal cortex (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal 
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex). These latter structures are involved 
in exerting cognitive control over processing of affective material 
(Davidson et al., 2002; Whittle, Allen, Lubman, & Yücel, 2006). The 
study of interactions between attention and memory biases at a 
neurological level could lead to compelling insight into the interplay 
between cognitive biases (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). The emerging 
integrative (gene-by-environment) views on depression allow further 
exploration of the interplay among genes, neurocircuitry, and stress in 
relation to multiple cognitive biases. 
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Modification of Cognitive Biases 
Knowing how cognitive biases interact may allow us to 
understand and address some of the difficulties depressed people 
encounter during therapy in developing new and more flexible ways of 
thinking (D. A. Clark et al., 1999). Cognitive biases may hinder the 
effectiveness of verbal information transmission when individuals are 
severely depressed. That is, concentration, attention, and memory 
deficits in combination with emotion-specific biases can counteract 
therapeutic interventions in that encoding, consolidation, and retrieval 
of information could be strongly favored towards schema-congruent 
information (Baert, Koster, & De Raedt, 2011).  
Given the maintaining role of emotional processing biases, it is 
important to consider the potential value of targeted cognitive training 
that can either train neural structures known to be impaired in 
depression (Calkins et al., 2014; Schweizer et al., 2013; Siegle et al., 
2007) or modify emotion-specific biases in attention (Baert, De Raedt, 
Schacht, et al., 2010; Browning et al., 2012; Cooper et al., 2014; Wells 
& Beevers, 2010; Yang et al., 2014), interpretation (Blackwell & Holmes, 
2010; Bowler et al., 2012; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Lang et al., 
2012; Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), or memory (Joormann, Hertel, 
LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009; Raes et al., 2009). These cognitive bias 
modification (CBM) methodologies target specific cognitive processes 
by exposing participants to experimentally established contingencies 
during a task designed to encourage the acquisition or attenuation of a 
certain bias (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). Notwithstanding 
promising findings, the number of CBM studies in depression needs to 
be extended and enlarged (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009).  
Future improvement of CBM procedures and, in particular, 
their implementation into clinical practice may benefit from insights 
gained from studies investigating the CCBH. For example, if the impact 
of a particular cognitive bias on another cognitive process and 
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depressive symptoms differs depending on the depression phase, the 
preferred CBM intervention should be chosen accordingly. Moreover, 
depending on the precise interplay among cognitive biases in 
depression (e.g., unidirectional, reciprocal relations), the optimal 
training program might not only depend on the targeted aspect of 
information processing (i.e., attention, interpretation, memory, 
cognitive control) but also on the number of targeted cognitive biases. 
If various biases operate in a reciprocal manner, one might have to train 
multiple biases simultaneously to efficiently obtain clinically significant 
and enduring symptomatic improvement. In this regard, promising 
findings have been reported by pilot studies combining attention and 
interpretation bias training in community (Beard, Weisberg, & Amir, 
2011) and clinically anxious outpatient (Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, 
Sillence, & MacKintosh, 2011) samples. Both studies observed 
decreases on self-report or behavioral measures of anxiety. CCBH 
research has major implications for future CBM applications. 
As these training methodologies find their way to clinical 
practice, they will likely be combined with other approaches to modify 
biases (e.g., medication, cognitive therapy). Note that different 
interventions may change biases for emotional information through 
distinct mechanisms (Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010) and may 
not always interact as expected. For instance, a study examining effects 
of citalopram combined with attention bias modification in healthy 
participants, found that the combined interventions were less effective 
in inducing a positive bias than each individual intervention (Browning 
et al., 2011). This warrants specific research on processes affected by 
cognitive training methods to optimize combinations of treatment 
strategies. 
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Conclusion 
We argue for an approach that considers interactions between 
cognitive biases. Current empirical evidence suggests that depression-
related biases in attention, interpretation, and memory are related. 
However, research on this topic is at the beginning stages. Future 
research could be guided by the outlined research questions and 
cognitive frameworks of depression. Our understanding of this disorder 
and its treatment will benefit from research that adopts an integrative 
perspective to multifactorial risk factors in depression. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Attending to Remember 
 
 
 
Every day people are confronted with memories of prior 
emotionally significant events, feelings, and thoughts. For example, a 
simple job ad in the newspaper may trigger a person’s memory of a prior 
job interview with the attached pleasant and/or unpleasant emotions 
(e.g., feelings of stress/relief before/after the interview). While healthy 
persons typically recall more positive aspects (e.g., “I passed the first 
round of interviews”), depressed persons tend to recall negative aspects 
tied to that event (e.g., “I failed to address one of the questions”). 
However, the mechanisms underlying this differential recall of 
emotional information are currently not well understood. In an attempt 
to cast light on the processes involved in the encoding and retrieval of 
emotional material, the experiments reported in this chapter 
investigated how attention operations modulate encoding and retrieval 
of emotional interpretations to regulate what is remembered. 
Cognitive Biases During Emotional Memory Encoding 
Prior research has made considerable progress by showing that 
emotional biases in attention and interpretation during encoding 
predict congruent biases in long-term memory (Everaert, Koster, & 
Derakshan, 2012). However, current understanding of the functional 
relations among attention, interpretation, and memory biases is limited 
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in that no research examined these three biases in one single study. We 
lack a comprehensive insight into the interplay among cognitive biases 
and the time course of effects. That is, it remains unclear how healthy 
and depressed individuals direct their attention while elaborating and 
interpreting emotional information and how this sets the stage for 
emotional biases in memory. Note, that attention is not a unitary 
mechanism (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011) and emotional 
biases in distinct operations of attention (e.g., attentional selection, 
sustained attention) might have differential relations with other 
cognitive processes (e.g., interpretation, recollection). Attention 
mechanisms that determine which information is processed (i.e., the 
selection mechanism) might be strongly related to subsequent 
interpretation of this information and only weakly to memory for the 
encoded information. This is because selection alone might not 
determine how well but only which information is processed and, 
therefore, it does not necessarily lead to better memory. In line with this 
idea, some cognitive models of depression propose that emotional 
biases in attention influence how occurring events are interpreted 
through selection of competing information for further interpretation 
which in turn controls what will be remembered (Joormann, Yoon, & 
Zetsche, 2007; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). In other 
words, these models predict that selection mechanisms of attention 
regulate memory via their influence on interpretation. In another way, 
attention operations that are involved in how extensively relevant 
material is processed (i.e., sustained attention) might be strongly 
related to the extent to which this information is recalled. Similarly, 
several cognitive models of depression emphasize the role of biases in 
sustained attention mechanisms during elaboration on emotional 
information in improving memory for negative material (Ingram, 1984; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). In explaining emotional 
biases in memory, these models attribute a central role to attention 
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biases at the later or elaboration processing stages, with attention 
affecting the processing of emotional information in the absence of 
overt competition and not at the selection of competing information. 
It is clear that various cognitive frameworks of depression make 
different predictions on the complex interplay among attention, 
interpretation, and memory biases. Attentional selection and sustained 
attention may regulate emotional memory in different ways. To 
improve understanding of the relations among these biased cognitive 
processes, we set out two experiments to investigate their interplay 
during incidental encoding of emotional material. 
Experiment 11 
The first study was designed as a proof-of-principle test of the 
combined cognitive biases hypothesis with respect to the dependence 
of memory on emotional biases in attention and interpretation. 
Following predictions by cognitive views on depression (Clark, Beck, & 
Alford, 1999; Ingram, 1984; Joormann et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988, 
1997), we modeled functional relations among distinct attention 
operations, interpretation, and memory biases through path analysis. 
This powerful data-analytic technique allows a comprehensive test of 
sets of a priori hypothesized pathways between multiple variables. We 
built a first path model (Model 1) in which a bias in selective orienting 
of attention is associated with interpretation bias, which is in turn 
associated with memory bias. We added links between depression levels 
and the processing biases to account for depressive symptom levels in 
explaining associations between biases. In a second path model (Model 
2), depression levels are related to negative biases in sustained 
attention and elaboration processes which are in turn related to 
                                                             
1 Based on Everaert, J., Duyck, W., & Koster, E.H.W. (2014). Attention, interpretation, 
and memory biases in subclinical depression: A proof-of-principle test of the combined 
cognitive biases hypothesis. Emotion, 14(2), 331-340. doi: 10.1037/a0035250. 
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memory bias. To investigate the hypothesis that cognitive biases 
influence each other rather than operate as isolated mechanisms, 
Model 1 and 2 were contrasted with a path model in which attention, 
interpretation, and memory biases are individually tied to depressive 
symptom severity without any relations modeled between cognitive 
biases (Model 0). 
Cognitive processing biases were measured at multiple stages 
using a sequence of related cognitive tasks. Attention toward 
emotionally positive and negative material was assessed online using 
eye movement registration while subclinically depressed and non-
depressed participants performed a task to measure interpretative 
tendencies. Next, we tested explicit memory for the interpretations 
constructed. An asset of this study design is that the task conditions 
allow investigation of the online interplay among emotionally biased 
cognitive processes in a highly controlled, though ecologically-valid, 
experimental setting. Individuals actively select competing positive and 
negative information, elaborate on the target item relevant to the active 
process of making meaning and, by necessity, they focus attention on 
this information. Via a subsequent memory test for the constructed 
meanings, the paradigm enables a stringent investigation of whether 
emotional biases in attention operations and interpretation are 
reflected in memory for the encountered emotional material. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-one undergraduate students (62 women, age range: 17-
33) were recruited for this study. Recruitment was based on Beck 
Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van 
der Does, 2002) scores obtained in a prescreening. Six participants 
reported use of antidepressant medication. All participants were native 
Dutch speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were 
compensated a course credit or 10 euro. 
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Depressive symptom severity 
The BDI-II measured severity of depressive symptoms via 21 
items rated on a scale from 0 to 3. This self-report measure has good 
reliability and validity in both healthy and depressed samples (Beck et 
al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002). The internal consistency was α=.92 in 
this study. At testing, BDI-II scores ranged from 0 to 40, with 39 
individuals reporting minimal, 12 mild, 15 moderate, and 5 severe 
symptom levels. A mean score of 13.56 (SD=9.57) was observed. 
Stimuli 
A set of 105 Dutch scrambled sentences (60 emotional, 45 
neutral sentences) was used as stimuli. Emotional scrambled sentences 
retrieved from Van der Does (2005) were modified to control for 
psycholinguistic variables that are known to influence eye movements 
(Rayner, 1998). Each emotional scrambled sentence presents one 
positive and one negative target word (e.g., “winner” and “loser” in “am 
winner born loser a I”), that were matched between valence categories 
on word length, word class, and CELEX-based word frequency using 
WordGen (Duyck, Desmet, Verbeke, & Brysbaert, 2004). Paired 
samples t-tests showed no significant differences between negative and 
positive target words on these lexical variables (all p-s>.05)2. Word 
position within each scrambled sentence was randomized such that 
emotional words did not occur next to each other, nor as the first or last 
word within a scrambled sentence. This controls for parafoveal 
processing of adjoining words (Schotter, Angele, & Rayner, 2012) and 
wrap-up effects (Rayner, Kambe, & Duffy, 2000) which might influence 
fixations on emotional target words. The positive word was also 
presented before the negative word in half of the scrambled sentences. 
Word order criteria imposed on emotional scrambled sentences were 
                                                             
2 Word length: Mnegative=8.42 (SD=1.90), Mpositive=8.37 (SD=2.12); Word frequency (log 
frequency per million): Mnegative=1.07 (SD=0.56), Mpositive=1.22 (SD=0.69). 
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also applied to neutral target words (e.g., “cinema” and “theatre” in “the 
I theatre visit cinema often”) in neutral scrambled sentences. All 
scrambled sentences were self-referent and six words long. 
Assessment of cognitive biases 
Attention bias. Emotional biases in attention were measured 
via eye movement registration during stimulus display trial parts of the 
interpretation task (see below). This methodology enables online 
measurement of visual attention and provides multiple valid 
parameters to index this cognitive process within the current task 
(reading) setting (Rayner, 1998). For this study, the total fixation 
frequency (i.e., total number of fixations) and total fixation duration 
(i.e., summation of the duration across fixations) on the target words in 
the scrambled sentences (the areas of interest) served as dependent 
variables. These parameters are commonly reported indices of 
attention bias sensitive to individual differences in depressive 
symptoms (Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & Wells, 2008; Leyman, De Raedt, 
Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011) and reflect different attentional 
mechanisms (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Specifically, the fixation 
frequency parameter measures (re)orienting of attention and the 
fixation duration parameter measures sustained attention. Relative 
bias scores were calculated within-subjects. The total fixation frequency 
on negative words was divided by the total fixation frequency on 
emotional (positive and negative) words in the emotional scrambled 
sentences. Analogous calculations were made to obtain a relative bias 
index for the fixation duration. Note that the relative indices also 
control for inter-individual baseline fixation differences due to inter-
individual variability in reading performance. 
Interpretation bias. A computerized version of the Scrambled 
Sentences Test (SST) (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) was used to measure 
individual differences in the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information as either negative or positive. Prior studies with this task 
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revealed differences in interpretative tendencies between depressed 
and non-depressed people (Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Rude, Wenzlaff, 
Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002). In this study, each trial started with a 
fixation point at the left side of the screen (to elicit left-to-right reading) 
followed by a stimulus display depicting either a neutral or an 
emotional scrambled sentence. Each sentence was presented at the 
center of the screen on a single line in black mono-spaced lowercase 
Arial (font size 25pt) against a white background. In the display part of 
the trial, participants unscrambled the presented stimulus mentally and 
as quickly as possible to form grammatically correct and meaningful 
statements using five of the six words (e.g., “I often visit the theatre” or 
“I am a born winner”). Upon completion, participants pressed a button 
to continue to the response part of the trial. Each scrambled sentence 
was displayed for maximum 8 s and the task automatically continued 
to the response trial part once the time limit had been expired. In the 
response part, each word of the scrambled sentence was presented 
along with a number. To reduce social desirable responses, participants 
reported their unscrambled sentence using the corresponding numbers. 
The response trial part was skipped when a participant did not create a 
sentence in time during the display part (5% of the trials). Figure 1 
presents the flow of events in a single trail. 
The task comprised a practice and a test phase. The practice 
part included 5 trials of neutral scrambled sentences to familiarize 
participants with the task. The test part included 100 trials equally 
dispersed over 10 blocks. Each block contained 6 emotional and 4 
neutral stimuli presented in a fixed order for each participant. No more 
than two emotional scrambled sentences were presented consecutively 
in a block to reduce priming effects. A cognitive load procedure was also 
added to prevent social desirable report strategies. As in previous 
research with the SST (Rude et al., 2002), participants memorized a 6-
digit-number before each block (presented for 5 s) to be recalled at the 
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end of the block. Interpretation bias was indexed by the ratio of 
negatively unscrambled sentences over the total correctly completed 
emotional sentences. 
 
 
 
Memory bias. In the incidental free recall test, participants 
were asked to recall the sentences that they had constructed during the 
SST as accurately as possible. A maximum of 5 minutes was allowed for 
this task. Emotional biases in memory were calculated by dividing the 
number of recalled negatively unscrambled sentences by the total 
number of unscrambled emotional sentences recalled. 
Eye tracking 
The experimental task was programmed in SR Research 
Experiment Builder and a tower-mounted Eyelink 1000 eye tracking 
device (SR Research, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) recorded gaze 
behavior. Viewing was binocular and eye movements were registered 
from the right eye only. Fixations were sampled every millisecond and 
were only considered when longer than 50ms (shorter fixations reflect 
anticipatory saccades) (Rayner, Sereno, Morris, Schmauder, & Clifton, 
1989). Areas of interest areas were the negative and positive target 
words in emotional scrambled sentences and the neutral target words 
in neutral scrambled sentences. 
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Procedure 
Participants were seated 60 cm from the monitor in a height-
adjustable chair. A forehead rest of the eye-tracker minimized head 
movements. Participants started with the interpretation task which was 
combined with eye tracking. A 9-point grid calibration procedure was 
repeated before each block of the interpretation task and drifts from 
proper calibration were checked at the start of each trial. The system 
was recalibrated as necessary. The experimenter recorded the 
participants’ verbal responses (i.e., coded unscrambled sentences, 
cognitive load) manually without providing feedback. Participants were 
given the opportunity to take a short break after each test block to 
ensure optimal concentration. After the interpretation task, 
participants continued with the incidental free recall test and filled out 
the BDI-II. The experimental session lasted approximately 70 min. 
Statistical analyses 
Data analysis comprised two steps. First, we calculated 
bivariate correlations between cognitive bias indices and depression 
scores to examine associations among these variables. Next, different 
path models were fitted by full information maximum likelihood 
estimation using the SEM package in R (Fox, 2006). As described in the 
introduction, in Model 0, we used BDI-II scores to predict biases in 
attention, interpretation, and memory without any relations among 
these cognitive biases. Model 1 also included a chain from attentional 
selection bias (relative fixation frequency) over interpretation bias to 
memory bias. In Model 2, BDI-II scores predict sustained attention 
biases (relative fixation duration) and interpretation, which are both 
associated with biases in memory.  
Model fit was evaluated with different types of fit measures 
sensitive to model misspecification and less affected by sample size. In 
particular, we used the χ²-test, the Root-Mean-Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA), and the Standard Root Mean Squared 
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Residuals (SRMR) as indexes of overall model fit, the Confirmatory Fit 
Index (CFI) and Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) as incremental fit 
indices, and, finally, the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) as a 
parsimony fit measure. A well-fitting model has a non-significant test 
statistic on the χ² test (p>.05), an RMSEA value lower than or equal to 
0.06, an SRMR value less than .08, as well as values on the NNFI and 
CFI that exceed 0.95 (West, Taylor, & Wu, 2012). When path models 
attained a good model fit, a χ² difference test was conducted and the 
parsimony of both models was compared using the AIC values favoring 
the model with a lower value. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations between cognitive biases and 
depression. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 BDI-II M (SD) 
1. Attentional selection – .49*** .34** .18 .27* 49.94 (4.36) 
2. Sustained attention  – .22† .35** .25* 50.29 (3.34) 
3. Interpretation bias   – .54*** .61*** 33.63 (18.41) 
4. Memory bias    – .33** 29.72 (26.72) 
Notes. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; †p<.10. 
 
Results 
Associations among cognitive biases 
The correlation pattern is supportive for associations among 
depression scores, attention, interpretation, and memory biases (see 
Table 1). Individuals with more severe symptoms fixate more frequently 
and longer on negative information, endorse more negative than 
positive meanings, and recall relatively more negative sentences. 
Interestingly, differential correlations emerged between different 
attentional mechanisms and processing biases in interpretation and 
memory. Attentional selection bias correlated with interpretation bias 
but not with memory bias, whereas sustained attention bias correlated 
with memory bias and marginally significant with interpretation bias. 
The attention biases were positively correlated. 
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The BDI-II scores did not correlate with fixation frequency on 
neutral words, r=-.06, p>.05, nor with fixation durations on neutral 
words, r=.01, p>.05. This indicates that baseline fixation indices, and 
thus reading times, did not differ with respect to levels of depressive 
symptom severity. 
 
 
 
Functional relations among cognitive biases 
To address the main research question, the constructed path 
models assuming interrelations among biased cognitive processes 
(Model 1 and Model 2) were fitted and compared to a competing path 
model in which functional relations between biases were omitted 
(Model 0). Figures 2 and 3 depict the tested path models with the 
estimates of the path coefficients. 
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Model 1 versus Model 0. Path analysis yielded a good fit for 
Model 1, χ²(2)<1, p=0.9996, CFI=1, NNFI=1.10 and RMSEA=0, 
SRMR=.001, AIC=16.00. Inspecting the path coefficients, depression 
levels (BDI-II) predicted both selection bias, γ11=.27 (SE=.12), p<.05, 
and interpretation bias, γ21=.56 (SE=.10), p<.001, but not memory bias, 
γ31 = -0.01 (SE=.13), p=.93. As expected, biased attentional selection 
was associated with interpretation bias, β21=.19 (SE=.10), p<.05, which 
in turn was associated with memory bias, β32=.55 (SE=.13), p<.001. In 
support of the combined cognitive biases hypothesis, a poor fit for 
Model 0 was observed on all fit measures, χ²(4)=20.34, p<.001, 
CFI=.73, NNFI=0.60, RMSEA=0.24, SRMR=.13, AIC=32.34, though 
the modeled pathways were significant. 
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Model 2 versus Model 0. Path analysis revealed an excellent fit 
for Model 2 on all fit indices, χ²(3)<1, p=.87, CFI=1, NNFI=1.07, 
RMSEA=0, SRMR=.03, AIC=14.68. Depression (BDI-II) scores were 
significantly associated with sustained attention bias, γ11=.25 (SE=.12), 
p<.05, and interpretation bias, γ21=.61 (SE=.09), p<.001. Both 
sustained attention, β31=.24 (SE=.10), p<.05, and interpretation bias, 
β32=.49 (SE=.10), p<.001, were in turn associated with memory bias. 
Providing evidence for the combined cognitive biases hypothesis, a poor 
model fit for Model 0, χ²(4)=22.88, p<.001, CFI=.70, NNFI=0.55, 
RMSEA=0.26, SRMR=.14, AIC=34.88, was observed. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 tested the dependence of emotional memory bias 
on distinct attention operations and interpretation. The results showed 
significant correlations between cognitive biases and depressive 
symptom severity and path analyses revealed that models with the 
predicted functional relations between processing biases attained good 
and superior model fits compared to path models without functional 
relations between biases. These observations provide evidence for the 
combined cognitive biases hypothesis in a mixed sample of healthy and 
subclinically depressed individuals. These findings are discussed below. 
The present results lend support for associations among 
depression-linked biases at different levels of processing. As noted, 
cognitive models of depression (Clark et al., 1999; Joormann et al., 
2007; Williams et al., 1988) postulate that emotional biases emerge 
across different modalities of processing (i.e., attention, memory) and 
this should have an impact on cognitive tasks and bias measures. The 
findings demonstrate that individuals with elevated depressive 
symptoms allocate attention more frequently (attentional selection) 
and longer (sustained attention) to negative compared to positive 
material. Also, they make more negative interpretations and recall more 
negative than positive memories. Interestingly, the correlation pattern 
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also showed the expected differential relations among attention bias 
indices, interpretation, and memory. We found that the relative fixation 
frequency was correlated with interpretation bias, whereas the relative 
fixation duration was correlated with the extent to which negative 
interpretations were recalled. These eye tracking parameters thus tap 
into distinct attention operations (Chun et al., 2011), with the fixation 
frequency reflecting attentional selection and the fixation duration 
reflecting sustained attention. 
Evidence for the central tenet of the CCBH was obtained from 
substantial better model fits for path models including the predicted 
functional relations among cognitive biases compared to path models 
assuming independent cognitive processes. The findings show that 
emotional biases in distinct attention mechanisms and interpretation 
regulate what is remembered via different mechanisms. The modeled 
paths indicate that attentional selection of negative information is 
followed by more negative interpretations, because one has to actually 
look at the word one is choosing (i.e., select the relevant information) 
to complete the sentence (i.e., construct meaning). In turn, 
interpretation bias sets the stage for congruent biases in memory in that 
individuals who make more negative sentences will recall more of them. 
Memory bias reflects interpretive choices. Moreover, memory for 
emotional information was also related to emotional biases in sustained 
attention. A more severe bias in sustained attention predicted improved 
memory for negative material. Importantly, the modeled functional 
relations in Model 1 and Model 2 remained significant when accounting 
for each bias’ relation with depressive symptoms. This suggests that the 
observed relations among biases in attention, interpretation, and 
memory are not merely a by-product of influences of a joint third 
variable, being depressive symptom severity. 
These observations extend prior research in that they connect 
findings from research linking memory to interpretation bias (Hertel & 
Attending to remember 73  
 
El-Messidi, 2006; Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015; Salemink, Hertel, 
& Mackintosh, 2010; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011) and research 
linking memory to attention biases (Blaut, Paulewicz, Szastok, 
Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013; Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011; Koster, De 
Raedt, Leyman, & De Lissnyder, 2010). Thus, the accumulated 
empirical evidence for the modeled pathways supports competing 
theoretical claims by cognitive models of depression on interrelations 
among emotional processing biases and depression levels (Ingram, 
1984; Joormann et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988, 1997), prompting an 
integration of the different hypotheses. 
Several limitations of this study should be noted. The cross-
sectional design precludes conclusions regarding causality because 
third variables may account for the observed relations. Research should 
test the hypothesized direction of the modeled pathways via 
experimental manipulation (see chapter 4). Another limitation 
concerns features of the study design that forces the use of relative bias 
indices that compare the processing of positive versus negative material. 
This is because the emotional scrambled sentences have a different 
semantic context than the neutral scrambled sentences, which makes it 
difficult to compare eye movements across emotional and neutral 
sentences. Although this approach cannot determine whether the 
observed effects are driven by a greater emphasis on negative material 
or a lack of responsiveness to positive material, research has shown that 
relative bias indices might be robust markers of depression-associated 
processing (Shane & Peterson, 2007).  
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Experiment 23 
Experiment 2 aimed to substantiate the indirect effect of 
attention bias on memory via interpretation. A sequence of well-
established experimental paradigms with similar stimuli across the 
tasks was used to measure attention, interpretation, and memory biases. 
This allows investigation of how encountered information is selected 
throughout several processing stages and a rigorous test of the indirect 
effect hypothesis. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduate students (56 women, age range: 17-
48) were recruited. Participants were selected based on self-reported 
depressive symptoms assessed by the Beck Depression Inventory – II 
(BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002) obtained in a screening. 
Participants received a course credit. 
Depressive symptom severity 
The BDI-II measures depressive symptom severity through 21 
items. The questionnaire has good reliability and validity in both 
healthy and subclinically depressed samples (Beck et al., 1996; Van der 
Does, 2002). The internal consistency was α=.86 in this study. At 
testing, BDI-II scores ranged from 0 to 40, with 31 individuals reporting 
minimal, 15 mild, 14 moderate, and 4 severe symptom levels.  
Assessment of cognitive biases 
Attention bias. Selective attention was measured via a Posner 
cueing task modeled after Koster et al. (2010). The task was 
                                                             
3 Based on Everaert, J., Tierens, M., Uzieblo, K., & Koster, E.H.W. (2013). The indirect 
effect of attention bias on memory via interpretation bias: Evidence for the combined 
cognitive bias hypothesis in subclinical depression. Cognition & Emotion, 27(8), 1450-
1459. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2013.787972. 
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programmed and presented using Inquisit 3 (Millisecond Software 
LLC., Seattle, WA, USA). On each trial, a black fixation cross was 
presented for 500 ms at the center of the screen (white background) 
which was flanked by two black rectangles (2.86° width by 7.63° length). 
The center of the rectangles was 7.63° from fixation. Next, a cue word 
(either positive, neutral, or negative in valence; see below) written in 
uppercase letters (Times New Roman, size 35) was presented for 1500 
ms in the middle of one of the rectangles. Then, a target (a black square, 
0.67° × 0.67°) appeared 50 ms after cue offset (CTOA=1550) in the 
same (i.e., valid trials) or opposite (i.e., invalid trials) location of the cue 
word. Participants were instructed to locate the target (left/right 
decision), as fast and accurately as possible, by pressing the 
corresponding key on a standard AZERTY keyboard. The target 
remained on-screen until a response was recorded. The next trial 
started immediately after a response was registered. 
The task presented a 15 practice trials followed by 2 test blocks 
of each 120 test trials and 6 catch trials. On test trials, there was a 50/50 
ratio of valid and invalid trials. Thus, cue words were not predictive of 
the target’s location. Cue words were presented in random order either 
at the left or right hemifield with an equal number of presentations for 
each cue word. On catch trials, a digit from 1 to 3 replaced the fixation 
point for 100ms prompting participants to report the number using the 
numerical keypad. Catch trails were included to test whether 
participants maintained gaze on the fixation point throughout the task. 
Similar to Baert, De Raedt, and Koster (2010), an attention bias index 
was calculated by subtracting the cue validity (cue validity: RTinvalid cue – 
RTvalid cue) of neutral trials from the cue validity of negative trials 
(CVnegative – CVneutral). 
As cues, 20 positive (e.g., winner, happy) and 20 negative (e.g., 
loser, sad) cue words were drawn from the interpretation bias task (i.e., 
the emotional words in the scrambled sentences test; see below) to use 
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similar stimulus materials across cognitive tasks. In addition, 20 
neutral cue words were retrieved from an earlier study (Koster et al., 
2010). The cue valence categories were matched on word length (in 
number of letters; negative words: M = 7.6, SD = 1.60; neutral words: 
M=8.00, SD=1.49; positive words: M = 8.30, SD = 1.42) as indicated by 
non-significant t-tests (all p-s>.05).  
Interpretation bias. A paper-and-pencil scrambled sentences 
test (SST) (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998) assessed positive and negative 
tendencies to interpret ambiguous information. Participants 
unscrambled sentences using five of the six words to form 
grammatically correct and meaningful statements (e.g., looks the future 
bright very dismal). By reporting the unscrambled sentence that comes 
to mind first (by putting a number above the word), a sentence is 
resolved in either a positive (e.g., the future looks very bright) or a 
negative (e.g., the future looks very dismal) manner. Twenty 
unscrambled sentences designed to tap into depression-relevant 
themes were retrieved from experiment 1. Participants received 2.5 
minutes to complete the task.  
A cognitive load procedure was added to prevent social 
desirable report strategies (see also experiment 1). At start, all 
participants memorized a 6-digit-number to be recalled at the end of 
the task. A negative bias in interpretation was indexed by the ratio of 
negatively unscrambled sentences over the total correctly completed 
emotional sentences.  
Memory bias. In the incidental free recall test, participants 
received 5 min to recall the unscrambled sentences they constructed 
during the SST as accurately as possible. An unscrambled sentence was 
coded as a correctly recalled if it matched the sentence reported during 
the interpretation task in terms of valence (i.e., positive or negative), 
target word (e.g., bright, dismal), quantifier (e.g., very), and topic (e.g., 
future). Negative biases in memory were calculated by dividing the 
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number of recalled negatively unscrambled sentences by the total 
number of emotional unscrambled sentences recalled. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 20 students in a room 
designed for testing large groups. They were seated approximately 60 
cm from the monitor. All participants started with the Posner cueing 
task, followed by the SST, and, after a short break (to minimize primacy 
and recency effects on recall), the incidental free recall test. Then, 
participants filled out the BDI-II. The experimental session lasted 
approximately 60 min.  
 
 
 
Data preparation and statistical analyses 
Data from the Posner cueing task was trimmed by discarding 
trials with errors, removing participants (n=3) who exhibited a high 
level of erroneous responding on catch trials (> 3 SD from M=.04%.). 
Also responses reflecting anticipatory (RTs < 200 ms) and delayed (RT > 
750 ms) responding were removed (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2010) as 
well as outliers (RTs deviating more than 3 SD from the M per trial type). 
Analyses were performed on 96.42% of the data. 
78  Chapter 2 
 
The main analysis examined the indirect effect model with 
attention bias as an independent variable, interpretation bias as an 
intervening variable, and memory bias as a dependent variable. Figure 
4 depicts the tested model. To examine whether the conditions of an 
indirect effect model were met, we tested the significance of the indirect 
effect (path a × b), the total effect (i.e., effect of attention bias on 
memory bias without taking interpretation bias into account; path c) 
and the direct effect (i.e., effect of attention bias on memory bias 
variable after controlling for interpretation bias; path c’). Evidence for 
an indirect effect hypothesis is provided by a significant indirect effect 
and both non-significant total and direct effects (Mathieu & Taylor, 
2006). Note that there are theoretical reasons to expect that both paths 
c and c’ would be non-significant (several cognitive models do not 
postulate a direct influence of attention on memory bias).  
The indirect effect was directly tested using a bootstrapping 
approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). By relying on confidence intervals 
to determine the significance of the indirect effect, this statistical 
method avoids problems associated with traditional approaches (e.g., 
unrealistic assumptions regarding multivariate normality) (Hayes, 
2009). In this study, we estimated 5000 bias-corrected bootstrap 95% 
confidence intervals which should not contain 0 for the indirect effect 
to be significant. 
Results 
Correlational analysis 
Significant correlations were found between attention and 
interpretation bias, r=.25, p<.05, and between interpretation and 
memory bias, r=.73, p<.001. Attention bias did not correlate with 
memory bias, r=.01, p>.05. Moreover, depressive symptom severity 
correlated with interpretation, r=.77, p<.001, and with memory bias, 
r=.51, p<.001, but not with attention bias, r=.19, p>.05.  
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Importantly, skewness (S) and kurtosis (K) statistics (z-scores) 
indicated no substantial deviations from normality for the critical 
variables: depression levels, S=1.87, K=0.58, emotional biases in 
attention, S=1.28, K=0.54, interpretation, S=1.98, K=-0.73, and 
memory, S=1.42, K=-1.71. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for non-depressed (BDI-
II<14) and subclinically depressed (BDI-II>13) participants. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for depression groups. 
 Non-depressed Subclinical 
 M SD M SD 
Age 20.41 6.36 19.22 1.54 
m/f 3/26  4/28  
BDI-II 8.29 4.04 21.76 6.28 
Attention (RTs) 
Negative valid  
Negative invalid 
Positive valid  
Positive invalid 
Neutral valid  
Neutral invalid 
 
381 
366 
377 
370 
378 
366 
 
57 
48 
54 
57 
55 
56 
 
372 
363 
374 
364 
376 
363 
 
49 
42 
46 
47 
49 
46 
Interpretation 
Relative bias (%) 
no. positive 
no. negative 
 
20.69 
9.81 
2.39 
 
16.85 
3.52 
1.63 
 
46.73 
6.64 
5.97 
 
21.68 
3.25 
3.58 
Memory 
Relative bias (%) 
no. positive 
no. negative 
 
31.97 
2.58 
1.00 
 
35.77 
1.65 
1.03 
 
50.14 
1.88 
1.82 
 
33.63 
1.27 
1.26 
Notes. Relative bias indexes compare positive versus negative 
material; Age data of 4 participants are missing. 
 
Bias-corrected bootstrapping analysis 
Bias-corrected bootstrapping revealed that the indirect effect of 
attention bias on memory bias via interpretation bias was positive 
(indirect effect coefficient = .12) and statistically different from zero 
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(p<.05). The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval was entirely 
above zero, 95% CI = [.004, .270]. Both the total effect, c=.06, t=0.77, 
p=.44, and the direct effect, c’1=-.06, t=-1.02, p=.31, were not significant. 
These results support the hypothesis of an indirect effect of attention 
on memory bias via interpretation bias.  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 aimed to test specific functional relations 
between emotional biases in attention, interpretation, and memory in a 
mixed sample of non-depressed and subclinically depressed individuals. 
The main finding was that a negative bias in attention has an indirect 
effect on memory via interpretation. The reported evidence for this 
indirect effect model lends further support for predictions by cognitive 
models of depression (Clark et al., 1999; Joormann et al., 2007; 
Williams et al., 1988). These models postulate that cognitive biases 
emerge at different levels of processing and influence each other such 
that a negative bias at one level affects the further processing of this 
information at other levels. In line with the combined cognitive biases 
hypothesis, our data suggests that attention to emotional information 
regulates interpretation of this information which in turn improves 
memory for this material. Memory bias reflects interpretative choices: 
when depressed people make more negative interpretations, they are 
more likely to recall these meanings. Interpretation bias in turn reflects 
biases in attention in that the selected (negative) information is 
processed or interpreted. 
One finding that needs to be addressed is that there was no 
relation between depressive symptom severity and attention bias, 
though the predicted relations between interpretation and memory 
were observed. This is not in line with the majority of previous studies 
using an emotional Posner cueing task (De Raedt & Koster, 2010), but 
note that some researchers also failed to find depression-related 
attention biases with this task (Koster, Leyman, De Raedt, & Crombez, 
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2006). Although depressive symptom levels were not related to 
attention bias, the bias index of this cognitive process was related to 
congruent biases in interpretation, which was correlated with 
depression scores. This indicates that, even when not related to 
depressive symptoms in this study, an emotional bias in attention 
(which is the gate of all incoming information) is of importance through 
its influence on other cognitive processes that are related to depressive 
symptoms. 
Some limitations of the present investigation should be 
acknowledged. First, as in experiment 1, the cross-sectional study 
design does not allow conclusions regarding the direction of the 
modeled relations between cognitive biases. Although features of our 
study design (i.e., temporal sequence of processes and tasks, similar 
stimulus materials across tasks) optimized conditions to test the 
indirect effect hypothesis and allow some confidence in the predicted 
chain of relations between cognitive biases, experimental manipulation 
is required to stringently test the direction of the effects. In this regard, 
cognitive bias modification techniques provide the tools to test the 
postulated causal relations (Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009). For 
example, to investigate the causal influence of attention bias on 
interpretation, investigators could manipulate attention allocation (e.g., 
either by training healthy individuals to attend to positive or negative 
information, or by training depressed individuals to attend away from 
negative and toward positive information) and examine differences 
between the conditions in interpretative tendencies. The data reported 
here suggests that training an emotional bias in attention would result 
in congruent biases in interpretation. Our results may provide an 
impetus for future research to test the direction of the relations through 
experimental manipulation (see chapter 4). 
Other limitations involve the low number of men in this sample. 
Although the gender distribution was representative for an 
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undergraduate university college, it may limit the generalizability of the 
findings to men. Given gender differences in the risk of depression 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Hilt, 2009), future research could investigate 
gender differences in the interplay between vulnerability mechanisms 
underlying the disorder (e.g., how cognitive biases are involved in 
gender differences in rumination). 
In sum, the findings from experiment 2 converge with results 
from experiment 1 providing evidence for a model in which attentional 
selection predicted interpretation bias which was in turn related to 
memory bias. The data of experiment 2 replicates the indirect effect of 
attention on memory via interpretation, using a covert attention task to 
index emotional biases in attention. 
Cognitive Biases During Emotional Memory Retrieval4 
Despite recent advances in knowledge on how attention at 
encoding regulates emotional long-term memory, little is known about 
the role of attention during emotional memory retrieval. Prior research 
on attentional influences on retrieval of emotional material has 
produced mixed results. One study using a concurrent task to divide 
attention observed that the emotion-enhanced memory effect was not 
influenced by divided attention at retrieval (Clark-Foos & Marsh, 
2008), indicating that retrieval of emotional material can occur 
successfully in the absence of focused attention. However, another 
study reported that the enhancement effect disappeared with divided 
attention (Maddox, Naveh-Benjamin, Old, & Kilb, 2012), suggesting 
that emotional memory retrieval is an attentionally-demanding 
process. Similarly, basic cognitive science studies applying a divided 
attention paradigm has also yielded inconsistent findings on the role of 
                                                             
4 Based on Everaert, J., & Koster, E.H.W. (in press) The interaction between emotional 
attention, encoding, and retrieval of ambiguous information: An eye-tracking study. 
Emotion. doi: 10.1037/emo0000063. 
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attention during recall of neutral material (Fernandes & Moscovitch, 
2000; Naveh-Benjamin, Kilb, & Fisher, 2006).  
The extent to which attention during retrieval affects memory 
may depend on the retrieval process, namely recollection versus 
familiarity (Dudukovic, Dubrow, & Wagner, 2009). Recollection (i.e., 
retrieval of specific details about the prior occurrence of an item) and 
familiarity (i.e., a sense of having encountered an item without 
retrieving specific details) rely on at least partly different cognitive and 
neural mechanisms (Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010). The former 
is attentionally-demanding while the latter can be largely automatic 
(Jacoby, 1991). Basic research suggest that divided attention during 
retrieval reduces memory for recollected items but leaves familiarity-
based retrieval intact (Hicks & Marsh, 2000). 
The distinction between recollection- and familiarity-based 
retrieval may also be key in emotional memory retrieval: controlled and 
automatic processes may differentially recruit emotional attention to 
guide memory search and retrieval. In support of this idea, studies have 
shown that emotional content (Ochsner, 2000) and affective states 
(Jermann, Van Der Linden, Laurençon, & Schmitt, 2009) influence 
memory retrieval by boosting recollection. However, no prior research 
has tested how attention is deployed toward retrieval cues that are used 
to guide memory search, and how this relates to the retrieved memory. 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 aimed to examine attention biases toward 
positive versus negative retrieval cues that are used to guide memory 
search in an eye-tracking task enabling assessment of attentional 
allocation to retrieval cues during recollection- and familiarity-based 
retrieval. It was hypothesized that: (1) attention bias during familiarity-
based retrieval will not be related to familiarity memory bias, while 
attention bias during recollection-based retrieval will be related to 
recollection memory bias; (2) sustained attention (i.e., assessed by 
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fixation durations on retrieval cues) and not attentional selection (i.e., 
assessed by the number of fixations on retrieval cues) bias during 
recollection-based retrieval will be related to recollection memory bias; 
and (3) sustained attention bias during recollection-based retrieval 
predicts recollection memory bias when controlling for encoding bias. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-nine undergraduate students (45 women; age: 18 – 32 
years) were recruited. All participants were native Dutch speakers with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were paid 10 euro. 
Stimuli 
Encoding task. A set of 30 emotional and 20 neutral scrambled 
sentences was drawn from experiment 1. The positive and negative 
target words presented in each emotional scrambled sentence (e.g., 
“winner” and “loser” in “am winner born loser a I”) were matched on 
word class, word length (Mpositive=8.50, SDpositive=2.24, Mnegative=8.50, 
SDnegative=1.91; t<1, p>.05), and word frequency (log frequency per 
million; Mpositive= 1.14, SDpositive=0.65, Mnegative=1.13, SDnegative=0.50; t<1, 
p>.05) using WordGen (Duyck et al., 2004). Word position within each 
scrambled sentence was randomized with the constraint that emotional 
words did not occur next to each other, nor as a first or last word within 
a scrambled sentence. This controls for parafoveal processing of 
adjoining words and wrap-up effects (Rayner et al., 2000). The positive 
word was presented before the negative word in 50% of the emotional 
scrambled sentences. Word order criteria imposed on emotional 
scrambled sentences were also applied to target words in neutral 
scrambled sentences (e.g., “cinema” and “theatre” in “the I theatre visit 
cinema often”). All scrambled sentences were self-referent and six 
words long. 
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Memory task. The 30 emotional and 20 neutral target word 
pairs of the scrambled sentences from encoding served as retrieval cues 
in the memory task. These ‘old’ items were mixed with an equal number 
of ‘new’ emotional and neutral distractor word pairs retrieved from the 
remaining set of scrambled sentences from experiment 1. The ‘new’ 
emotional target words pairs were matched on word class, word length 
(Mpositive=8.03, SDpositive=2.08, Mnegative=7.97, SDnegative=1.71; t<1, 
p>.05), and word frequency (log frequency per million; Mpositive= 1.33, 
SDpositive=0.74, Mnegative=1.14, SDnegative=0.62; t=1.03, p=.31). There were 
no differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ negative and positive target 
words (p-s>.05). 
Procedure 
Figure 5 depicts the trial events of each experimental task. 
Encoding task. Participants started with a computerized 
version of the scrambled sentences test (cf. experiment 1). On each trial, 
a neutral or emotional scrambled sentence was displayed following 
fixation (left-aligned to elicit left-to-right reading). While the item was 
on-screen, participants were instructed to unscramble the sentence into 
its two semantically different meanings using five of the six words (e.g., 
“am winner born loser a I” into “I am a born winner” and “I am a born 
loser”), to elaborate thoroughly on how each statement applied to them, 
and select the most self-relevant option. In contrast to standard task 
instructions used in experiment 1, here the instructions encouraged 
encoding of both sentences with one statement serving as the target 
cognition in the memory test. The task automatically continued after 30 
s or when participants pressed the spacebar. The next trial display 
presented the scrambled sentence with each word numbered 
prompting participants to verbally report the sentence selected using 
the numbers. 
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The complete task displayed emotional and neutral scrambled 
sentences in fixed random order, divided over 5 blocks of each 6 
emotional and 4 neutral sentences. No more than two emotional 
scrambled sentences were consecutively presented to minimize priming 
effects.5 As in prior research, a cognitive load procedure was added to 
each block to reduce social desirable responses: a six digit number had 
to be memorized before and recalled after a block (Rude et al., 2002). 
Retention interval. After encoding, participants worked for 3 
minutes on a digit–symbol substitution test of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale 3th edition (Wechsler, 1997). 
Memory task. Next, participants engaged in an incidental 
memory test. Here, each trial presented two cue words at the same 
eccentricity (5°) above or below central fixation. Cues were target words 
from the SST (e.g., “winner” and “loser” on test trials) or new words (e.g., 
“smart” and “stupid” on distractor trials). The on-screen position of 
positive and negative cues was counterbalanced. Test and distractor 
trials were presented in random order. 
While the cues were on-screen, participants were instructed to 
use the cues to search their memory to determine if they constructed 
sentences with the words during the previous task and to recall the 
sentence selected if they thought to have used them before. Participants 
continued by pressing the spacebar to describe their retrieval 
experience. Using a remember/know/new paradigm (Tulving, 1985) 
following recommendations by Migo, Mayes, and Montaldi (2012), 
participants judged if their retrieval was based on recollection versus 
familiarity, or whether the word pair was new using following options: 
“Type A” (i.e., Remember: the word pair cued the recall of details of the 
sentence selected), “Type B” (i.e., Know: a feeling that the word pair was 
previously encountered without recalling associated details from the 
                                                             
5 Neutral scrambled sentences served as control stimuli, and are not considered here. 
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prior exposure), or “New”. Next, participants specified the retrieved 
sentence (for Type A) or selected the cue that triggered the highest sense 
of familiarity (for Type B). Participants were trained prior to the task to 
ensure correct understanding of the distinct retrieval experiences. 
Attentional bias. Eye movements were recorded when 
scrambled sentences (encoding task) or retrieval cues (retrieval task) 
were on-screen to measure attention toward positive and negative 
words during encoding and retrieval, respectively. This methodology 
enables online assessment of attention while participants elaborate on 
self-relevant meanings and use cues to guide memory search.  
Eye tracking  
Experimental tasks were coded in SR Research Experiment 
Builder and eye movements were registered with a tower-mounted 
Eyelink 1000 device (SR Research, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada). 
Viewing was binocular and eye movements were recorded from the 
right eye. Fixations were sampled every millisecond and considered 
when longer than 50ms. Areas of interest were the negative and positive 
target/cue words in the encoding/memory task. 
Assessment of cognitive biases 
Attention bias indices reflecting processing of positive over 
negative material were computed for following variables: (1) attentional 
selection at encoding; (2) sustained attention at encoding; (3) 
attentional selection during familiarity-based retrieval; (4) attentional 
selection during recollection-based retrieval; (5) sustained attention 
during familiarity-based retrieval; (6) sustained attention during 
recollection-based retrieval. Bias indices, calculated within-subjects, 
were based on number of fixations and fixation durations on positive 
and negative words during the encoding and memory tasks (cf. 
experiment 1). The number of fixations on positive words was divided 
by the total number of fixations on positive and negative words to index 
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attentional selection bias. Analogous calculations led to a relative bias 
index for fixation duration to index sustained attention bias. These 
relative bias indices control for inter-individual baseline fixation 
differences due to inter-individual variability in reading performance.  
 
Table 3. Memory performance. 
 Negative items Positive items 
 Remember Know Remember Know 
Hits 2.65 (2.31) 0.86 (1.78) 8.96 (3.72) 6.57 (4.15) 
False alarms 0.02 (0.14) 0.47 (1.00) 0.31 (0.51) 2.08 (2.23) 
Misses 1.04 (1.47) 4.94 (2.25) 
Notes. The mean number of correct rejections was 24.35 (3.03); Scores 
are means with standard deviations between parentheses. 
 
Encoding bias was indexed by the ratio of selected positively 
unscrambled sentences over the total selected positive and negative 
sentences. Memory bias indices were computed based on the dual-
process signal detection model of recognition conceiving recollection as 
a threshold process and familiarity as a signal detection process 
(Yonelinas et al., 2010). The proportion of positive items out of all hits 
and false alarms was calculated separately for Remember (recollection) 
and Know (familiarity) reports as well as the proportion of misses and 
correct rejections (see Table 3). Following Yonelinas et al. (2010), a 
recollection memory bias index was calculated by subtracting the 
proportion of false remember (i.e., false alarms, misses) from correct 
remember (i.e., hits, correct rejections) responses. For familiarity 
memory bias, d’ was computed by subtracting z-transformed false 
alarm rates from z-transformed hit rates. Higher scores reflect a greater 
ability to discriminate encoded positive from distractor positive items 
relative to negative items.  
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Results 
Associations between cognitive biases 
Correlations between bias indices were inspected per retrieval 
process to test associations between attention bias during retrieval and 
memory bias. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and correlation 
coefficients. In line with hypotheses 1 and 2, the correlations between 
familiarity memory bias and each of the indices of attention bias during 
familiarity-based retrieval were not significantly different from zero. 
Regarding recollection-based retrieval, the correlation between 
memory bias and sustained attention bias was significantly different 
from zero, while the correlation between memory bias and attentional 
selection was not. The correlations between memory bias and the 
attention bias indexes were not significantly different for both 
familiarity-based (z=0.65, p=.52) and recollection-based (z=0.78, 
p=.43) processes. 
 
 
Table 4. Correlations between cognitive bias indices. 
 Encoding Retrieval 
M (SD) 
 ABs ABm EB ABs ABm 
Encoding       
ABs (%) —     50.45 (2.24) 
ABm (%) .43c —    51.49 (3.56) 
EB (%) .22 .34b —   79.59 (13.79) 
Familiarity       
ABs (%) .32b .23 .07 —  51.14 (5.87) 
ABm (%) .27a .14 -.03 .73d — 52.26 (7.34) 
MB (d’) -.24 -.03 -.25a -.05 .02 0.00 (1.35) 
Recollection       
ABs (%) .24 -.10 .02 —  54.50 (6.34) 
ABm (%) .07 -.09 .25a .67d — 55.27 (8.33) 
MB (threshold) .18 -.22 .14 .22 .31b 43.87 (38.84) 
Notes. Spearman's rank correlation coefficients are presented; ap<.10, 
bp<.05; cp<.01; dp<.001; ABs=attention selection bias; ABm=attentional 
maintenance bias; EB= encoding bias; MB=memory bias. 
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Note that attentional selection bias during encoding was not 
significantly different from 50%, t(48)=1.42, p=.16, indicating positive 
and negative words were fixated equally. This suggests compliance with 
the task instruction to consider the positively and negatively 
unscrambled statements. 
Does attentional bias regulate memory recollection? 
Hypothesis 3 was tested via a two-step hierarchical regression 
analysis on recollection memory bias scores with encoding bias and 
sustained attention bias during recollection-based retrieval entered in 
the first and second step, respectively. All predictors were z-
transformed and the dependent variable showed no substantial 
deviations from normality (skewedness=-0.57, kurtosis=-2.15). 
Collinearity statistics were within acceptable limits indicating low levels 
of multicollinearity (VIF-s<1.08, Tolerance-s>.93). Table 5 presents the 
statistical models tested. The results showed that encoding bias did not 
add to the model, F<1, p=.34. In line with the hypothesis, adding 
sustained attention bias scores in a second step significantly 
contributed to the model, explaining 8.9% of the variance in 
recollection memory bias, ΔF(1,46)=4.58, p<.05. The variables 
included in step 2 accounted in total for 10.8% of the variance, with 
sustained attention bias (β=.31, p<.05) but not encoding bias (β=.06, 
p=.71) as a significant predictor. 
 
Table 5. Hierarchical regression model predicting recollection bias. 
Predictor b SEb β t ΔR2 
Step 1 Constant 
Encoding bias 
0.48 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
 
.14 
4.83d 
0.96 
.019 
Step 2 Constant 
Encoding bias 
Sustained attention during retrieval 
-0.12 
0.00 
0.01 
0.30 
0.00 
0.01 
 
.06 
.31 
-0.39 
0.38 
2.14b 
.089b 
Notes. ap<.10; bp<.05; cp<.01; dp<.001. 
 
92  Chapter 2 
 
Discussion 
This study observed that attention bias during recollection-
based retrieval predicts accurate recollection of emotional material 
after controlling for encoding bias. This suggests that retrieval of 
emotional memories benefits from strategic allocation of attention 
toward appropriate retrieval cues during memory search. Interestingly, 
not attentional selection but sustained attention toward positive versus 
negative retrieval cues may regulate controlled emotional memory 
retrieval. That is, successful recollection memory depends on how long 
one focuses attention on a particular cue and not on attentional 
operations that select cues to guide memory search. Whereas attention 
may play a role in controlled, recollection-based retrieval, the current 
findings also indicate that attention toward retrieval cues does not 
modulate automatic, familiarity-based retrieval. Specifically, the results 
showed that the correlations between attentional biases at retrieval and 
familiarity memory bias were not significantly different from zero. 
The findings are consistent with prior research indicating that 
recollection- and familiarity-based processes differentially recruit 
attention to guide memory search (Hicks & Marsh, 2000) and may 
explain earlier contrasting findings supporting either automatic (Clark-
Foos & Marsh, 2008) or attention-demanding (Maddox et al., 2012) 
nature of emotional memory retrieval. Moreover, the observations 
extend prior research on attention biases during encoding in 
accounting for emotional memory (Talmi & McGarry, 2012) by showing 
that attention bias also regulates memory during controlled but not 
automatic retrieval. Sustained attention biases may regulate emotional 
memory during both encoding and retrieval stages. 
The study is not without limitations. First, the high number of 
female participants limits generalizability of the results to men. Second, 
measurement of attention via eye-tracking informs on overt attention 
and provides limited insight into covert attentional shifts. Finally, as in 
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experiment 1, the study design forces the use of relative bias indices that 
compare the processing of positive versus negative material. This 
approach cannot determine whether effects are driven by an emphasis 
on positive material or a lack of responsiveness to negative material. 
In conclusion, this study examined how emotional biases 
during memory retrieval regulate the recognition of emotional material. 
The data revealed that the influence of attention during emotional 
memory retrieval depends on the retrieval process and the attentional 
operation.  
94  Chapter 2 
 
References 
Armstrong, T., & Olatunji, B. O. (2012). Eye tracking of attention in the 
affective disorders: A meta-analytic review and synthesis. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 32(8), 704–723. 
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2012.09.004 
Baert, S., De Raedt, R., & Koster, E. H. W. (2010). Depression-related 
attentional bias: The influence of symptom severity and symptom 
specificity. Cognition & Emotion, 24(6), 1044–1052. 
doi:10.1080/02699930903043461 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck 
Depression Inventory - II. San Antonio, TX: Psychological 
Corporation. 
Blaut, A., Paulewicz, B., Szastok, M., Prochwicz, K., & Koster, E. H. W. 
(2013). Are attentional bias and memory bias for negative words 
causally related? Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 44(3), 293–299. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2013.01.002 
Chun, M. M., Golomb, J. D., & Turk-Browne, N. B. (2011). A taxonomy 
of external and internal attention. Annual Review of Psychology, 
62, 73–101. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100427 
Clark, D. A., Beck, A. T., & Alford, B. A. (1999). Scientific foundations of 
cognitive theory and therapy of depression. New York: John 
Willey and Sons Ltd. 
Clark-Foos, A., & Marsh, R. L. (2008). Recognition memory for 
valenced and arousing materials under conditions of divided 
attention. Memory (Hove, England), 16(May 2012), 530–537. 
doi:10.1080/09658210802007493 
De Raedt, R., & Koster, E. H. W. (2010). Understanding vulnerability 
for depression from a cognitive neuroscience perspective: A 
reappraisal of attentional factors and a new conceptual 
framework. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 10(1), 
50–70. doi:10.3758/CABN.10.1.50 
Attending to remember 95  
 
Dudukovic, N. M., Dubrow, S., & Wagner, A. D. (2009). Attention 
during memory retrieval enhances future remembering. Memory 
& Cognition, 37(7), 953–961. doi:10.3758/MC.37.7.953 
Duyck, W., Desmet, T., Verbeke, L. P. C., & Brysbaert, M. (2004). 
WordGen: A tool for word selection and nonword generation in 
Dutch, English, German, and French. Behavior Research 
Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36(3), 488–499. 
doi:10.3758/BF03195595 
Ellis, A. J., Beevers, C. G., & Wells, T. T. (2011). Attention allocation and 
incidental recognition of emotional information in dysphoria. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 35(5), 425–433. 
doi:10.1007/s10608-010-9305-3 
Everaert, J., Koster, E. H. W., & Derakshan, N. (2012). The combined 
cognitive bias hypothesis in depression. Clinical Psychology 
Review, 32(5), 413–424. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2012.04.003 
Fernandes, M. A., & Moscovitch, M. (2000). Divided attention and 
memory: evidence of substantial interference effects at retrieval 
and encoding. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 
129(2), 155–76. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.129.2.155 
Fox, J. (2006). Structural equation modeling with the sem package in 
R. Structural Equation Modeling, 13(3), 465–486. 
doi:10.1207/s15328007sem1303_7 
Hayes, A. F. (2009). Beyond Baron and Kenny: Statistical mediation 
analysis in the new millennium. Communication Monographs, 
76(4), 408–420. doi:10.1080/03637750903310360 
Hedlund, S., & Rude, S. S. (1995). Evidence of latent depressive 
schemas in formerly depressed individuals. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 104(3), 517–525. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.104.3.517 
Hertel, P. T., & El-Messidi, L. (2006). Am I blue? Depressed mood and 
the consequences of self-focus for the interpretation and recall of 
96  Chapter 2 
 
ambiguous words. Behavior Therapy, 37(3), 259–268. 
doi:10.1016/j.beth.2006.01.003 
Hicks, J. L., & Marsh, R. L. (2000). Toward specifying the attentional 
demands of recognition memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26(6), 1483–1498. 
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.26.6.1483 
Ingram, R. E. (1984). Toward an information-processing analysis of 
depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 8(5), 443–477. 
doi:10.1007/BF01173284 
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating 
automatic from intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory 
and Language, 30(5), 513–541. doi:10.1016/0749-
596X(91)90025-F 
Jermann, F., Van Der Linden, M., Laurençon, M., & Schmitt, B. (2009). 
Recollective experience during recognition of emotional words in 
clinical depression. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 31(1), 27–35. doi:10.1007/s10862-008-9093-1 
Joormann, J., Waugh, C. E., & Gotlib, I. H. (2015). Cognitive bias 
modification for interpretation in major depression: Effects on 
memory and stress reactivity. Clinical Psychological Science. 
doi:10.1177/2167702614560748 
Joormann, J., Yoon, K. L., & Zetsche, U. (2007). Cognitive inhibition in 
depression. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 12(3), 128–139. 
doi:10.1016/j.appsy.2007.09.002 
Kellough, J. L., Beevers, C. G., Ellis, A. J., & Wells, T. T. (2008). Time 
course of selective attention in clinically depressed young adults: 
An eye tracking study. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(11), 
1238–1243. doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.07.004 
Koster, E. H. W., De Raedt, R., Leyman, L., & De Lissnyder, E. (2010). 
Mood-congruent attention and memory bias in dysphoria: 
Exploring the coherence among information-processing biases. 
Attending to remember 97  
 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48(3), 219–225. 
doi:10.1016/j.brat.2009.11.004 
Koster, E. H. W., Fox, E., & MacLeod, C. (2009). Introduction to the 
special section on cognitive bias modification in emotional 
disorders. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 118(1), 1–4. 
doi:10.1037/a0014379 
Koster, E. H. W., Leyman, L., De Raedt, R., & Crombez, G. (2006). 
Cueing of visual attention by emotional facial expressions: The 
influence of individual differences in anxiety and depression. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 41, 329–339. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2005.12.022 
Leyman, L., De Raedt, R., Vaeyens, R., & Philippaerts, R. M. (2011). 
Attention for emotional facial expressions in dysphoria: an eye-
movement registration study. Cognition & Emotion, 25(1), 111–
120. doi:10.1080/02699931003593827 
Maddox, G. B., Naveh-Benjamin, M., Old, S., & Kilb, A. (2012). The role 
of attention in the associative binding of emotionally arousing 
words. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1128–1134. 
doi:10.3758/s13423-012-0315-x 
Mathieu, J. E., & Taylor, S. R. (2006). Clarifying conditions and 
decision points for mediational type inferences in organizational 
behavior. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27(8), 1031–1056. 
doi:10.1002/job.406 
Migo, E. M., Mayes, A. R., & Montaldi, D. (2012). Measuring 
recollection and familiarity : Improving the remember/know 
procedure. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(3), 1435–1455. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.04.014 
Naveh-Benjamin, M., Kilb, A., & Fisher, T. (2006). Concurrent task 
effects on memory encoding and retrieval: further support for an 
asymmetry. Memory & Cognition, 34(1), 90–101. 
doi:10.3758/BF03193389 
98  Chapter 2 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Hilt, L. M. (2009). Gender differences in 
depression. In I. H. Gotlib & C. Hammen (Eds.), Handbook of 
depression (2nd ed.). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Ochsner, K. N. (2000). Are affective events richly recollected or simply 
familiar? The experience and process of recognizing feelings past. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(2), 242–261. 
doi:10.1037/0096-3445.129.2.242 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling 
strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple 
mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40(3), 879–91. 
doi:10.3758/BRM.40.3.879 
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information 
processing: 20 years of research. Psychological Bulletin, 124(3), 
372–422. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.124.3.372 
Rayner, K., Kambe, G., & Duffy, S. A. (2000). The effect of clause wrap-
up on eye movements during reading. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. A, Human Experimental Psychology, 
53(4), 1061–80. doi:10.1080/713755934 
Rayner, K., Sereno, S. C., Morris, R. K., Schmauder, a. R., & Clifton, C. 
(1989). Eye movements and on-line language comprehension 
processes. Language and Cognitive Processes, 4(3-4), SI21–SI49. 
doi:10.1080/01690968908406362 
Rude, S. S., Wenzlaff, R. M., Gibbs, B., Vane, J., & Whitney, T. (2002). 
Negative processing biases predict subsequent depressive 
symptoms. Cognition & Emotion, 16(3), 423–440. 
doi:10.1080/02699930143000554 
Salemink, E., Hertel, P. T., & Mackintosh, B. (2010). Interpretation 
training influences memory for prior interpretations. Emotion, 
10(6), 903–907. doi:10.1037/a0020232 
Attending to remember 99  
 
Schotter, E. R., Angele, B., & Rayner, K. (2012). Parafoveal processing 
in reading. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 74(1), 5–35. 
doi:10.3758/s13414-011-0219-2 
Shane, M. S., & Peterson, J. B. (2007). An evaluation of early and late 
stage attentional processing of positive and negative information 
in dysphoria. Cognition and Emotion, 21(4), 789–815. 
doi:10.1080/02699930600843197 
Talmi, D., & McGarry, L. M. (2012). Accounting for immediate 
emotional memory enhancement. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 66(1), 93–108. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2011.07.009 
Tran, T. B., Hertel, P. T., & Joormann, J. (2011). Cognitive bias 
modification: Induced interpretive biases affect memory. 
Emotion, 11(1), 145–152. doi:10.1037/a0021754 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian 
Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne, 26(1), 1–12. 
doi:10.1037/h0080017 
Van der Does, A. J. W. (2002). Handleiding bij de Nederlandse versie 
van de Beck Depression Inventory - second edition (BDI-II-NL). 
[The Dutch version of the Beck Depresion Inventory-II]. Lisse, 
The Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger. 
Van der Does, A. J. W. (2005). Thought suppression and cognitive 
vulnerability to depression. The British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 44(1), 1–14. doi:10.1348/014466504x19442 
Wechsler, D. (1997). Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(3rd ed.). San Antonio, TX: Harcourt Assessment. 
Wenzlaff, R. M., & Bates, D. E. (1998). Unmasking a cognitive 
vulnerability to depression: How lapses in mental control reveal 
depressive thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
75(6), 1559–1571. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.6.1559 
West, S. G., Taylor, A. B., & Wu, W. (2012). Model fit and model 
selection in structural equation modeling. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.), 
100  Chapter 2 
 
Handbook of structural equation modeling. New York: The 
Guilford Press. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1988). 
Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders. New York: John 
Willey and Sons Ltd. 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C., & Mathews, A. (1997). 
Cognitive psychology and emotional disorders (2nd ed.). 
Chichester: John Willey and Sons Ltd. 
Yonelinas, A. P., Aly, M., Wang, W. C., & Koen, J. D. (2010). 
Recollection and familiarity: Examining controversial 
assumptions and new directions. Hippocampus, 20(11), 1178–
1194. doi:10.1002/hipo.20864 
 
  
Chapter 3 
 
Remembering to Attend 
 
 
 
What people think, how they feel, and act upon their thoughts 
and emotions in their daily life is frequently based on prior emotional 
experiences. It is now well-known that encoding of new learning 
experiences into long-term memory is modulated emotional biases in 
attention (Pottage & Schaefer, 2012; Talmi & McGarry, 2012), but 
surprisingly little known about the reverse effect – how prior emotional 
learning can guide attention. 
Prior learning may contribute to attention via multiple memory 
systems (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012). Basic research has 
demonstrated that explicit long-term memory representations can be 
used to shift attention toward relevant locations (Becker & Rasmussen, 
2008; Brockmole & Henderson, 2006; Stokes, Atherton, Patai, & Nobre, 
2012; Summerfield, Lepsien, Gitelman, Mesulam, & Nobre, 2006). For 
example, detection of transient targets is typically facilitated when 
viewing previously learned visual scenes that are associated with spatial 
memories about the target’s location (Summerfield, Rao, Garside, & 
Nobre, 2011). Moreover, there is evidence for the role of implicitly 
learned associations in guiding attention (Zhao, Al-Aidroos, & Turk-
Browne, 2013). Studies on contextual cuing during visual search, for 
instance, have shown that certain targets (e.g., a rotated T) are more 
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rapidly detected when embedded within repeated arrays of distractors 
(e.g., configurations of rotated L’s) compared to novel arrays (Chun & 
Jiang, 2003; Chun, 2000). This suggests that implicit knowledge 
gained through repetition of target–distractor configurations can guide 
attention toward the target’s location. 
If prior learning of non-emotional material can guide attention 
via explicit and implicit memory systems, emotional learning 
experiences may also have the ability to alter attentional deployment. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, several studies in samples of 
unselected participants have shown that incidental learning of stable 
relations between neutral stimuli and reward (Anderson, Laurent, & 
Yantis, 2011; Hickey & van Zoest, 2013) or aversive events (Koster, 
Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Schmidt, 
Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2015) automatically guide attention toward 
stimuli with previously learned associations, mainly affecting 
attentional capture operations (but see also Van Damme, Crombez, & 
Notebaert, 2008). Several experiments have also observed the opposite 
effect, namely early attentional avoidance in response to stimuli with 
emotionally positive and negative associations (Mackintosh & Mathews, 
2003). Current research findings converge on the observation that the 
emotional learning history of a stimulus can modify its attentional 
priority, but has yielded mixed findings regarding the direction of 
emotional learning effects on attention. 
There is evidence suggesting that the expression of attentional 
guidance by learned positive or negative associations depends on 
individual differences factors in emotion processing, such as 
neuroticism, anxiety, and depression levels. One study showed that 
learned associations between neutral pictures and negative mental 
images were more likely to cause attentional interference in high-
neuroticism participants during a probe detection task (Fulcher, 
Mathews, Mackintosh, & Law, 2001). Another study observed that 
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higher levels of anxiety are linked to memory-based reallocation of 
attention from locations presenting angry faces to locations depicting 
happy faces in response to neutral cues (Rohner, 2004). Finally, two 
recent studies reported that healthy but subclinically depressed 
individuals oriented attention toward reward-associated stimuli 
(Anderson, Leal, Hall, Yassa, & Yantis, 2014; Brailean, Koster, 
Hoorelbeke, & De Raedt, 2014). 
Despite recent advances in knowledge on associative learning 
of emotional material in guiding attention, several issues limit current 
understanding of this phenomenon. To understand the factors involved 
in attentional guidance based on prior learning, studies need to assess 
the effect of the associative learning procedure on the subjective 
evaluation of the stimuli that are subsequently presented in the 
attention task. This is important to clarify whether attentional guidance 
by prior learning is driven by the acquired valence of the stimulus itself 
or its associations that are activated from long-term memory. While 
only few studies have reported emotion-congruent effects of neutral – 
emotional stimulus pairings on ratings of the initially neutral stimuli 
(Fulcher et al., 2001; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003), many other 
studies did not report such data. Moreover, there is a limited number of 
studies examining depression-related individual differences in 
attentional guidance by prior learning of positive and negative 
associations. Addressing this issue seems critical in understanding the 
relations between the emotional biases in attention and memory that 
characterize depression (Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). 
This Investigation 
The current experiments aimed to cast light on how emotional 
learning alters attention allocation by addressing the outlined 
limitations. Experiment 1 tested whether attention is guided by positive 
and negative associations and if individual differences in depressive 
symptoms modulate this effect. In an initial encoding phase, distinct 
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colors were consistently paired with faces depicting either happy, 
neutral, or angry expressions while participants performed a gender-
discrimination cover task. In a subsequent test phase, participants 
searched for a target that was framed by either a color that was 
associated with happy/angry faces versus neutral faces. We expected 
that (1) higher depression levels would be related to faster target 
detection times when colors with negative associations framed the 
target versus the distractor; and (2) higher depression levels would be 
related to slower target detection times when colors with positive 
associations framed the target versus the distractor. 
Experiment 2 aimed to cast light on the specific attentional 
operations (attentional capture, attentional disengagement) that may 
be altered by emotional learning as well as the temporal profile of 
learning effects on attention. After the encoding phase, participants 
performed a probe discrimination task in which encoded colors with 
emotional associations were presented as task irrelevant stimuli. Prior 
to the presentation of colors that were associated with happy/angry 
faces versus neutral faces, participants’ gaze was anchored to a location 
at which either a color associated with happy/angry faces or with 
neutral faces is subsequently presented (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014). 
Next, a target appeared at the location of the color with emotional 
associations or the color with neutral associations and participants 
made probe discrimination decisions. We hypothesized that emotional 
associations would facilitate detection of targets by affecting attentional 
capture operations at short exposure durations. Depending on high 
versus low depression levels, we expected that attention would be 
captured by stimuli with negative versus positive associations, 
respectively.  
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Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-five participants (27 women, age range: 18 – 35 years) 
were recruited from the Princeton research pool and participated in 
sessions lasting 50 minutes. All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision, provided 
informed consent, and received either $12 or course credits. The study 
protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board for Human 
Subjects at Princeton University. 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four face images (unique identities; 12 women) were 
drawn from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998) based on identification accuracy 
(>84%), intensity, and arousal ratings (evaluated on 9-point scales) 
from validation data (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 
2008). To create positive, negative, and neutral valence categories, 
eight faces depicting happy [Mintensity=6.97 (1.56); Marousal=4.18 (2.06)], 
angry [Mintensity=6.54 (1.67); Marousal=3.88 (1.99)], and neutral 
[Mintensity=5.52 (2.14); Marousal=2.36 (1.40)] expressions were used. 
Eight colors were drawn from equally spaced points on a circle 
(radius 59°) in the CIE L*a*b* color space, centered at L = 54, a = 18, 
and b = -8. To form arbitrary associations between colors and emotional 
valence, two of these colors were paired with happy expressions and two 
colors were paired with angry expressions. The remaining four colors 
were paired with neutral expressions to provide a baseline measure of 
the effects of exposure to face-color associations in the absence of 
emotional valence. 
Four additional, independently sampled colors that were never 
paired with faces were used to probe baseline affective associations in a 
rating task and serve as lures in a final memory test. 
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Procedure 
Encoding phase 
Associations between colors and emotional valence were 
established via a forward evaluative learning procedure (Hofmann, De 
Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010) in which each color was 
consistently presented with faces drawn from its corresponding valence 
category (positive, negative, neutral). 
Each trial of the encoding phase began with the onset of a 
circular, uniformly colored disk (radius=8.27°). After 1000ms, a face 
image (size 11.68° by 11.68°) was superimposed upon the disk. Both 
stimuli remained onscreen for an additional 2000ms. Following 
stimulus offset, participants discriminated the gender of the face by 
pressing one of two response keys (‘l’ or ‘p’). Thus, both the color of the 
background disk and the emotional expression of the face were 
completely irrelevant to the primary gender-discrimination task. See 
figure 1 for a schematic depiction. 
 
 
 
Each color-face combination from each of the three valence 
categories (2 colors × 8 happy faces + 2 colors × 8 angry faces + 4 colors 
× 8 neutral faces) was presented once during each block (64 trials). 
Each participant completed six blocks of this task, for a total of 384 
trials (64 trials/block × 6 blocks). 
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Search phase 
The consequences of exposure to color-valence associations 
were assessed in a subsequent search phase. On each trial, two black 
line segments (0.43° in length) were displayed at the same eccentricity 
(8.27°) to the left and right of central fixation: one was tilted 45° away 
from vertical (target) and the other was vertical (distractor). Observers 
discriminated the position of the target (left or right) by pressing one of 
two response keys (‘i’ or ‘j’), and the target’s position was randomized. 
In addition, a colored disk (radius=2.07°) appeared at the location of 
each line segment. On critical trials, one color was associated with 
either positive or negative valence (‘emotional’ colors), and the other 
was associated with neutral valence (‘neutral’ colors). Because all colors 
were equally likely to appear with the target (i.e., valid trial) and 
distractor (i.e., invalid trial), color was completely task-irrelevant. On 
control trials, two colors associated with neutral valence appeared with 
both line segments. The presentation of colors across search displays 
was counterbalanced, resulting in a total of 192 orientation-
discrimination trials, comprising 128 critical trials (32 
trials/emotional-color x 4 emotional-colors) and 64 control trials (16 
trials/neutral-color x 4 neutral-colors). Figure 2 presents the flow of 
trial events. 
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Subjective ratings 
To assess participants’ explicit preferences for colors, we 
collected subjective ratings of their ‘global feelings’ toward each color, 
evaluated on a 7-point scale from ‘very negative’ (score of 1) to ‘very 
positive’ (score of 7). Participants were instructed to judge their feelings 
toward the color directly and not take into account any other 
associations that may come to mind. In total, twelve colors were rated. 
Eight had been repeatedly presented throughout the encoding and 
search phases; four were novel colors, to provide a baseline measure of 
color preference in the absence of specific associations with faces. 
Explicit memory test 
To assess the nature of the learned associations, we tested 
participants’ explicit memory for the pairing of colors and valence 
categories. For each color, participants were instructed to judge which 
of three cartoon face images went best with that color, each of which 
bore a happy, angry, or neutral expression (e.g., Maratos, Mogg, & 
Bradley, 2008). If unsure, participants were permitted to report “I don’t 
know”. All twelve colors were tested in a randomized order. 
Depressive symptom severity 
In order to understand how individual differences influenced 
the nature of affective learning, we administered the Beck Depression 
Inventory – II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) to measure depressive 
symptom severity. This questionnaire presents 21 items to be rated on 
a scale from 0 to 3. The measure has a good reliability and validity in 
nonclinical samples (Joiner, Walker, Pettit, Perez, & Cukrowicz, 2005). 
The internal consistency was α=.94 in experiment 1 and α=.91 in 
experiment 2. A mean score of 11.48 (SD=8.89) on the BDI-II (range: 
0-35) was observed. 
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Apparatus 
Participants were seated 70cm from a CRT monitor with a 100 
Hz refresh rate. Stimuli were presented against a grey background 
(RGB: 50/50/50) using MATLAB Release 2013a (MathWorks, Natick, 
MA) and Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
Data Preparation 
Only correct orientation-discrimination responses were 
included for analysis (overall accuracy: 90%). Six participants 
responded incorrectly on more than 20% of the trials (range error rates: 
20%-78%) while the mean error rate in the remainder of the group was 
4.63% (SD=2.66), suggesting low task compliance in these individuals. 
These individuals accounted for 63% of all errors and were excluded 
from analyses. The total sample size included in the analyses was 29 
observers. Median scores were generated per individual, per trial type, 
and per emotion category (e.g., valid happy, invalid happy, valid angry, 
invalid angry, etc.).  
Results 
Encoding effects on memory and ratings 
Percentages of correct responses on the test probing memory 
for colors associated with happy, M=50.00 (SD=38.49), t(27)=2.34, 
p<.05, and angry, M=48.21 (SD=37.22), t(27)=2.16, p<.05, faces were 
more accurate compared to 33% chance level. Colors paired with 
neutral faces were recognized by chance, M=33.33 (SD=24.90).  
The subjective ratings of colors associated with angry, M=4.65 
(SD=1.33), happy, M=4.58 (SD=1.19), and neutral faces, M=4.75 
(SD=0.76), were not significantly different (all t’s<1). The ratings of 
these ‘old’ colors were not different from ratings of the four ‘new’ colors, 
M=4.67 (SD=.92), t<1.  
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BDI-II scores did not correlate with indices of memory accuracy 
or subjective ratings of colors associated with happy, angry, or neutral 
faces (p-s >.14). 
Attentional guidance by emotional associations 
To test memory-guided effects on attention, a 2 (Valence: 
happy versus angry) × 2 (Validity: invalid versus valid) ANCOVA with 
BDI-II scores as a covariate was conducted on RTs. Results showed no 
significant main effects of Valence, F<1, p=.36, η2= .03 (Mnegative=587, 
SE=16; Mpositive=593, SE=15), nor Validity, F(1,27)=1.69, p=.21, η2= .06 
(Mvalid=585, SE=14; Minvalid=595, SE=16), and BDI-II did not change 
these main effects: BDI-II × Validity, F<1, p=.93, η2= .00, and BDI-II × 
Valence, F<1, p=.75, η2= .004. The two-way interaction of Valence × 
Validity was significant, F(1, 27)=6.32, p=.02, η2= .19, and modified by 
BDI-II in a three-way interaction: Valence × Validity × BDI-II, 
F(1,27)=8.36, p<.01, η2= .24. These significant interaction-effects 
suggest general and depression-modulated attentional guidance effects 
by emotional associations. To break down the three-way interaction, 
positive and negative associations were considered separately. 
For negative associations, an ANCOVA on RTs with Validity 
(invalid versus valid) as a within-subjects factor and BDI-II as a 
covariate revealed no significant main effect of Validity, F<1, p=.46, 
η2= .02, suggesting no general attentional guidance effects by negative 
associations (Mvalid=583, SD=86; Minvalid=591, SD=94). Also the 
Validity × BDI-II interaction failed to reach significance, F(1,27)=3.07, 
p=.09, η2= .10. For positive associations, a similar ANCOVA revealed a 
main effect of Validity, F(1,27)=9.99, p<.01, η2= .27, with faster RTs on 
valid, M=586 (SD=82), than on invalid trials, M=598 (SD=86). This 
suggests a general attentional guidance effect by positive associations. 
Moreover, the significant Validity × BDI-II effect, F(1,27)=5.51, p<.05, 
η2= .17, indicates that this general guidance effect was modulated by 
depression symptoms.  
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To follow up on these findings, we computed an attention bias 
score for positive associations by subtracting RTs on valid trials from 
RTs on invalid trials. A higher score on this attention bias index 
suggests a stronger bias toward positive associations. Correlational 
analysis showed that BDI-II scores were negatively correlated with an 
attention bias driven by positive associations, ρ(29)=-.39, p<.05. This 
suggests greater attentional guidance by positive associations in 
individuals with lower BDI-II levels while individuals with higher BDI-
II levels show less guidance by positive associations.  
Interestingly, attentional bias toward stimuli with positive 
associations was positively related to memory accuracy, ρ(28)=.45, 
p<.05. This suggests that better memory for color – happy faces 
pairings is related to greater attentional bias toward the stimuli with 
learned associations. Moreover, the correlation between subjective 
ratings of colors associated with positive faces and attentional bias was 
not significant, ρ(28)=.28, p=.14. This suggests that the observed 
results are driven by the acquired associations and not by the valence of 
the color itself. Note that the correlations between attentional bias 
driven by negative associations and BDI-II, ρ(28)=-.16, p=.43, and to 
memory accuracy, ρ(27)=-.15, p=.45, or subjective ratings of colors 
associated with angry faces, ρ(28)=.00, p=.99, were not significant. 
Discussion 
The results from experiment 1 suggest a dissociation between 
attentional guidance by stimuli with emotionally positive and negative 
associations. Faster detection times when a target was framed by colors 
with positive associations than when framed by colors with neutral 
associations suggest that attention can be guided toward stimuli with 
positive associations. This was not found for stimuli with negative 
associations. This general attentional bias  
This general attentional guidance effect by positive associations 
was related to depressive symptom severity levels. Greater attentional 
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guidance by positive associations occurred in individuals with lower 
symptom severity and less guidance emerged in individuals with more 
severe symptoms. Moreover, guidance of attention by positive 
associations was related to memory for the stimulus – valence 
associations. The ability to accurately recall the learned positive 
associations was related to a greater bias toward the stimuli.  
Different form previous research applying an evaluative 
learning procedure to study effects of emotional learning on attention 
(Fulcher et al., 2001; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003), the extensive 
encoding phase in which colors were consistently associated with either 
positive or negative facial expression did not result in differential 
subjective evaluations of the colors. Interestingly, individual 
differences in subjective evaluations of colors with positive associations 
were not related to attentional bias toward stimuli with such 
associations. This suggests that attentional guidance by prior learning 
is not driven by the acquired valence of the stimulus itself but rather its 
associations that are activated from long-term memory. 
To further investigate memory-guided attention effects, we 
designed experiment 2 to examine which attentional mechanisms 
(attentional capture, attentional disengagement) are altered by prior 
learning as well as the temporal profile of learning effects on attention. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Participants 
Fifty-seven participants (48 women, age range: 18 – 35) with 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and normal color vision 
participated in this experiment. All individuals gave informed consent 
and received course credits or €10. This study was approved by the 
ethics committee at Ghent University. 
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Stimuli and procedure 
The experimental procedure was identical to experiment 1 with 
exception of the attention task. Here, participants performed an cueing 
task modeled after Grafton and MacLeod (2014). Figure 3 presents the 
flow of trial events. Each trial started with two black circle outlines 
(radius=2.07°) presented at the same eccentricity (8.27°) to the left and 
right of the center of the screen. A smaller circle (radius=1.35°) was 
simultaneously displayed in the center of the left or right black outline 
with equal frequency. Participants were instructed to direct attention to 
this smaller circle. After 1000 ms, a horizontal or vertical black line 
segment (0.43° in length) was shown for 150 ms within the attended 
region, prompting participants to apprehend the identity of this anchor 
probe. The anchor probe had a horizontal orientation on 50% of the 
trials. Next, the two circle outlines were filled with colors drawn from 
the encoding phase, one disk had associations with either happy or 
angry faces and the other disk had associations neutral faces. Both 
colors were presented simultaneously and the color with emotional 
associations was presented either proximal (i.e., anchor valid trial) or 
distal (i.e. anchor invalid trial) to initial attentional focus, with equal 
frequency in either of the two locations. Half of the trials exposed the 
color display for 100 ms and the other trials exposed the colors for 500 
ms. Following offset, a small black line segment (0.43° in length) with 
a horizontal or vertical in orientation appeared with equal frequency in 
either the same (i.e., emotional match trial) or opposite (i.e., neutral 
match trial) location from the color with emotional associations. 
Participants were instructed to quickly indicate whether this line 
segment (the target probe) did or did not match the orientation of the 
anchor probe by pressing the corresponding key. The anchor probe 
matched the target probe on 50% of the trials. Speed and accuracy of 
the probe discrimination responses were recorded. The next trial 
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started after a 1000 ms intertribal-interval. A total of 128 trials were 
delivered. 
Emotional biases in attentional capture were examined by 
comparing RTs on anchor valid versus invalid trials for emotional 
match trials. If attention is captured by colors with emotional 
associations, there should be no difference in RT on anchor valid versus 
invalid trials when the target probe appears at the location of the color 
with emotional associations. Delayed withdrawal if attention from 
colors with emotional associations was investigated by comparing RTs 
on emotional match versus neutral match trials. If individuals have 
difficulties disengaging attention from colors with emotional 
associations, longer RTs will occur on neutral match relative to 
emotional match trials. Emotional biases in attentional capture and 
withdrawal of attention were investigated per exposure duration 
(100ms, 500ms).  
 
 
 
Apparatus 
Participants were seated approximately 60cm from a CRT 
monitor with a 100Hz refresh rate. Stimuli were presented against a 
dark grey background (RGB: 210/210/210) using Psychtoolbox 
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(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) for MATLAB Release 2014a (MathWorks, 
Natick, MA). 
Statistical analyses 
Three participants were found to be outliers in terms of probe 
discrimination accuracy on the attention task (M=46.61%, SD=42.18, 
range: 21.88% - 95.31%; remainder of the sample: M=6.42%, SD=4.29) 
and were excluded from analyses. The total sample size included in the 
analyses was 54 observers. The incorrect probe-discrimination 
responses were excluded for analysis (overall accuracy: 94.58%) and 
extreme values deviating more than 3SD from the mean on a particular 
trial type were removed (2.03% of all data points). Mean scores were 
generated per individual, per trial type, per exposure duration, and per 
emotion category and cognitive bias indexes were computed. As for 
experiment 1, attention bias scores were computed per exposure 
duration and attention mechanisms by subtracting RTs on valid trials 
from RTs on invalid trials. 
Results 
Encoding effects on memory and ratings 
Color – face expression associations were recognized above 33% 
chance level for each emotion category: happy, M=57.41 (SD=39.34), 
t(53)=4.56, p<.001, angry, M=50.93 (SD=39.44), t(53)=3.34, p<.01, 
and neutral, M=51.39 (SD=32.73), t(53)=4.13, p<.001. Memory for 
colors associated with happy faces was not different from memory for 
colors associated with angry faces, t(53)=1.07, p=.29, or neutral faces, 
t(53)=1.37, p=.18. Memory for colors associated with neutral faces was 
not different from memory for colors associated with angry, t<1, p=.91. 
The subjective ratings showed that colors associated with happy faces, 
M=4.24 (SD=1.00), were not rated differently than colors associated 
with angry, M=4.19 (SD=1.18), t<1, p=.79, p=.33, or neutral faces, 
M=4.38 (SD=0.86), t<1, p=.43. There was also no difference between 
116  Chapter 3 
 
ratings of colors paired with angry or neutral expressions, t(53)=1.01, 
p=.32.  
BDI-II scores were not correlated with memory accuracy nor 
subjective ratings of colors associated with happy, angry, or neutral 
faces (p-s>.65). 
Attentional guidance by emotional associations 
The distribution of BDI-II scores (M=9.91, SD=8.73, range: 0-
35) was skewed (zskewness=3.22, zkurtosis=0.54). The ANCOVAs reported 
below included square root transformed variables. Table 1 presents RTs 
on non-transformed data. 
 
Table 1. Reaction times on different trial types. 
 Negative asociations Positive associations 
 100ms 500ms 100ms 500ms 
Anchor valid 850 (173) 821 (192) 841 (153) 826 (190) 
Anchor invalid 897 (208) 853 (182) 859 (159) 847 (165) 
Emotional match 866 (164) 838 (169) 848 (144) 835 (154) 
Neutral match 867 (163) 837 (152) 851 (164) 820 (141) 
Note. Means are presented with standard deviations between parentheses. 
 
Attentional capture 
A 2 (Valence: happy versus angry) × 2 (Validity: invalid versus 
valid) ANCOVA with BDI-II scores as a covariate were conducted on 
RTs per exposure duration. For 100 ms exposure durations, results 
showed no main effects of Valence, F(1, 52)=1.17, p=.29, η2= .02, or 
Validity, F(1, 52)=1.43, p=.24, η2=.03, and also BDI-II scores did not 
modify the main effects: Valence × BDI-II, F<1, p=.65, η2= .004, and 
Validity × BDI-II, F<1, p=.80, η2=.001. The significant Valence × 
Validity interaction, F(1, 52)=4.84, p<.05, η2=.09, was not modified by 
BDI-II scores, F(1, 52)=1.80, p=.19, η2=.03. To follow up on the Valence 
× Validity interaction, the validity effects were inspected separately for 
positive and negative associations. Analyses revealed a significant 
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Validity effect for negative associations, F(1,52)=4.77, p<.05, η2=.08, 
with faster RTs on anchor valid trials than on anchor invalid trials (see 
Table 1). This suggests early attentional avoidance of stimuli with 
emotionally negative associations. The general effect was not modified 
by BDI-II, F(1, 52)=1.36, p=.25, η2= .03. For positive associations, no 
effect of Validity, F<1, p=.56, η2= .007, nor an interaction of Validity × 
BDI-II, F(1, 52)=1.37, p=.25, η2= .03, was found. The correlational 
analyses showed that attentional avoidance of stimuli with negative 
associations was not related to memory accuracy for color – angry face 
pairings, ρ(54)=.05, p=.72, nor to subjective ratings of negative colors, 
ρ(54)=-.10, p=.46. Also the index of attentional capture by positive 
associations was not related to memory for color – happy face 
associations, ρ(54)=-.07, p=.62, nor to subjective ratings of negative 
colors, ρ(54)=-.02, p=.87. 
For 500 ms exposure durations, the results showed no main 
effects of Valence nor Validity, F-s<1, p-s>.69, and BDI-II scores did 
not modify the main effects (F-s<1, p-s>.55). The Valence × Validity 
interaction, F(1, 52)=2.07, p=.16, η2= .04, nor the three-way interaction 
with BDI-II, F(1, 52)=1.86, p=.18, η2= .04, was significant. The 
correlational analyses showed that attentional capture neither by 
negative nor by positive associations was related to memory accuracy 
(p-s>.17) or subjective ratings (p-s>.06).  
These findings suggest that attention is captured neither by 
emotionally positive nor by negative associations at longer presentation 
durations. Attentional capture was also not related to subjective ratings 
nor memory. 
Attentional disengagement 
A 2 (Valence: happy versus angry) × 2 (Match type: emotional-
match versus neutral-match) ANCOVA with BDI-II scores as a 
covariate was conducted on RTs per exposure duration. For 100 ms 
exposure durations, results showed no main effects of Valence, F<1, 
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p=.85, η2=.001, or Validity, F<1, p=.54, η2= .01, and also BDI-II scores 
did not modify the main effects: Valence × BDI-II, F<1, p=.40, η2= .01, 
and Validity × BDI-II, F<1, p=.57, η2= .01. Neither the Valence × 
Validity interaction, F(1, 52)=2.62, p=.11, η2= .05 nor the three-way 
Valence × Validity × BDI-II interaction, F(1, 52)=2.56, p=.12, η2= .05, 
reached significance. For 500 ms exposure durations, the results 
showed no main effects of Valence or Validity, F-s<1, p-s>.59, and BDI-
II scores did not modify the main effects, F-s<1, p-s>.90. The Valence 
× Validity interaction, F(1, 52)=1.62, p=.21, η2= .03, nor the three-way 
interaction with BDI-II, F<1, p=.32, η2= .02, was significant. For both 
short and long exposure duration, attentional disengagement by 
negative nor by positive associations was correlated to memory 
accuracy (p-s>.34). There were also no relations between attentional 
capture and subjective ratings (p-s>.24). 
This pattern of results suggest that emotional associations do 
not modulate attentional disengagement operations neither at short 
nor at longer exposure durations. Depression levels nor memory 
accuracy did alter these attentional responses to emotional associations. 
Discussion 
The results from experiment 2 suggest a dissociation between 
attentional guidance by emotionally positive versus negative 
associations. Different from experiment 1, evidence was found for a 
general effect of emotional learning on attention driven by negative and 
not by positive associations. The findings suggest that learned negative 
associations specifically affect early attentional avoidance and not 
attentional disengagement operations at short exposure durations. 
Thus, emotionally negative associations may rapidly modulate early 
attentional mechanisms. Here, no evidence was found that depression 
levels modulated the effect of emotional learning on attention and 
memory accuracy was also not related to attentional guidance effects. 
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Similar to experiment 1, the extensive encoding phase did not 
alter the subjective ratings of the colors and the individual differences 
in subjective evaluations of colors were not related to attentional bias 
indices. Again, these findings suggest that attentional guidance by prior 
learning is driven by the learned associations with the stimuli that are 
activated from long-term memory. 
General Discussion 
In two experiments we investigated whether learned positive 
and negative associations with stimuli modulate attention allocation in 
a subsequent search (experiment 1) and cueing (experiment 2) task. The 
results from both experiments suggest there is a dissociation between 
attentional guidance by positive versus negative associations. While 
evidence for attentional guidance by positive associations was found in 
experiment 1, experiment 2 showed learning effects on attention for 
negative associations. In line with prior research in samples of healthy 
individuals, we observed a larger attentional bias toward positive 
associations and a lower bias toward or avoidance of negative 
associations (Everaert et al., 2012). As in the majority of prior studies, 
we also did not find this double bias in one single study. This 
observation inquires the mechanisms involved in modulating 
attentional allocation toward stimuli with positive and negative 
material. 
Prior studies that assessed the effect of the associative learning 
procedure on the subjective evaluation of the stimuli (Fulcher et al., 
2001; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003), suggested that effects of 
emotional learning on attention can be attributed to the acquired 
valence of the stimulus itself. Different from these findings, however, 
both experiment 1 and 2 showed no differential effects of the evaluative 
learning procedure on subjective liking of the colors associated with 
positive and negative facial expressions while the learning phase clearly 
altered performance on the subsequent attention tasks. Also the 
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individual differences in subjective evaluations of colors with positive 
associations was not related to attentional guidance by positive or 
negative associations. This observations suggests that attentional 
guidance by prior learning is not driven by the acquired valence of the 
stimulus itself but rather its associations that are activated from long-
term memory.  
The observed pattern of correlations between memory accuracy 
and the memory-guided attention biases suggests that different 
memory systems may be involved in attention guidance by prior 
emotional learning. While effects of learned positive associations on 
attention by were related to accuracy on the explicit memory test 
(experiment 1), this was not found for negative associations 
(experiment 2). The ability to accurately recall learned positive 
associations between colors and the paired emotional faces was related 
to a greater bias in attention toward the colors. This pattern of 
correlations indicates that different memory systems may have guided 
attention toward stimuli with positive and negative associations. Given 
the attention task features of experiment 1 and 2, it seems plausible that 
attentional guidance by positive associations would have relied more on 
explicit memory while guidance by negative associations would have 
relied more on implicit memory. Although the colors with emotional or 
neutral associations were task-irrelevant in both experiments, the task 
conditions of the visual search task (experiment 1) may have permitted 
more time to retrieve the associations with the presented colors 
whereas the shorter exposure durations in cueing task (experiment 2) 
allow better measurement of attentional expressions driven by implicit 
memory. However, the current studies did not include a direct test of 
implicit memory and further experimentation needs to directly 
investigate potential differential guidance effects by multiple memory 
systems (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012).  
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Regarding the nature of the particular attentional mechanisms 
modulated by emotional memory and the time course of such effects, 
experiment 2 suggested that negative associations specifically modulate 
early attentional operations at short exposure durations. This findings 
is consistent with line with prior research documenting effects of prior 
associative learning on attentional capture (Anderson et al., 2011; 
Koster et al., 2004; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2015). 
Similar to observations by Mackintosh and Mathews (2003), the data 
further suggeststhat emotional memory has the ability to rapidly bias 
attention away from stimuli based on prior learning of negative 
associations. For attentional biases driven by positive associations, 
however, we were not able to identify the critical attentional 
mechanisms nor to illuminate the temporal profile. If such guidance 
effects by positive associations would rely on explicit memory systems, 
as suggested, than it is possible that attentional disengagement 
operations would be affected such that healthy people more slowly 
withdraw from positive material. This hypothesis awaits further 
research. 
Based on prior research evidencing dperssion-related 
individual differences in attention allocation toward reward-associated 
stimuli (Anderson et al., 2014; Brailean et al., 2014), we hypothesized 
that emotional memory-guided attention would depend on individual 
differences in depressive symptom severity. In line with this prediction, 
attentional guidance driven by positive associations was related to 
depression levels. Individuals with lower symptom levels showed 
greater attentional guidance by positive associations, while individuals 
with higher symptom levels showed less attentional guidance by 
positive associations. However, depression levels did not modulate 
attentional guidance by negative associations in experiment 2. The lack 
of depression-modulated effects could be explained by the limited 
number of participants with elevated depression scores in experiment 
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2. While 34 % of the participants reported elevated depression levels 
(BDI-II ≥ 14) in experiment 1, only 24% of the participants in 
experiment 2 reported mild to severe symptoms. Consequently the 
results from experiment 2 pertain more to healthy emotional 
functioning rather than depression-modulated distortions in attention. 
The current findings have implications for cognitive theories of 
emotional processing biases which do often not explicitly consider 
memory contributions to attention bias. In light of prior research 
showing how certain goals (e.g., making meaning of a situation) guide 
allocation of attentional orienting and sustained attention toward 
emotional material (Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014), it seems 
important to distinguish between goal-based and memory-guided 
influences on emotional attention. The findings reported here suggest 
that when processing emotional material, prior learning or memory has 
an influences on attention allocation. Attentional guidance by 
emotional memory may alter a different set of attentional mechanisms 
(e.g., attentional capture) than when current goals regulate attention 
allocation (e.g., sustained attention, attentional selection). This may be 
especially true when implicit memory systems guide attention, but may 
be not different when explicit knowledge is recruited to guide (e.g., goal-
based) search for relevant targets. The current pattern of findings 
prompts theories to consider effects of memory on attention in addition 
to stimulus-based and goal-based influences. This provides an 
important challenge for future cognitive models as well as research that 
draws from these theoretical perspectives. 
Several limitations should be acknowledged. A first limitation 
concerns the number of colors that were paired with emotionally 
positive or negative facial expressions may have underestimated 
memory effects on attention. A limited set of colors was deliberately 
chosen to ensure maximal discriminability between the randomly 
generated colors. A larger set of stimuli may more accurately reflect the 
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diversity of stimuli that would receive attention based on prior affective 
learning. A second limitation concerns the number of participants with 
elevated depressive symptoms in experiment 1. This may have reduced 
the likelihood to find modulation of attentional guidance by depressive 
symptom severity levels. When further investigating how depression 
levels alter memory-guided attention, a higher number of participants 
with higher depression levels in the recruited samples is required. 
In conclusion, the experiments showed that emotional memory 
associations with stimuli can modulate attention allocation. Based on 
prior affective learning, attention can be biased toward stimuli with 
positive associations and away from stimuli with negative associations. 
However, there could be a dissociation between attentional guidance by 
emotionally positive and negative memory associations which could be 
explained by explicit versus implicit memory systems that differentially 
contribute to attention allocation. 
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Cause and Effect: Experimental 
Modification of Attentional Bias 
 
 
 
Most research testing relations between emotionally biased 
cognitive processes inferred mutual influences between cognitive biases 
from cross-sectional research. Although certain features of the 
developed study designs optimize conditions to test the effect of one 
cognitive bias on another process (e.g., temporal order of tasks, similar 
stimulus materials across tasks) and allow some confidence in the 
modeled relations between biases, third variables may account for the 
observed relations. Direct proof of causality requires experimental 
manipulation of one cognitive bias to track effects on other processes. 
Cognitive bias modification methods provide the tools to test 
the causal role of cognitive biases in psychological disorders. These 
procedures encourage acquisition or attenuation of an emotional bias 
via exposure to experimentally established contingencies (Koster, Fox, 
& MacLeod, 2009). These methods to modify biases in attention (Blaut, 
Paulewicz, Szastok, Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013) and interpretation 
(Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015; Salemink, Hertel, & Mackintosh, 
2010; Tran, Hertel, & Joormann, 2011) have been applied to test the 
hypothesized influence on emotional memory. The research in this 
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chapter aims at testing the causal influence of attention bias on 
interpretation and affective task-switching ability. 
Attention Bias Modification Via Single-Session Dot-Probe 
Training: Failures To Replicate1 
A commonly-used procedure to manipulate attention bias is 
based on the emotional dot-probe task, originally designed to measure 
selective attention toward disorder-related material (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). A standard task design simultaneously 
presents two stimuli (e.g., one disorder-related, one neutral) for a brief 
duration (e.g., 500 ms) at either side of fixation. After offset, a probe 
(e.g., an E or F) appears with equal probability at the location of one of 
the stimuli. Participants are instructed to identify the probe as quickly 
and accurately as possible by pressing the corresponding button. 
Negative biases in attention are inferred from faster RTs on trials with 
probes replacing disorder-related stimuli (i.e., congruent trials) 
compared to trials with probes replacing neutral stimuli (i.e. 
incongruent trials). By varying the contingency between the disorder-
related stimuli and the probe’s location, the standard design can be 
adapted to induce or reduce emotional biases in attention. Using such 
an adapted version of the task, MacLeod and colleagues were able to 
induce a negative bias by consistently presenting the probe at the 
location of the disorder-related stimulus and, analogously, to reduce a 
negative bias by presenting the probe at the opposite location 
(MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002). 
Interestingly, they found that induction compared to reduction of a 
negative attention bias increased stress reactivity.  
                                                             
1 Based on Everaert, J., Mogoase, C., David, D., & Koster, E.H.W. (in press). Attention 
bias modification via single-session dot-probe training: Failures to replicate. Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2014.10.011 
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Building on these initial observations, numerous studies 
investigated the causal relation between attention bias and symptoms 
of emotional disorders, including studies examining whether ABM 
reduces symptoms of anxiety and depression. Effect sizes of attention 
training on affective symptoms vary strongly across meta-analyses. An 
early report estimated the effect size of ABM on anxiety in the medium 
range in nonclinical or subclinical samples, and in the medium-to-large 
range in clinical samples (Hakamata et al., 2010). Later reports, 
including a larger number of studies, found only small effect sizes of 
ABM training in modifying anxiety and emotional reactivity (Beard, 
Sawyer, & Hofmann, 2012; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; Mogoașe, David, & 
Koster, 2014). For depression, meta-analytic evidence suggests no 
effects of ABM on depressive symptomatology, but note that there is 
little research testing ABM in depressed samples (Mogoașe et al., 2014). 
While several recent ABM studies did not produce clinically significant 
changes (Boettcher, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2013; Carlbring et al., 
2012; Julian, Beard, Schmidt, Powers, & Smits, 2012; Rapee et al., 
2013), such failures might be due to failures of ABM to change 
attentional bias at the group or training condition level (Clarke, 
Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014). Yet, there is large variability among 
trainees in attention bias acquisition following ABM delivery and such 
individual differences may predict anxiety levels (Clarke, Chen, & 
Guastella, 2012; Clarke, Macleod, & Shirazee, 2008). These 
observations prompt researchers to consider both the training 
condition and individual differences level of analysis when evaluating 
dot-probe ABM effects. 
Although ABM seems effective in reducing affective 
symptoms, the processes through which ABM alters these symptoms 
need clarification. Decreases in attention bias through training are 
related to reductions in affective symptoms (Mogoașe et al., 2014), but 
this does not explain how changes in attention result in a congruent 
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symptomatic improvement. One process that could account for this is 
generalization or transfer from the stimuli presented in a controlled 
experimental training context to non-trained disorder-relevant stimuli 
and mechanisms closely related to attention that are important to 
emotional well-being. Transfer effects of dot-probe ABM were 
investigated by Van Bockstaele, Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, and De 
Houwer (2012). In their study, participants were trained to attend 
either toward or away from threatening pictures, but training effects did 
not generalize to an emotional interference task measuring processes 
related to attention. These findings contradict earlier observations 
suggesting that dot-probe training effects generalize to a spatial cueing 
task, that is, conditions resembling the initial training task (Amir, 
Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Amir, Weber, Beard, Bomyea, & Taylor, 
2008; Heeren, Lievens, & Philippot, 2011). Moreover, there is some 
evidence for transfer of ABM to memory. A study reported that 
participants with elevated depressive symptom severity trained to 
orient away from negative words did not show a negative recollection 
bias which was observed in control individuals (Blaut et al., 2013). In 
sum, research indicates that dot-probe training effects transfer to new, 
non-trained stimuli under similar conditions, but provides mixed 
evidence regarding transfer to other critical processes. The limited 
insight into the stimuli and processes to which ABM effects transfer 
warrant further empirical scrutiny.  
This section presents three studies to investigate transfer of 
single-session dot-probe training. In experiment 1, we studied transfer 
of attention training toward and away from negative material to non-
trained stimuli in an affective task-switching task. This task measures 
the ability to flexibly switch between affective and non-affective 
processing task-sets, which is a process predictive of trait resilience 
(Genet & Siemer, 2011). In experiment 2 and 3, we examined transfer 
of training toward positive and negative material to trained and non-
Causal relations between cognitive biases 131  
 
trained stimuli in an interpretation task requiring individuals to 
evaluate positive and negative self-relevant meanings. Interpretation 
bias, a risk factor to various emotional disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005), depends on emotional biases in attention and regulates 
emotional memory (Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014; Everaert, Tierens, 
Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013). In keeping with recent ABM research, we 
investigated effects of training on attention bias and transfer tasks at 
the condition and the individual differences level. We expected that 
trained attention biases modulate the flexibility of switching between 
emotional and non-emotional features of non-trained stimuli and alter 
interpretation of emotional material. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Design overview 
After the pre-training attention bias assessment, participants 
were randomly assigned to either a condition in which attention was 
trained away from negative stimuli (i.e., ‘neutral training’), toward 
negative stimuli (i.e., ‘negative training’), or the no-training control. 
Then, participants completed a post-training bias assessment and the 
affective switching task. All tasks were programmed and presented 
using Inquisit 3 (Millisecond Software LLC., Seattle, WA, USA). The 
experiment ended with the questionnaires. The study protocol was 
approved by the ethical committee at Ghent University. 
Participants 
Undergraduate students completed either the neutral (n=26), 
negative (n=23), or no-training (n=25) condition. All participants 
provided informed consent and received a course credit or 8 euro. 
Tasks and measures 
Attention training. ABM consisted of a dot-probe procedure 
modeled after Amir et al. (2008) and Van Bockstaele et al. (2011). On 
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each trial, a 500 ms fixation was followed by of the presentation of two 
pictures (3.82° height × 5.06° width) above and below fixation for 500 
ms. There was a 3.8° angle between fixation and the picture’s center. 
After offset, a probe (E or F) replaced one picture and participants 
identified the probe as fast and accurately as possible by pressing the 
corresponding button. The next trial started 500 ms after a response 
was registered. Participants were seated 60 cm from the monitor.  
There were three different trial types. First, digit trials 
presented numbers from 1 to 6 at the screen’s center requiring 
participants to manually report the digit. This was to check whether 
participants maintained gaze on fixation throughout the task. Second, 
emotional trials presented negative-neutral picture pairs preceding the 
probe (e.g., a snake and a dryer). Trials were considered incongruent 
when a probe replaced the neutral picture and congruent when a probe 
replaced the negative picture. Third, neutral trials presented only 
neutral picture pairs before the probe (e.g., a book and a cup). 
The full ABM procedure comprised four phases. First, a 
practice phase of 24 neutral and 3 digit trials served to familiarize 
participants with the task. In a subsequent pre-training phase, 96 
emotional trials (48 congruent, 48 incongruent), 24 neutral trials, and 
6 digit trials were presented in random order. Next, in the training 
phase, 288 experimental, 72 neutral, and 18 digit trials were presented 
in random order equally dispersed over 3 blocks. Depending on the 
training condition, experimental trials depicted only emotionally 
congruent (‘negative training’), incongruent (‘neutral training’) or an 
equal amount of congruent and incongruent (‘no-training’) trials. In a 
post-training phase, 96 emotional trials (48 congruent, 48 incongruent), 
24 neutral trials, and 6 digit trials were presented. As stimuli, 12 
negative and 12 neutral scenes were used for assessment and training, 
and 6 additional neutral scenes were used for practice. The stimuli were 
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pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) drawn from Van Bockstaele et al. (2012). 
Flexible affective processing. An affective task-switching task 
was modeled after Genet and Siemer (2011). The task presented 
emotional pictures against a red or blue background which served as 
cue to prompt participants to categorize the picture according to the 
affective (Is the picture content positive or negative?) or non-affective 
(Is the picture content an animate or inanimate?) rule. For example, 
participants applied the affective rule when the background colored 
blue, and the non-affective rule when the background colored red. On 
each particular trial, one rule was active and the other non-active. 
Participants were instructed to categorize the picture as fast and 
accurately as possible by pressing a key. The categories were spatially 
mapped on to the ‘E’ and ‘F’ key. For example, animate and positive 
were mapped on to ‘E’ and inanimate and negative were mapped on to 
‘F’. The category – key mappings and cue – rule linkages were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Trials were divided into one consistent and one inconsistent 
block depending on whether responses to the affective and non-
affective rule were mapped on to consistent or inconsistent response 
keys. In the consistent block, trials presented only animate positive and 
inanimate negative pictures such that the response associated with the 
non-active rule did not interfere with the correct response of the active 
rule. That is, the presented pictures required participants to press the 
same key regardless of the cued rule (e.g., ‘F’ is correct when presented 
with inanimate negative pictures regardless the cued rule). In the 
inconsistent block, trials presented only inanimate positive and 
animate negative pictures such that responses associated with the non-
active rule interfered with correct responses according to an active rule. 
Correct categorization responses to the active rule were mapped on to 
different response keys than correct responses for the non-active rule 
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(e.g., ‘F’ is only correct when presented with animate negative pictures 
and cued with an affective rule) Thus, a correct response required 
inhibition of the response associated with the non-active rule. After a 
60-trial practice with feedback, participants completed 120 consistent 
trials followed by 120 inconsistent trials. The processing rule alternated 
randomly within consistent and inconsistent blocks.2 
Stimuli. Thirty positive and thirty negative IAPS scenes (Lang 
et al., 2008) were selected. Half of the positive and negative pictures 
depicted animate and the other half inanimate scenes.  
Questionnaires. Depression severity and trait anxiety were 
measured with the Beck Depression Inventory – II (Beck, Steer, & 
Brown, 1996; Van der Does, 2002) and the Spielberger State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory – ‘trait’ version (STAI-T) (Spielberger, 1983; Van der 
Ploeg, Defares, & Spielberger, 2000). The questionnaires presented a 
series of statements (21 items in a BDI-II, 20 items in a STAI-T) to be 
rated on a 4-point rating scale (BDI-II: from 0 to 3; STAI-T: from 1 to 
4). Both the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002) and the 
STAI-T (Spielberger, 1983; Van der Ploeg et al., 2000) have good 
psychometric properties in non-clinical samples. 
Data preparation and analytical strategy 
Pre and post-training data was trimmed by removing errors, 
RTs faster than 150 ms and slower than 1500 ms, and outlying RTs ± 3 
SD from the individual’s M. All participants performed satisfactory on 
digit trials and were included. Statistical analyses were conducted on 
94% of the data. Affective task-switching task data was trimmed by 
removing practice trials, errors (9.9%), RTs faster than 250ms and 
slower than 2500ms (2.5%).  
                                                             
2 The affective task-switching task presented an equal number of repetition and switch 
trials across the training conditions. There were 121.31 (SD=7.98) switch and 118.68 
(7.89) repetition trials, t(72)=1.42, p=.16. 
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An attentional bias index for the pre and post training phase 
was computed by subtracting RTs on congruent trials from RTs on 
incongruent trials (MacLeod et al., 1986), with higher scores indicating 
a stronger negative bias. Similar to Clark and colleagues, we computed 
an individual bias acquisition index by subtracting the pre-training 
from the post-training attention bias score (Clarke et al., 2012, 2008). 
For the affective task-switching task, repetition and switch trials were 
identified, and switch costs were calculated by subtracting RTs on 
repetition trials from RTs on switch trials for the consistent and 
inconsistent block.3 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics experiment 1, 2, and 3. 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
 Neutral Negative No  
training 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
f/m 20/5 * 21/5 10/8 14/6 18/2 16/1 
Age 20.70  
(1.78) 
* 21.76  
(3.38) 
18.78  
(1.86) 
19.85  
(3.47) 
19.10  
(2.45) 
18.53 
(1.55) 
BDI-II  8.92  
(8.61) 
5.78  
(5.35) 
9.80  
(7.11) 
7.06  
(3.51) 
8.50  
(3.73) 
5.40  
(3.98) 
6.32  
(3.37) 
STAI-T  41.16  
(10.89) 
38.17  
(9.14) 
43.76  
(11.48) 
36.72  
(5.54) 
38.85  
(8.73) 
34.25  
(6.81) 
36.79 
(7.64) 
Notes. Means are presented with standard deviations between parentheses; *data was 
missing for experiment 1. 
 
Statistical analyses were conducted at the training condition 
and at the individual bias acquisition level. We first tested ABM effects 
on attention bias at the condition level via a repeated measures ANOVA 
on RTs with Time (pre-training versus post-training) and Trial Type 
                                                             
3 RTs on switch trials (M=1059, SD=198) were significantly higher than RTs on repetition 
trials (M=911, SD=157), confirming task-switching costs, t(72)=15.31, p<.01. Moreover, 
the task-switching costs on inconsistent trials (M=220, SD=119) were larger than on 
consistent trials (M=102, SD=100), t(72)=6.75, p<.01. 
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(congruent, incongruent) as within-subjects variables and Condition 
(negative, neutral, or no training) as a between-subjects variable. 
Depending on effective ABM implementation, we followed up by 
examining transfer effects at the training condition level via condition-
specific repeated measures analysis. Next, individual differences in 
transfer of training were examined via regression analysis. The 
regression analyses included pre-training attention bias scores (i.e., the 
natural propensity to attend to emotional material) and individual bias 
acquisition scores (i.e., the propensity to modify the natural attentional 
pattern) as predictors of performance on the transfer task, namely the 
affective task-switching costs on consistent and inconsistent blocks. 
Results 
Group characteristics 
No differences among between conditions were found on age, 
F<1, BDI-II, F(2,71)=2.03, p=.14, or STAI-T scores, F(2, 71)=1.70, p=.19. 
The neutral and no-training condition did not differ on gender ratio, 
χ2(1)=.21, p=.65. Table 1 present the sample characteristics. 
Attention training effects 
Repeated measure analysis yielded a main effect of Time, F(1, 
67)=25.99, p<.01, with faster RTs at post-training than at pre-training 
(see Table 2). No other main effects were significant (F-s<1.68). The 
effect for Time × Condition, F(2,67)=4.280, p=.01, revealed 
significantly faster RTs at post-training than at pre-training in the 
neutral, t(23)=2.72, p=.01, and no-training, t(23)=4.81, p<.01, but not 
in the negative training condition, t(21)=1.06, p=.30. The other 
interaction-effects were not significant (all F-s<1).  
Transfer to affective task-switching 
Transfer effects of attention training were tested at the 
individual differences level across conditions given the not-successful 
ABM delivery at the condition level and the substantial variability in 
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attention bias acquisition scores (across conditions: M=3.84, 
SD=34.62, range: -74 – 98; see Table 2 for within condition statistics). 
Regression analysis on consistent task-switching trials yielded no 
significant model fit F(2,67)=1.90, p=.15, R2 = 5.00%, VIF=1.38, T=.72, 
without individual effects of pre-training attention bias, β=-.26, p=.06, 
and individual bias acquisition scores, β=-.08, p=.54. Similarly, neither 
pre-training attention bias scores, β=-.21, p=.13, nor individual bias 
acquisition scores, β=.06, p=.64, predicted task-switching costs on 
inconsistent trials, F(2,67)=1.20, p=.30, R2 = 3.00%, VIF=1.38, T=.72. 
 
Table 2. Attention training data for experiment 1. 
 Condition 
 Neutral  Negative  No-training  
Pre-training 
Congruent 
Incongruent 
 
587 (86) 
584 (77) 
 
545 (54) 
546 (58) 
 
570 (82) 
566 (84) 
Post-training  
Congruent 
Incongruent 
 
559 (73) 
553 (71) 
 
533 (61) 
536 (66) 
 
523 (70) 
516 (75) 
ABA 2 (29) 0 (36) 2 (33) 
TCC 44% 60% 40%* 
Notes. Means are displayed with standard deviations between 
parentheses; ABA=attention bias acquisition score; Training 
congruent change (TCC) refers to the percentage of individuals 
who showed a change in attentional bias score congruent with the 
delivered training. In the no-training group, 40% exhibited a bias 
away from threat and the remaining 60% showed an attention bias 
toward threat compared with baseline. 
 
Discussion 
The results yielded no effects of dot-probe ABM in modifying 
an attention bias at the training condition level, and individual 
differences in the natural tendency to process emotional material as 
well as individual differences in attention bias acquisition were not 
related to affective task-switching costs. This suggests that single-
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session ABM might be insufficient to induce and reduce a negative 
attention bias that could transfer to new emotional stimuli presented in 
an affective task-switching task. 
Experiment 2 
Methods 
Design overview 
After a pre-training attention bias assessment, participants 
were randomly assigned to a condition in which attention was trained 
toward either negative (i.e., ‘negative training’) or positive (i.e., ‘positive 
training’) words. This was to track transfer from ABM to an 
interpretation task, a scrambled sentences test (SST) (Wenzlaff & Bates, 
1998) in which individuals constructed negative or positive sentences 
from ambiguous information. An SST was administered before the pre-
training and after post-training attention bias assessment. Participants 
completed the questionnaires after the pre-training SST. The study 
protocols of experiments 2, and 3 were approved by the institutional 
review board at Ghent University. 
Participants 
Undergraduate students with minimal depression levels (BDI-
II< 14; Van der Does, 2002) at the moment of testing completed either 
the positive (n=18) or negative (n=20) training condition. All 
individuals provided informed consent and received a course credit. 
Tasks and measures 
Attention training. The ABM procedure was identical to 
experiment 1 with exception of the stimuli (words, not pictures) and 
presented stimulus pairs (negative-positive pairs, not negative-neutral 
pairs). Emotional trials were considered incongruent when probes 
replaced positive words, and congruent when probes replaced negative 
words. There was 2° vertical distance between the words. 
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Stimuli. Forty-eight word pairs were selected for the ABM task. 
Each pair corresponded with positive and negative words from a 
scrambled sentence (e.g., ‘bright’ and ‘dismal’ in ‘looks the future bright 
very dismal’; see below). Word pairs of the pre-training SST were 
presented in the pre-training phase and word pairs of the post-training 
SST were presented in the training and post-training phase. All stimuli 
were displayed in white uppercase letters against a black background. 
Twelve neutral-neutral word pairs corresponded with target words 
from a SST used in an earlier study (Everaert et al., 2014). 
Transfer task and questionnaires. The SST assessed 
interpretation bias. Presented with a scrambled sentence (e.g., “looks 
the future bright very dismal”), participants form grammatically correct 
and meaningful self-relevant statements by using 5 of the 6 words. 
Reporting the first sentence that comes to mind, all solved items have a 
positive (e.g., “the future looks very bright”) or negative (e.g., “the 
future looks very dismal”) meaning. Two matched sets of 24 scrambled 
sentences were drawn from Everaert, Duyck, et al. (2014) as a pre- and 
post-training measures. At each assessment, participants solved as 
many sentences as possible within 3.5 minutes. A cognitive load 
procedure was applied to reduce social desirable responses (Rude, 
Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002). Participants memorized a 6 
digit number before which they had to recall after the test. The number 
of sentences solved in a negative versus positive manner served as an 
index of interpretation bias. The questionnaires were identical to 
experiment 1. 
Data preparation and analytical strategy 
Pre- and post-training data were trimmed by removing errors 
(4.80%), RTs faster than 150 ms and slower than 1500 ms (< 1%), and 
RTs ± 3 SDs from the individuals’ mean score (1.30%). All participants 
performed satisfactory on digit trials and were included. A change index 
for interpretation bias was computed by subtracting pre-training from 
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post-training biases scores across training conditions. The analytical 
strategy from experiment 1 was applied. 
Results 
Group characteristics 
The negative and positive training condition were not 
significantly different regarding mean age, F(1, 36)=1.36, gender ratio, 
χ2(1)=.85, p=.36, p=.25, BDI-II, F(1, 36)=1.50, p=.23, nor STAI-T, F<1, 
p=.38, scores (see Table 1).  
 
Table 3. Attention training and interpretation data for experiment 2 and 3. 
 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Variable 500 ms 500 ms 750 ms 1000ms 750ms 1000 ms 
Pre-training 
Congruent 
Incongruent 
SST 
515 (45) 
507 (43) 
25 (16) 
556 (58) 
556 (52) 
27 (19) 
604 (91) 
599 (90) 
19 (15) 
588 (81) 
584 (93) 
655 (106) 
659 (105) 
19 (12) 
653 (108) 
645 (116) 
Post-training 
Congruent 
Incongruent 
SST 
504 (40) 
501 (42) 
24 (14) 
537 (57) 
536 (49) 
23 (16) 
600 (62) 
602 (68) 
14 (14) 
594 (63) 
598 (61) 
618 (81) 
618 (78) 
19 (15) 
614 (73) 
607 (70) 
ABA 4 (20) -1 (30) 8 (54) 8 (50) -4 (50) 1 (52) 
TCC  50% 55% 55% 65% 42% 47% 
Notes. Means are displayed with standard deviations between parentheses; ABA=attention 
bias acquisition score; TCC=Training congruent change. 
 
Attention training effects 
Analysis yielded a main effect of Time, F(1, 36)=6.17, p=.02, 
with faster RTs at post-training, M=520 (SD=48), than at pre-training 
assessment, M=534 (SD=50). The main effect of Condition, F(1, 
36)=7.31, p=.01, indicated that individuals in the positive training 
condition responded significantly faster, M=507 (SD=43), compared to 
individuals in the negative training condition, M=547 (SD=54). The 
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effect of Trial Type, F(1,36)=2.15, p=.15, and all interaction-effects were 
not significant (F-s<1.10). Table 3 presents the RT data. 
Transfer to interpretation bias 
As in experiment 1, there was substantial variability in 
attention bias acquisition scores (across conditions: M=1.77, SD=25.28, 
range: -49.41 – 54.51; see Table 3 for within condition statistics) 
warranting analysis of transfer of training at the individual bias 
acquisition level across conditions (N=38). Regression analysis showed 
that neither pre-training attention bias scores, β=.06, p=.77, nor 
individual bias acquisition scores, β=.12, p=.58, predicted the change in 
interpretation bias, F<1, p=.85, R2=1.00%, VIF=1.62, T=.62. 
Discussion 
The ABM procedure did not induce a positive or negative 
attention bias and pre-training attention bias as well as individual bias 
acquisition scores were also not related to interpretation bias. To 
optimize the attention training, the procedure in experiment 3 
presented emotional faces to elicit stronger emotional reactions 
compared to verbal stimuli (Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, 
2013), and extended stimulus presentation durations to allow longer 
elaboration on the stimuli presented (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). 
Experiment 3 
Methods 
The experimental procedure was identical to experiment 2. 
Participants 
Undergraduate students with minimal depression levels (BDI-
II < 14) (Van der Does, 2002) completed to the positive (n=20) or 
negative training (n=19). All participants provided informed consent 
and received course credits or 8 euro.  
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Tasks and measures 
Attention training. The ABM task from experiment 2 was 
modified such that after fixation two face expressions appeared at the 
left and right side from fixation for either 750 ms or 1000 ms (to test 
the effect of elaboration time). Within trials, the face pairs depicted a 
happy and a sad expression from the same actor or two neutral 
expressions from different actors. The horizontal distance between the 
center of the pictures was 12.37° (picture size 9.33° × 9.33°). After offset, 
a probe (an E or F) prompted participants to identify the letter by 
pressing the corresponding button. The next trial started 500 ms after 
a response was recorded. Features of the ABM task were identical to 
experiment 1. An equal number of trials presented the stimuli for 750 
ms and 1000 ms in each phase. 
Stimuli. Face expressions were drawn from the Karolinska 
Directed Emotional Faces database (Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & 
Koster, 2006). Based on the hit rates (>80%), intensity, arousal ratings 
(evaluated on 9-point rating scales), and identity (same actor for happy 
and sad faces), 24 happy (intensity: M=6.39, SD=1.64; arousal: M=3.85, 
SD=1.98), 24 sad (intensity: M=6.14, SD=1.66; arousal: M=3.67, 
SD=1.76), and 18 neutral (intensity: M=5.11, SD=2.17; arousal: M=2.51, 
SD=1.47) faces were selected.  
Transfer task. Interpretation bias was measured using the SST. 
Two versions of each 20 items were used as pre- and post-training 
assessment. Participants received 2.5 minutes to complete the test and 
again a cognitive load procedure was applied. 
Data preparation and analytical strategy 
Errors, RTs faster than 150 ms and slower than 1500 ms, as well 
as individual outliers (± 3SD from M) were removed from the pre- and 
post-training data. All participants performed satisfactory on digit trials 
and were included. Analyses were ran on 96% of the data. The analytical 
strategy was identical to experiment 2.  
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Results 
Group characteristics 
Training conditions did not differ on age, F<1, p=.41, gender 
ratio, χ2(1) = .21, p = .65, BDI-II, F<1, p=.44, nor STAI-T, F(1,37)=1.20, 
p=.28, scores (see Table 1). 
Attention training effects 
Analysis on RTs for trials presenting stimuli for 750 ms 
revealed no significant main or interaction effects of Time × Condition, 
Trial Type × Condition, or Time × Trial Type. Also the crucial effect of 
Time × Trial Type × Condition was not significant (all F-s<2). The 
analysis on RTs for trials with 1000 ms durations yielded no effects of 
Time, F<1, Trial Type, F<1, or Condition, F(1,37)=2.97, p=.09. The 
interaction-effects of Time × Condition, F(1,37)=2.65, p=.11, Trial Type 
× Condition, Time × Trial Type, and Time × Trial Type × Condition were 
also not significant, F-s <1. Table 3 presents RT data. 
Transfer to interpretation bias 
Individual differences in transfer were examined across 
conditions (N=39) given the considerable variability in attention bias 
acquisition (across conditions: for 750 ms duration: M=2.00, 
SD=52.13, range: -127.25 – 146.63; for 1000 ms duration: M=4.76, 
SD=50.42, range: -131.38 – 121.25; see also Table 3 for within condition 
statistics). For 750 ms presentation durations, regression analysis on 
change scores of interpretation bias (F<1, p=.67, R2=2.20%, VIF=1.59, 
T=.63) revealed no predictive effects of pre-training attention bias, β=-
.17, p=.41, nor individual bias acquisition scores, β=-.16, p=.45. For 
1000 ms presentation durations, regression analysis showed that not 
pre-training attention bias, β=-.18, p=.35, but individual bias 
acquisition scores, β=-.46, p<.05 predicted the change in interpretation 
bias. However, the model with the two predictors had no significant fit: 
F(2, 36)=3.05, p=.06, R2=14.5%, VIF=1.60, T=.63.  
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Discussion 
The dot-probe training induced neither a positive nor a 
negative attention bias. Again, pre-training attention bias scores and 
individual differences in attention bias acquisition were not related to 
performance on the interpretation transfer task. 
General Discussion 
Three experiments investigated transfer effects of single-
session dot-probe attention training procedures to manipulate 
emotional biases in attention allocation. In contrast to prior research 
reporting effective modification of attention through dot-probe training 
in healthy samples (Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; 
Mogoașe et al., 2014), we found –across three studies– no evidence that 
dot-probe ABM can induce or reduce attention biases via a single-
session training. Although the applied training procedure closely 
resembled procedures that have effectively implemented ABM (Amir et 
al., 2008; Van Bockstaele et al., 2011), we did not find changes in 
attention bias at the training condition level in response to training 
toward negative, positive, or away from negative with various stimulus 
materials (i.e., emotional scenes, words, facial expressions) and 
stimulus presentation durations (500ms, 750ms, 1000ms). Thus, the 
present findings add to recent research that did not replicate successful 
ABM delivery (Boettcher et al., 2013; Carlbring et al., 2012; Rapee et al., 
2013). 
When inspecting individual differences in bias acquisition, we 
consistently observed a large inter-individual variability both within 
and across training conditions indicating that attention bias changed in 
accordance to the contingency of the dot-probe procedure in a subset of 
the trained individuals, in the conducted experiments varying from 42% 
to 65%. Analogous to studies indicating that such individual differences 
predict changes in anxiety (Clarke et al., 2012, 2008), we tested whether 
individual differences the natural propensity to attend to emotional 
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material (i.e., pre-training attention bias scores) and the propensity to 
modify the natural attentional pattern (i.e., individual bias acquisition 
scores) were related to individual differences in performance on the 
transfer tasks. We found no evidence for transfer of attention training 
at the individual differences level of analysis. Individual bias acquisition 
scores were not related to congruent biases on an affective task-
switching task presenting new, non-trained stimuli. This finding seems 
to be in contrast with prior studies reporting transfer from dot-probe 
training to new stimuli presented in a spatial cueing (attention) task 
(Amir et al., 2009, 2008; Heeren et al., 2011). Furthermore, we found 
no evidence for transfer of individual training effects to interpretation 
bias. Individual bias acquisition scores were not related to performance 
on an interpretation test presenting trained (experiment 2) or non-
trained (experiment 3) stimuli. This is surprising in light of prior 
research showing that interpretation mediates the relation between 
attention and memory bias (Everaert et al., 2014, 2013). Moreover, the 
pre-training attention bias scores did not predict affective task-
switching costs nor the change in interpretation bias. This suggests that 
an individual’s natural tendency to allocate attention to emotional 
material, measured before attention training, is not related to 
performance on transfer tasks tapping into cognitive processes related 
to attention. 
What factors may explain the variability in ABM response and 
modulate transfer? Effective ABM delivery may depend on attentional 
control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), that is a person’s 
ability to exert top down control to focus attention on stimuli appearing 
at the probe’s location and to inhibit attention on stimuli at the opposite 
location. Individuals with better attentional control may benefit more 
from ABM training which might enhance transfer of training. The role 
of top down attentional control in bottom up (dot-probe) ABM and how 
this alters transfer requires future investigation. A second factor that 
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could moderate training and transfer are emotion regulation strategies. 
Such strategies (e.g., reappraisal, rumination) do not only involve 
attention toward information that matches one’s concerns, but also 
cognitive processes to which ABM might transfer, in that way 
moderating (transfer of) training. Interestingly, research found that 
high ruminators trained to attend toward positive material showed a 
stronger positive bias after training (Arditte & Joormann, 2014), and 
observed a close relation between rumination and emotional biases in 
interpretation (Mor, Hertel, Ngo, Shachar, & Redak, 2014). Future 
studies may consider trait differences in emotion regulation when 
evaluating ABM training and transfer effects. A last factor concerns the 
limited reliability of the dot-probe task to measure attention bias, as 
such jeopardizing detection of training and transfer (Salemink, Van 
Den Hout, & Kindt, 2007; Schmukle, 2005). Particular task features 
(e.g., intra-individual variability in voluntary responses) and the nature 
of attention (e.g., flexible prioritizing on a trial-by-trial basis depending 
on thoughts that come to mind) could explain the low reliability. Its 
causes need to be identified to optimize future task designs.  
Several limitations of the experiments conducted should be 
acknowledged. A first limitation is the lack of effective ABM 
implementation at the condition level. Although examining transfer via 
individual bias acquisition scores is informative, transfer of ABM may 
need to be retested after effective ABM delivery at the condition level. A 
second limitation is the measurement of affective task-switching after 
the ABM procedure in experiment 1. Although this avoids adverse 
consequences of long experimental sessions, we cannot rule out that 
there were pre-existing differences between training conditions. 
Measuring switching ability before and after training would enable a 
more rigorous test of transfer from ABM to this process. Another 
limitation concerns the order of cognitive tasks after training delivery. 
In all experiments, participants completed a transfer task after post-
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training bias assessment which could have reduced ABM effects on the 
transfer task. However, proof of change in attention bias and transfer is 
essential to draw conclusions on training effects and how they transfer 
(Van Bockstaele et al., 2011). Of final note, the limited range of 
psychopathology may have obscured training and transfer effects. 
Studies by Blaut et al. (2013) and Arditte and Joormann (2014) 
observed training or transfer at higher levels of depression or 
rumination. The restricted range of affective symptoms in the 
experiments limits exploration of such moderation effects. 
In conclusion, three experiments provide no evidence for 
single-session dot-probe ABM to effectively manipulate attention 
biases toward negative, away from negative, or toward positive stimuli 
at the training condition level. The large individual variability in 
attention bias acquisition was not related to the performance on 
transfer tasks of flexible affective processing and interpretation. Future 
research may need to investigate factors that moderate attentional 
plasticity in response to dot-probe ABM to optimize conditions for 
effective implementation and transfer of training. 
Ability and Tendency Processes During Ambiguity 
Resolution4 
A wealth of empirical research has provided evidence for 
depression-related emotional biases in attention and interpretation. 
Whereas healthy people are biased toward positive material, depressed 
people allocate attention disproportionally more to negative compared 
with positive or neutral material (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010) and draw more negative than positive meanings 
on ambiguous information (Wisco, 2009). These biases in attention and 
                                                             
4 Based on Sanchez, A., Everaert, J., De Putter, L., Mueller, S., & Koster, Ernst H. W. (in 
press). Emotional attention during instructed and uninstructed ambiguity resolution in 
relation to depressive symptoms. Biological Psychology. 
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interpretation seem closely related. Attention biases modulate 
encoding (Everaert et al., 2014) and retrieval (Everaert & Koster, 2015) 
of emotional interpretations drawn on ambiguous material. At present, 
however, the nature of attention and interpretation biases is not well-
understood.  
Some theoretical models of depression (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 
1999; Ingram, 1984; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997) 
assume that emotionally biased cognitive processes reflect processing 
tendencies driven by schemas. Schemas refer to a coherent set of 
memory representations gravitating around beliefs about the self and 
others (e.g., “I am a failure”). The knowledge represented in these 
schemas could be recruited in automatic and goal-driven or strategic 
ways to guide attention allocation and interpretation while processing 
new emotional information. In support of this hypothesis, some studies 
have shown that prior learning experiences can shape attention 
allocation toward emotionally congruent material (Anderson, Laurent, 
& Yantis, 2011; Fulcher, Mathews, Mackintosh, & Law, 2001; Hickey & 
van Zoest, 2013; Rohner, 2004; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 
2015).  
Other cognitive views on depression (Hertel, 1997; Joormann, 
Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007; Joormann, 2010) propose that cognitive biases 
reflect regulatory deficits in cognitive or attentional control. Attentional 
control refers to a person’s ability to exert top down control to focus 
attention on task-relevant stimuli and to inhibit attention toward task-
irrelevant stimuli. Here, emotional biases in attention toward negative 
material would reflect deficits in cognitive control processes, such as 
deficient cognitive inhibition of negative material in working memory. 
In support of this notion, research has demonstrated such depression-
related difficulties in inhibition and attentional control (De Lissnyder, 
Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010; Derakshan, Salt, & Koster, 2009; 
Goeleven et al., 2006; Joormann, 2004).  
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While schema-based and impaired cognitive control accounts 
of depression differ with respect to their prediction regarding the nature 
of emotional biases in attention and interpretation, both theoretical 
perspectives have received some empirical support. At present, 
however, a direct test comparing how tendency versus ability processes 
are involved in the interplay between attention and interpretation 
biases during elaboration on emotional material has yet to be conducted. 
This lingering issue motivated the current study. 
Experiment 4 
To illuminate the nature of attention and interpretation biases 
related to depression, empirical tests could be derived from defining 
features of tendency-driven versus ability-driven processes with respect 
to the malleability of the cognitive biases in attention and interpretation. 
If attention and interpretation biases reflect processing tendencies, 
then these biases could be overridden by verbal instruction and/or top-
down control (Hertel, 1994). Alternatively, if these biases are related to 
a reduced ability to control or regulate emotion processing, than they 
would be less malleable via verbal instruction and thus require more 
sophisticated interventions to modify the processing biases (Calkins, 
McMorran, Siegle, & Otto, 2014; Siegle, Ghinassi, & Thase, 2007). 
The present study aimed to investigate relations between 
depressive symptom severity, attention bias, and interpretation bias 
while distinguishing between processing tendency and ability processes 
based on assumptions regarding their malleability. We adapted a 
recently designed method to model attention – interpretation relations 
(Everaert et al., 2014) to tap into tendency and ability processes. The 
original study design involved the use of eye tracking (to measure 
attention bias) while participants performed a scrambled sentences test 
(to measure interpretation bias). This test requires participants to 
create self-referent statements using five of the six presented words 
(e.g., “I am a born winner” derived from the item “born I winner am 
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loser a”). In this study, participants with varying depressive symptom 
levels took part in two different lab sessions in which they completed a 
processing tendency (session 1) or ability (session 2) version of the 
scrambled sentences test. In the tendency version, participants were 
asked to report the first unscrambled sentence that came to mind (i.e., 
to assess individual differences in the tendency to interpret ambiguous 
information in a negative or positive manner). In the ability version, 
participants were asked to unscramble all emotional sentences in a 
positive manner (i.e., to assess individual differences in the ability to 
draw positive meanings on ambiguous information). Modeling 
relations between depressive symptom severity, attention bias, and 
interpretation bias, several cognitive models (Ingram, 1984; Joormann 
et al., 2007; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988) and prior 
research (Everaert et al., 2014, 2013) point out that depression-related 
biases in attention can regulate the process of interpretation. Therefore, 
we hypothesized that attention bias (indexed by the relative fixation 
time on positive versus negative words in a scrambled sentence) would 
mediate the relation between depressive symptom severity and 
interpretation bias (indexed by the number of positively versus 
negatively unscrambled sentences). We expected such an indirect effect 
for both tendency and ability processes. 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty-two undergraduate students (39 women; age range: 17-27) 
with a broad range of Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II) (Beck et 
al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002) scores were recruited. All participants 
were native Dutch speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
They provided informed consent and were paid 15 euro. The study was 
approved by the faculty review board at Ghent University. 
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Depressive symptom severity 
The BDI-II assessed depressive symptom severity. On 21 items 
rated on a four-point scale, respondents indicated the extent to which 
they suffered from depressive symptoms in the past two weeks. This 
measure has good reliability and validity in both healthy and depressed 
samples (Beck et al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002). The internal 
consistency was α=.94 in this study. At testing, a mean score of 9.85 
(SD=9.39; range: 0-37) was observed, with 38 individuals reporting 
minimal, 5 mild, 6 moderate, and 3 severe symptom levels. 
Stimuli 
A total set of 43 Dutch scrambled sentences (24 emotional, 19 
neutral sentences) was drawn from the stimulus pool designed for a 
prior study (Everaert et al., 2014). All scrambled sentences were self-
referent and six words long. Each emotional scrambled sentence 
presented one positive and one negative target word (e.g., “winner” and 
“loser” in “am winner born loser a I”). Target words were matched 
between valence categories on word length, word class, and CELEX-
based word frequency using WordGen (Duyck, Desmet, Verbeke, & 
Brysbaert, 2004). 5  There were no differences between negative and 
positive target words on these lexical variables (F-s<1). To control for 
parafoveal processing of adjoining words (Schotter et al., 2012) and 
wrap-up effects (i.e., differential reading times for sentence-final versus 
sentence-internal words; Rayner, Kambe, & Duffy, 2000), word 
position within each scrambled sentence was randomized with the 
constraint that emotional words occurred neither next to each other nor 
as the first or last word within a scrambled sentence. In addition, the 
positive word was presented before the negative word in exactly half of 
                                                             
5 Word length: M negative words = 8.79 (SD negative words = 1.71), M positive words = 8.58 (SD positive words 
= 1.97); Word frequency (log frequency per million): M negative words = 1.02 (SD negative words = 
0.47), M positive words = 1.04 (SD positive words = 0.62). 
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the emotional scrambled sentences. Criteria employed for the 
emotional scrambled sentences were also applied to neutral target 
words (e.g., “cinema” and “theatre” in “the I theatre visit cinema often”) 
in the neutral sentences. 
Assessment of cognitive biases  
The experimental task design was modeled after Everaert et al. 
(2014) who used a combination of an interpretation task (a 
computerized version of the Scrambled Sentences Test; SST; Wenzlaff 
& Bates, 1998) with online measurement of attention bias (via eye 
tracking).  
The basic experimental design. Each trial of the SST started 
with the presentation of a fixation cross at the left side of the screen 
until participants fixated the point for 200 ms. The following stimulus 
display presented either a neutral or an emotional scrambled sentence. 
Each scrambled sentences occurred at the center of the screen on a 
single line in black mono-spaced lowercase Arial (font size 25pt) against 
a white background. Participants were instructed to mentally 
unscramble the sentences to form a grammatically correct and 
meaningful statement using five of the six words (e.g., “I often visit the 
theatre” in a neutral trial; “I am a born winner”, in an emotional trial), 
as quickly as possible. Upon completion, participants pressed a button 
to continue to the response trial part. Here, each word of the scrambled 
sentence was presented with a number prompting participants to report 
their unscrambled solution to the experimenter using the 
corresponding numbers (to reduce socially desirable responding). The 
response display was presented until response or for maximum of 8000 
ms.  
After a 3-trial practice phase with only neutral scrambled 
sentences, participants started the test phase. The test phase presented 
40 scrambled sentences dispersed over 5 blocks with 3 blocks of only 
emotional sentences and 2 blocks of only neutral scrambled sentences. 
Causal relations between cognitive biases 153  
 
The neutral blocks were always presented between emotional blocks to 
reduce priming effects (i.e., emotional – neutral – emotional – neutral 
– emotional). Each block randomly presented 8 scrambled sentences. 
Interpretation bias was indexed by the number of positively versus 
negatively unscrambled sentences over the total correctly completed 
emotional (positive and negative) sentences (see the ‘cognitive bias 
indices’ section). 
While participants performed the SST, their gaze behavior was 
recorded during the stimulus display trial parts of the task via eye-
tracking. This enabled online measurement of visual attention while 
participants actively selected competing positive and negative stimuli 
(e.g., ““winner” and “loser” in “am winner born loser a I”) to elaborate 
on the target item relevant to the process of making meaning (e.g., “I 
am a born winner” versus “I am a born loser”). Eye movement 
registration provides sensitive parameters (e.g., fixation times) to index 
emotional biases in attention allocation in such a reading context 
(Rayner, 1998). 
Tendency versus ability processes. As noted in the introduction, 
the malleability of the processing biases through top-down control is, 
by definition, a distinguishing feature of tendency-driven versus ability-
driven processing biases. It is proposed that tendency processes can be 
overridden by verbal instruction whereas ability-related regulatory 
impairments are less malleable via instruction. This defining feature 
can be used to pit these different views on the nature of cognitive biases 
against each other. In this study, we used this basic feature to create two 
different versions of the SST: one version to index individual differences 
in the tendency to interpret ambiguous information in a negative or 
positive manner, and the other variant to assess individual differences 
in the ability to draw positive meanings on ambiguous information.  
The tendency and ability version of the basic task design only 
differed with regard to the task instructions provided to the participants. 
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In the tendency version, participants received the standard task 
instructions and were asked to report the first unscrambled sentence 
that came to mind. In the ability version, participants were instructed 
to unscramble all emotional sentences to create grammatically correct 
and positive self-statements in the emotional blocks and to follow 
standard task instructions during neutral blocks. The tendency and 
ability version of the SST were completed in two separate experimental 
sessions. All participants first completed the tendency version and one 
week later the ability version. The long time interval prevented 
memory-effects in the second session (even after a short retention 
interval participants recalled <7 unscrambled solutions in a previous 
study; see Everaert, Duyck, et al., 2014). 
The same set of scrambled sentences was used in each version 
of the SST. Note that the blocks of trials were presented in a different 
order between the sessions to control for serial position effects. Three 
types of block combinations across the two SST versions were 
constructed. We ensured that the emotional and neutral blocks in the 
first session did not appear in the same order in the second session. 
Participants were randomly presented with one of the three possible 
block combinations. 
Cognitive bias indices 
The same indices of attention and interpretation bias were 
computed for the tendency and the ability versions of the SST. 
Following calculations were made for each task variant. To obtain a 
measure of attention bias, we considered the total fixation time (i.e., the 
sum of the duration across fixations) on the positive versus negative 
target words in the emotional scrambled sentences (i.e., the areas of 
interest). This parameter is a commonly reported index of attention 
bias that is sensitive to individual differences in depressive symptom 
severity (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011; 
Everaert et al., 2014). A relative bias score (i.e., positive versus negative) 
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was calculated within-subjects (Everaert et al., 2014). The total fixation 
time on positive words was divided by the total fixation time on 
emotional (positive and negative) words in the emotional scrambled 
sentences. Note that this relative index controls for inter-individual 
baseline fixation differences due to inter-individual variability in 
reading performance. 
For interpretation bias, a positive bias index was computed by 
dividing the number of positively unscrambled sentences by the total 
number correctly completed emotional (positive and negative) 
sentences. 
Eye tracking 
Participants’ eye movements were recorded using a Tobii 
TX300 eye-tracker system. This system employs a dual-Purkinje eye-
tracking method (Crane & Steele, 1985) and samples eye-gaze 
coordinates at 300 Hz (e.g., a coordinates’ estimation every 3.3 ms). 
Both stimuli presentation and eye movements’ recording were 
controlled by E-prime Professional software (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2012). The eye-tracking system synchronized automatically 
with the program at the start of each trial. Participants were seated 
approximately 60 cm from the eye tracker capture. Eye movement 
signals were converted to visual fixation data by using E-prime 
extensions for Tobii (i.e., Clearview PackageCalls). Visual fixations were 
considered when longer than 100 ms. Areas of interest were the 
negative and positive target words in each emotional scrambled 
sentence. 
Procedure 
The study involved two separate experimental sessions. In the 
first session, participants provided informed consent and completed 
the BDI-II. This was followed by the tendency version of the SST, which 
was combined with eye tracking. A 9-point grid calibration procedure 
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was repeated before each emotional block of the SST, drifts from proper 
calibration were checked at the start of each trial, and the system was 
recalibrated when necessary. The experimenter recorded the 
participants’ verbal responses (i.e., the coded unscrambled sentences) 
manually without providing feedback. Participants were given the 
opportunity to take a short break after each test block to ensure optimal 
concentration. In the second experimental session, one week later, 
participants completed the ability version of the SST, which was again 
combined with eye-tracking. We adhered to the same protocol as in the 
first session. Each experimental session lasted between 20-30 min. 
Statistical analyses 
The data-analytic strategy comprised two steps. First, we 
inspected bivariate correlations between depressive symptom severity 
(BDI-II scores) and biases in attention (percentage of the total fixation 
time spent on positive words) and interpretation (percentage of 
positively unscrambled sentences) during tendency and ability 
processes. This was done to investigate associations between the 
variables under study. Second, to examine how tendency and ability 
processes in attention and interpretation biases operate in depression, 
we tested a mediation model in which attention bias intervenes as 
mediator in the relationship between depressive symptom severity and 
interpretation bias. Note that model building was based on theoretical 
hypotheses by cognitive models (Ingram, 1984; Joormann et al., 2007; 
Williams et al., 1988) and prior research findings (Everaert et al., 2014, 
2013).  
We tested the mediation model separately for tendency and 
ability processes using a bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). By relying on confidence intervals to determine the significance 
of the indirect effect, this statistical method avoids problems associated 
with traditional approaches (e.g., unrealistic assumptions regarding 
multivariate normality) (see Hayes, 2009). We examined the 
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significance of the total effect (i.e., effect of depressive symptom 
severity on interpretation bias without taking into account attention 
bias; path c), the direct effect (i.e., effect of depressive symptom severity 
on interpretation bias after controlling for attention bias; path c’), and 
the indirect effect (i.e., effect of depressive symptom severity on 
interpretation bias via attention bias; path a × b). The estimated 5000 
bias-corrected bootstrap 95% confidence intervals should not contain 0 
to be significant (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  
 
Table 1. Correlations between dependent variables and descriptive statistics. 
 1 2 3 4 M (SD) 
BDI-II -.32* -.75** -.31* -.19 9.85 (9.39) 
Processing tendency      
1. Attention bias – .30* .08 .20 52.06% (3.18) 
2. Interpretation bias  – .15 .26+ 69.87% (23.76) 
Processing ability      
3. Attention bias   – .32* 52.82% (3.58) 
4. Interpretation bias    – 96.89% (6.99) 
Notes. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – II; +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01. 
 
Results 
Correlational analysis 
Table 1 presents the correlations between depressive symptom 
severity and emotional biases in attention and interpretation for 
tendency and ability processes. 
Processing tendency. There were negative correlations between 
depressive symptom severity and both attention and interpretation 
biases, suggesting that lower depressive symptom severity levels are 
linked to more positive emotional biases in both attention and 
interpretation. Attention and interpretation biases were also positively 
correlated with one another. This indicates that a greater attention bias 
toward positive compared to negative material is linked to more 
positive compared to negative interpretations of ambiguous material.  
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Processing ability. Depressive symptom severity was negatively 
correlated with attention bias, but was not related to interpretation bias. 
Attention bias was again positively correlated with interpretation bias, 
showing that a higher ability to interpret ambiguous information in a 
positive manner is linked to a more positive emotional bias in attention.  
Processing tendency and ability associations. Across-session 
correlations indicate that attention and interpretation biases during 
tendency and ability processing are relatively independent. 
Interpretation tendency and ability were only marginally related (r=.26, 
p=.06), and no significant correlations between attention biases 
emerged across sessions (r=.08, p=.58). 
Bias-corrected bootstrapping analysis 
Bias-corrected bootstrapping analyses with 5000 samples were 
conducted separately for tendency and ability processes. For tendency 
processes, we tested a mediation model with depressive symptom 
severity as the independent variable, interpretation bias as the 
dependent variable, and attention bias as the mediator. For ability 
processes, we tested an indirect effect model (cf. the non-significant 
relation between depressive symptom severity and interpretation bias) 
with depressive symptom severity as the independent variable, 
interpretation bias as the dependent variable, and attention bias as the 
intervening variable (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). 
Processing tendency. Bootstrapping analysis estimated the 
indirect effect of depressive symptom severity on interpretation bias via 
attention bias between 95%-CI: [-.0025, .0009] suggesting that the 
indirect effect is not significantly different from zero at p<.05 (indirect 
effect coefficient=-.0006, SE=.0008). The total effect, c=-.019 
(SE=.0024), t=-7.90, p<.001, 95%-CI: [-.0236, -.0141], and the direct 
effect, c’=-.0183 (SE=0.0025), t=-7.22, p<.001, 95%-CI: [-.0233, -.0132] 
were significant. These results indicate that, for tendency processes, 
attention bias did not mediate the relation between depressive 
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symptom severity and interpretation bias. Instead, depressive symptom 
severity seems to have a direct effect on interpretation bias. 
Processing ability. The indirect effect of depressive symptom 
severity on interpretation bias via attention bias was negative (indirect 
effect coefficient=-.0007, SE=.0005) and statistically different from 
zero (p<.05). The bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval was 
entirely below zero, 95%-CI: [-.0020, -.0001]. This suggests that, for 
ability processes, attention bias acts an intervening variable in the 
relation between depressive symptom severity and interpretation 
ability. Both the total effect, c=-.0014 (SE=.001), t=-1.36, p=.18, 95%-
CI: [-.0035, .0007], and the direct effect, c’=-.0007 (SE=0.0011), t=-
0.70, p=.49, 95%-CI: [-.0028, .0014], were not significant. The 
significant indirect effect and the non-significant total and direct effects 
provide support for the proposed indirect effect model. 
Discussion 
This study examined relations between depressive symptom 
severity, attention, and interpretation bias under tendency-driven 
and/or ability-driven processing conditions of new emotional material. 
The results showed (1) that depressive symptom severity was related to 
attention biases during tendency as well as ability processes, and (2) an 
indirect effect of depressive symptom severity on interpretation bias via 
attention bias as an intervening variable only for ability processes. 
These main findings are discussed in turn. 
The significant correlations found between depressive 
symptom severity and attention biases during both tendency-driven 
and ability-driven processes suggest that depression-linked biases in 
attention may reflect influences of both schemas/prior learning and 
attentional control. This pattern of relations provides evidence for 
cognitive models of depression assuming that emotionally biased 
cognitive processes reflect processing tendencies driven by memory 
representations (Clark et al., 1999; Ingram, 1984; Williams et al., 1997) 
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as well as for cognitive views asserting that emotionally biased cognitive 
processes reflect regulatory deficits in attentional control (Joormann et 
al., 2007; Joormann, 2010). It also aligns with research indicating that 
depression-related attention biases can be guided by prior learning 
experiences of emotional material (Anderson et al., 2011; Fulcher et al., 
2001; Hickey & van Zoest, 2013; Rohner, 2004; Schmidt et al., 2015) 
but also with research showing that depression-related attention biases 
are linked to deficient attentional control in the inhibition of negative 
information (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Derakshan et al., 2009; 
Goeleven et al., 2006; Joormann, 2004). Interestingly, the indices of 
attention bias during tendency and ability processes were not correlated. 
This suggests that tendency-based biases and ability-driven deficits in 
emotional attention reflect relatively independent mechanisms that 
may influence emotional attention processing differently depending on 
the nature of the task. 
This study also showed that attention bias acts as an 
intervening variable between depressive symptom severity and 
interpretation bias for ability processes, while this was not true for 
tendency processes. This finding suggests that attention operations 
linked to deficits in attentional control in depression may act as a 
relevant mechanism in the subsequent elaboration on or interpretation 
of emotional material. This finding provides further support for 
predictions by impaired cognitive control accounts of depression 
(Joormann et al., 2007; Joormann, 2010) and adds to prior research 
evidence testing the hypothesized indirect effect of depression-linked 
attention biases on the elaboration of new emotional information 
(Everaert et al., 2014, 2013). The absence of evidence for an indirect 
effect of depressive symptom severity on interpretation bias via 
attention bias for tendency processes does not rule out the role of 
tendency-based cognitive biases in depression. It only indicates that the 
current mediation model does not adequately represent the interplay 
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between depressive symptom severity, attention bias, and 
interpretation bias. This is further suggested by the significant 
correlations between depressive symptom severity levels and attention 
biases for tendency as well as ability processes. Future research may 
need to provide a more direct measure of memory bias or dysfunctional 
schemas to explicitly model this effect in relation to depressive 
symptoms and attention bias to capture their interplay during tendency 
processing. 
The current observations have implications for the 
implementation of cognitive training methods to modify attention 
biases. Traditional attention bias modification procedures rely on 
experimentally established contingencies between to-be-detected 
targets and the location of positive or negative stimuli (MacLeod et al., 
2002). However, these procedures have yielded mixed findings and 
overall small effect sizes in modifying attention bias and reducing 
symptoms of anxiety and depression (Beard et al., 2012; Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011; Mogoașe et al., 2014). One explanation for these modest 
effect sizes may be that both processing tendencies as well as abilities 
need to be targeted where typically only one of these aspects is trained. 
It would be important to consider the plasticity or malleability of these 
different constituents of processing biases in depression. To effectively 
train or modify biases, future attention training procedures may need 
to target self-regulatory control in attention allocation. This could be 
achieved, for example, by increasing awareness of how attention is 
directed toward positive and negative stimuli when one processes 
emotional material (Bernstein & Zvielli, 2014) or by improving general 
cognitive control (Siegle et al., 2007). As a result of targeting self-
regulatory control processes, this type of training procedures may also 
alter the emotional content of the interpretations drawn on emotionally 
ambiguous material. 
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The present study is not without limitations. First, the cross-
sectional design precludes conclusions regarding the assumed 
influence of attention bias on interpretation for ability processes. As 
mentioned, direct proofs of cause-and-effect relations require 
experimental manipulation of attention bias (e.g., via cognitive control 
training) to examine training-related changes in interpretation bias. 
Second, the non-clinical nature of the recruited sample and the 
assessment of depressive symptom severity via a self-report measure 
limit the generalizability of our findings to depression. Further 
investigation of attention and interpretation biases during tendency 
and ability processes need to test whether similar dysfunctions cut 
across different samples representing the depression course (i.e., 
samples of non-depressed at-risk, clinically depressed, and formerly 
depressed individuals). Despite this limitation, the current findings 
remain of interest given that the magnitude of negative cognitive biases 
(e.g., in attention, interpretation) are a linear function of depressive 
symptom severity with cognitive shift from a positivity bias in healthy 
people to facilitated processing of negative information in clinically 
depressed people (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Clark et al., 1999). 
In conclusion, this study aimed to advance insight into the 
attention – interpretation bias interplay in healthy and subclinically 
depressed individuals. Our findings suggest that depression-linked 
attention processing biases emerge both under processing tendency 
and ability conditions and, moreover, that an ability-dysfunction in 
attention may regulate how individuals elaborate on new emotional 
information. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Predictive Magnitude of Combined 
Cognitive Biases1 
 
 
 
Individuals with elevated depressive symptoms selectively 
attend to negative material (De Raedt & Koster, 2010), draw more 
negative interpretations on ambiguous information (Wisco, 2009), and 
recall disproportionately more negative memories (Gaddy & Ingram, 
2014; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). Clarifying how emotional 
biases in these basic cognitive processes are involved in the course of 
depressive symptoms over extended time remains a major challenge for 
contemporary psychological scientists. Indeed, emotional biases in 
attention (Beevers & Carver, 2003), interpretation (Rude, Wenzlaff, 
Gibbs, Vane, & Whitney, 2002), and memory (Bellew & Hill, 1991) are 
individually predictive of future depressive symptoms, but how these 
related, yet distinctive, aspects of cognition interact to predict 
prospective changes in depressive symptom severity remains unknown. 
An integrative perspective to surpass individual bias effects seems 
                                                             
1  Based on Everaert, J., & Koster, E.H.W. (in press) Emotionally biased cognitive 
processes: The weakest link predicts prospective changes in depressive symptoms. Plos 
One. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0124457. 
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necessary to advance knowledge on how biased cognitive processes 
contribute to depressive symptoms.  
Integrative approaches to understand how cognitive factors 
work together in emotional disorders are relatively new (Abela & Sarin, 
2002; Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001). Two important 
approaches have been proposed to conceptualize the longitudinal 
impact of multiple depression-linked distortions in cognition (Abela & 
Hankin, 2008). First, the additive approach assumes that the severity 
of distorted cognitive factors has a cumulative effect, such that the risk 
to develop depressive symptoms increases with each additional factor. 
Applied to emotionally biased cognitive processes, the model predicts 
that individuals with more severe negative biases in multiple processes 
are at greater risk to develop depressive symptoms than individuals 
with fewer negatively biased processes. Second, a weakest link 
approach predicts that the course of depressive symptoms depends on 
the most pathogenic cognitive factor and not on the number of factors. 
The best marker of future increases in depressive symptoms would then 
be the cognitive process that is dominantly biased toward negative 
material. Many cognitive science approaches to depression hypothesize 
that distorted cognitive processes elevate depression risk under high 
levels of stress (Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). This means that 
biased aspects of cognition and their combined effects predict changes 
in depressive symptoms through their interaction with perceived stress. 
Research testing integrated models of distorted cognition as 
predictors of future depressive symptoms in adult samples is at the 
early stages. In research modeling effects of content aspects of cognition 
(e.g., questionnaire measures of dysfunctional attitudes and self-
esteem) longitudinally, both the weakest link (Abela, Aydin, & 
Auerbach, 2006) and additive (Hankin, Abramson, Miller, & Haeffel, 
2004; Reilly-Harrington, Alloy, Fresco, & Whitehouse, 1999) model 
received support. However, studies contrasting these approaches have 
Predictive magnitude of combined cognitive biases 175  
 
yielded mixed evidence for the model with the greatest predictive 
power. One study reported a high correlation (r=.93) between the 
weakest link and the additive model suggesting redundancy (Haeffel, 
2010). By contrast, another study observed greater power of the 
weakest link over the additive model in predicting prospective changes 
in depressive symptoms (Reilly, Ciesla, Felton, Weitlauf, & Anderson, 
2012). Data regarding integrated models × stress interactions are also 
mixed. While one study supports interactions between stress and 
integrative models (Haeffel, 2010), the other study found the 
interaction did not significantly predict additional sources of variance 
(Reilly et al., 2012).  
In research modeling longitudinal effects of cognitive processes 
(e.g., attention, memory), one study investigated whether prospective 
changes in depressive symptomatology and recovery status are 
predicted by multiple cognitive processes in a clinically depressed 
sample (Johnson, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2007). Neither attention nor 
memory bias was related to recovery at 9 months follow-up, and only 
memory for positive information at baseline was associated with lower 
symptom severity at follow-up. Although this study examined the 
predictive value of multiple biased cognitive processes individually, 
neither integrative models nor stress-interactions were tested. 
Unfortunately, this type of research on emotional biases in basic 
cognitive processes is currently absent. Clarifying the relation between 
biased cognitive processes and depressive symptoms seems 
instrumental in understanding both depression and biased aspects of 
cognition. 
The present study aimed to advance understanding of 
emotionally biased cognitive processes as predictors of changes in 
depressive symptoms by adopting an integrative perspective. A first aim 
was to apply the additive and weakest link approaches to depression-
linked biases in attention, interpretation, and memory to contrast the 
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models, testing their incremental utility. A second aim was to test 
whether integrative models interacted with perceived stress to predict 
the evolution in depressive symptoms. 
Methods 
A one-year follow-up was conducted building on a prior study 
(Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014). In that study, we found that 
depression-linked biases in attentional selection and sustained 
attention regulate memory via different mechanisms: attentional 
selection was associated with emotional memory via its relation with 
interpretation, while sustained attention was directly related to 
memory bias. This study focuses on the predictive value of these biased 
cognitive processes for depression measures, one year later.  
Participants 
All 71 undergraduate students (62 women) who participated in 
the cross-sectional study were invited to contribute to the Time 2 
assessment. Fifty-three participants (49 women) completed both time 
assessments (74.65%). Participants were native Dutch speakers 
between 17 and 33 years with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All 
individuals provided written informed consent and received 5 euro. The 
study was approved by the institutional review board at Ghent 
University. 
Time 1 Assessment 
In a 70-minute session, participants started with a scrambled 
sentences test to measure interpretation bias. A computerized version 
of the test presented 60 emotional (e.g., “am winner born loser a I”) and 
40 neutral (e.g., “the I theatre visit cinema often”) scrambled sentences 
in fixed random order.1 There were 10 blocks, each comprising 6 
emotional and 4 neutral sentences. Each sentence prompted 
participants to unscramble the item to form grammatically correct and 
meaningful statements using five of the six words (e.g., “I often visit the 
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theatre”). Unscrambled solutions were registered via coded report. To 
reduce social desirable responses, participants to memorized a six digit 
number (i.e., a cognitive load) before each block and were prompted to 
recall the number after the block. While a scrambled sentence was on-
screen, participants’ eye movements were recorded to assess attention 
biases toward emotional target words (e.g., “winner” and “loser” in “am 
winner born loser a I”). Target words were matched on word length, 
word class, and word frequency. Emotional scrambled sentences –
which could be solved in either a positive or a negative manner– were 
of interest to infer emotional biases in interpretation and attention. The 
ratio of negative over the total emotional unscrambled sentences served 
as an index of interpretation bias. Attentional selection bias was 
indexed by the total number of fixations on negative target words 
divided by the total number of fixations on positive and negative target 
words of the scrambled sentences. Analogous calculations on the 
fixation durations on positive and negative target words provided an 
index of sustained attention bias. 
After the task, participants received 5 minutes to recall the 
constructed unscrambled sentences. Memory bias was computed by 
dividing the number of negatively unscrambled sentences recalled 
accurately by the total number of unscrambled emotional sentences 
recalled correctly. Finally, participants filled out the Beck Depression 
Inventory – II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der Does, 
2002) to assess depressive symptom severity. This questionnaire 
presents 21 statements to be rated on a scale from 0 to 3. The BDI-II 
has good reliability and validity in nonclinical and depressed samples 
(Beck et al., 1996; Van der Does, 2002). The internal consistency was 
α=.92. 
Time 2 Assessment  
On average 368 days (SD=25.66 ; range: 347 – 523 days) later, 
participants were reassessed to determine depressive symptoms and 
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stress experienced prior to follow-up. Depressive symptoms were again 
measured by the BDI-II (internal consistency: α=.89). To control for 
stress levels experienced prior to follow-up, the Perceived Stress Scale 
(PSS) (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) assessed the degree to 
which participants appraised their life as stressful in the month prior to 
follow-up. The 10-item questionnaire presents disorder-unspecific 
items to provide a general estimation of how unpredictable, 
uncontrollable, and overloaded individuals have experienced their 
lives. Each item is rated on a scale from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). 
Research has supported the psychometric properties of the scale 
(Hewitt, Flett, & Mosher, 1992). The internal consistency was α=.88 in 
this study. 
Bias Composites 
Bias indexes of attentional selection, sustained attention, 
interpretation, and memory were on the same metric, namely 
percentages reflecting preferential processing of negative over positive 
material (Everaert et al., 2014). An additive composite was computed 
by summing all four bias indexes per participant. A weakest link 
composite was computed by selecting the highest score of the bias 
indexes per participant. Each bias contributed to the weakest link 
composite. The dominant bias was in 26.42% of the participants 
attentional selection, in 26.42% sustained attention, in 18.87% 
interpretation, and in 28.30% memory bias.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Attrition Analysis 
A BDI-II mean of 13.56 (SD=9.57) was observed at Time 1 in 
the full sample. Attrition analyses indicated that participants who 
completed the Time 2 assessment (n=53) reported lower BDI-II scores 
at Time 1, M=11.70 (SD=8.67), than participants who did not complete 
the Time 2 assessment (n=18), M=19.06 (SD=10.22), F(1,69)=8.83, 
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p<.01. However, a broad range of BDI-II scores at Time 1 in the sample 
of completers was preserved: 34 individuals reported minimal, 6 mild, 
11 moderate, and 2 severe depressive symptoms. Importantly, no 
differences emerged between completers and non-completers on the 
bias indexes (all F-s<1). At Time 2, a mean BDI-II score of 10.51 
(SD=8.02) and PSS score of 17.31 (SD=6.92; range: 6–34) was 
observed. The BDI-II scores at Time 2 demonstrated a broad range: 32 
individuals reported minimal, 13 mild, 7 moderate, and 1 severe 
symptom levels. 
 
Table 1. Correlations between depressive symptom severity, stress, and bias 
composites. 
Variable T1 BDI-II T2 BDI-II PSS Weakest link 
T1 BDI-II —    
T2 BDI-II .62d —   
PSS .57d .78d —  
Weakest link .33c .41b .11 — 
Additive  .52d .46d .26a .75d 
Notes. ap<.10; bp<.05; cp<.01; dp<.001; BDI-II=Beck Depression Inventory – II; 
PSS=Perceived Stress Scale (measured at time 2); Weak to moderate correlations were 
observed between individual cognitive biases at Time 1. Sustained attention correlated 
with selective orienting, r=.54, p<.001, and memory, r=.39, p<.01, but not with 
interpretation, r=.18, p=.20. Selective orienting correlated with interpretation, r=.34, 
p<.05, but not with memory bias, r=.21, p=.13. Interpretation correlated with memory 
bias, r=.52, p<.001. None of the four cognitive biases were redundant and the strength 
of the observed correlations is similar to correlations reported between cognitive 
content variables (Reilly et al., 2012). 
 
Correlational Analysis 
The additive and weakest link composites were correlated and 
related to depressive symptom severity levels at both time assessments. 
Experienced stress was not related to the either composite score. Table 
1 presents correlations between depressive symptoms, perceived stress, 
and cognitive bias composites. 
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Prediction of Depressive Symptoms 
To test the predictive value of each integrative model and its 
interaction with perceived stress, three-step hierarchical regression 
analyses were conducted per bias composite. In a first step, BDI-II 
scores at time 1 (T1 BDI-II) and PSS scores were entered to create a 
residual change score for BDI-II scores at time 2 (T2 BDI-II) and to 
control for proximal stress levels. The composite was added in a second 
step and its interaction with perceived stress in a third step. All 
predictors were z-transformed. Note that, to obtain composite-by-
stress interaction indexes, the lowest value of the standardized scores 
was added to the variable before multiplying both variables (Abela & 
Sarin, 2002). For each analysis, collinearity statistics were within 
acceptable limits indicating low levels of multicollinearity (VIF<1.79; 
Tolerance>.55). Table 2 presents coefficients and statistics per model. 
Tests of the additive model revealed that T1 BDI-II and PSS 
accounted for 65.4% of the variance in step 1, F(2, 49)=46.22, p< .001. 
The additive composite in step 2 explained an additional 3.0% of the 
variance, ΔF(1, 48)=4.54, p<.05, and its interaction with stress in step 
3 did not significantly add to the model, ΔR2=1.0%, ΔF(1, 47)=1.59, 
p=.21. The variables included in step 2 accounted for 68.4% of the 
variance in depressive symptoms at Time 2, with PSS (β=.64, p<.001), 
the additive composite (β=.20, p<.05), but not T1 BDI-II (β=.16, p=.15) 
as significant predictors of T2 BDI-II. 
Analysis of the weakest link model showed that adding T1 BDI-
II and PSS in step 1 contributed significantly to the regression model, 
F(2, 49)=46.22, p<.001, R2=65.4%. Introducing the weakest link 
composite in step 2 explained an additional 8.8%, ΔF(1, 48)=16.46, 
p<.001. Adding the weakest link × stress interaction in step 3 explained 
no additional variance, ΔR2=0%, ΔF<1, p=.98. Of the variables included 
in step 2, not T1 BDI-II (β=.15, p=.11), but PSS (β=.66, p<.001) and the 
weakest link composite (β=.31, p<.001) predicted T2 BDI-II. Together, 
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these variables accounted for 74.2% of the variation in depressive 
symptomatology at Time 2. 
 
Table 2. Hierarchical regression models testing integrative models. 
 Additive model Weakest link model 
Predictor b SEb β t b SEb β t 
Step 
1 
Constant 
T1 BDI-II 
PSS 
10.83 
2.25 
5.11 
0.69 
0.90 
0.82 
 
.26 
.64 
15.61d 
2.50b 
6.24d 
10.83 
2.25 
5.11 
0.69 
0.90 
0.82 
 
.26 
.64 
15.61d 
2.50b 
6.24d 
Step 
2 
Constant 
T1 BDI-II 
PSS  
Composite 
7.87 
1.39 
5.14 
1.67 
1.54 
0.96 
0.79 
0.78 
 
.16 
.64 
.20 
5.12d 
1.45 
6.51d 
2.13b 
8.00 
1.34 
5.30 
2.74 
0.92 
0.82 
0.72 
0.68 
 
.15 
.66 
.31 
8.67d 
1.64 
7.41d 
4.06d 
Step 
3 
Constant 
T1 BDI-II 
PSS  
Composite 
Composite 
× PSS 
7.66 
1.31 
3.87 
0.52 
0.71 
1.54 
0.95 
1.28 
1.20 
0.56 
 
.15 
.48 
.06 
.26 
4.98d 
1.37 
3.02c 
0.44 
1.26 
8.00 
1.34 
5.28 
2.72 
0.02 
0.93 
0.82 
0.96 
1.15 
0.55 
 
.15 
.66 
.31 
.00 
8.57d 
1.62 
5.49d 
2.36b 
0.03 
Notes. ap<.10; bp≤.05; cp<.01; dp<.001; BDI-II=Beck Depression Inventory – II; 
PSS=Perceived Stress Scale. 
 
Incremental Utility 
Prior analyses revealed that both integrative models predict the 
prospective change in depressive symptoms, with the weakest link 
model explaining a larger proportion of variance (8.8%) compared to 
the additive model (3.0%). To test the incremental utility of the weakest 
link model, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with T1 
BDI-II and PSS added in step 1, and the additive and weakest link 
composites entered in step 2 and 3, respectively. Collinearity statistics 
were within acceptable limits (VIF<2.7, Tolerance>.44). Results 
showed that adding the weakest link composite in step 3 significantly 
added to the model including T1 BDI-II, PSS, and the additive 
composite, ΔR2=6.2%, ΔF(1, 47)=11.39, p<.01. Of the variables in step 
3, PSS (β=.66, p<.001) and the weakest link composite (β=.37, p<.01), 
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but neither T1 BDI-II (β=.18, p=.08) nor the additive composite (β=-
.09, p=.44) predicted T2 BDI-II.  
Potential Confounds 
Partial correlations controlling for T1 BDI-II showed that 
neither the number of days between Time 1 and Time 2 assessment, 
rpartial=.10, p=.50, nor gender, rpartial=.18, p=.20, nor age, rpartial=-.02, 
p=.89, were related to T2 BDI-II. The above findings are thus not 
confounded by these variables. 
Discussion 
The present study is to the best of our knowledge the first to 
examine emotionally biased cognitive processes in interaction with 
perceived stress as predictors of prospective changes in depressive 
symptomatology by adopting an integrative perspective. It was found 
that the weakest link model had incremental utility over the additive 
model in predicting the change in depressive symptoms, although both 
models significantly predicted the change in depressive symptoms over 
time. In addition to the large proportion of variance accounted by 
depressive symptoms at Time 1 and perceived stress levels (65.4%), the 
weakest link composite (8.8%) explained more than two times the 
variability in the evolution of symptomatology at Time 2 than the 
additive composite (3.2%). This suggests that the best cognitive marker 
of prospective fluctuations in depressive symptoms does not depend on 
the number of emotionally biased cognitive processes, but instead on 
the severity of emotional bias (toward negative material) in the most 
affected cognitive process. Notwithstanding the variance explained by 
perceived stress, stress did not interact with integrative models to 
predict changes in depressive symptoms. In line with prior studies 
(Johnson et al., 2007; Rude et al., 2002), this finding suggests that 
cognitive biases can operate regardless of experienced stress, which 
contradicts predictions by several cognitive science approaches to 
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depression (Everaert et al., 2012). However, cautious conclusions are 
warranted given that only few prospective studies have examined 
cognitive process × stress interactions and these have yielded 
inconsistent findings (Haeffel, 2010; Reilly et al., 2012). Note that the 
measure of stress in this study may have lacked sensitivity to detect 
idiographic changes. Despite the considerable variability in perceived 
stress scores to demonstrate interaction-effects, the baseline to rate 
stress may have differed across participants providing an inaccurate 
estimation of increases in stress prior to Time 2 assessment.  
The present findings make two important contributions. First, 
they extend prior research in that this study applies integrative 
approaches to model longitudinal relations between multiple cognitive 
factors and depressive symptoms to the study of emotional biases in 
basic cognitive processes, which have generally been investigated in 
isolation and without stress-interactions (Johnson et al., 2007). The 
present observations add to research on cognitive content factors 
supporting the incremental validity of the weakest link over the additive 
approach (Reilly et al., 2012), and diverge from research suggesting 
redundancy between the integrative models tested (Haeffel, 2010). In 
line with the combined cognitive biases hypothesis stating that 
“combinations of biases have a greater impact on disorders than if 
individual cognitive processes acted in isolation” (Hirsch, Clark, & 
Mathews, 2006), the current data suggests that multiple interactive 
cognitive biases need to be considered to identify –within individuals– 
the bias with the greatest impact. Even though the best predictive 
potential may reside in one particular cognitive bias at one point in 
time, this biased cognitive process can still exert a strong influence 
other processing biases later on (Everaert et al., 2014; Everaert, Tierens, 
Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013; Everaert & Koster, 2015).  
Second, the findings have practical implications for cognitive 
training methods that manipulate emotional biases in cognitive 
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processes and have been implemented as tools to prevent future 
depressive symptoms (Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 
2012). If an individual’s weakest link is the best maker of future 
increases in depressive symptoms, cognitive training may be more 
effectively implemented after mapping an individual’s cognitive profile 
with various distorted aspects of cognition such that training can be 
tailored toward the cognitive process that is most affected in order to 
prevent future depressive symptoms. Note, that this study is the first to 
test the predictive value of integrative approaches to cognitive biases. 
Replication in clinical samples is required before such a strategy could 
be employed in clinical settings. 
Some limitations of this study should be acknowledged. A first 
limitation is that we did not examine whether the predictive power of 
multiple cognitive processes differs in first-onset versus recurrent 
depression. Future work will need to take into account the number of 
past depressive episodes to clarify differential predictive effects of 
integrative approaches. Another limitation is that we conducted the 
study in a sample with subclinical symptoms of depression and we did 
not take a diagnostic assessment of clinical depression. Instead, we 
investigated the predictive value of multiple cognitive processes in 
relation to prospective changes in self-reported symptoms. However, 
the present results remain of interest given that individuals with 
subclinical symptom levels experience significant symptomatic 
suffering, impaired role functioning, are at greater risk to develop 
clinical depression (Ingram & Siegle, 2009), and the cognitive biases 
under study here may contribute to this pathogenesis. Future research 
may extend the current work by examining the potency of integrated 
models to predict clinical outcomes such as recovery status in remitted 
and clinical samples. A final limitation concerns the scale to evaluate 
perceived stress which may have not been sufficiently sensible to detect 
the stressful events experienced during the follow-up period. The scale 
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measured perceived stress one month prior to follow-up to statistically 
control for proximal stress levels to examine the predictive value of the 
proposed integrative approaches. However, interview-based 
assessments that monitor the different stressful situations experienced 
during the full follow-up period may be preferred to test predictions by 
cognitive models of depression. 
This study investigated integrative effects of multiple emotional 
biases in basic cognitive processes as predictors of the future evolution 
of depressive symptoms. The weakest link model integrating attention, 
interpretation, and memory biases had incremental utility over the 
additive model, but did not interact with stress to predict the change in 
depressive symptomatology. This highlights the importance of 
considering multiple biased cognitive processes in evaluating effects of 
cognitive factors on the longitudinal course of depressive symptoms. 
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General Discussion 
 
 
 
Research on cognitive risk factors to depression has long 
recognized the relevance of emotional biases in basic cognitive 
processes such as attention, interpretation, and memory. A recent surge 
of studies examining the interactions between emotionally biased 
cognitive processes is augmenting our understanding of each individual 
bias as well as emotionally disordered cognitive functioning as a whole. 
It is now known that attention, interpretation, and memory biases are 
not independent, isolated mechanisms. Instead, cognitive biases seem 
to operate constantly and with mutual influences to have a combined 
impact on the course of depressive symptoms. In this chapter, we 
discuss the key findings and main conclusions from the research 
presented in this doctoral dissertation. We first summarize the most 
important results to describe their implications for cognitive theory and 
research, as well as possible clinical applications in the next section. 
Then, we consider a number of general limitations to the studies 
presented. Finally, we outline several directions and challenges for 
future study to deepen our understanding of the interplay between 
emotionally biased cognitive processes in depression. 
On The Knowledge Increment 
The general objective of this PhD research was to advance 
understanding of interactions among emotional biases in attention, 
interpretation, and memory. In samples of healthy and subclinically 
192  General discussion 
 
depressed individuals, we aimed to address several lingering questions: 
(1) How does emotional attention regulate what is remembered?; (2) 
Does emotional long-term memory guide attention?; (2) What is the 
role of interpretation in the attention – memory bias interaction?; (4) 
Do multiple cognitive biases combine to predict future depressive 
symptoms?. Related to the three core areas that originate from the 
combined cognitive biases hypothesis (see chapter 1), we set out a series 
of cross-sectional studies to investigate linkages between cognitive 
biases (association questions), cognitive training studies to test the 
assumed direction of effects (causal questions), and a longitudinal 
study to examine the predictive value of multiple cognitive biases 
(predictive magnitude questions). The following summary of our main 
findings is organized into these three core areas. 
Association Questions 
The first empirical efforts focused on the role of emotional 
biases in attention and interpretation during encoding and retrieval in 
explaining congruent biases in memory (chapter 2). Experiment 1 
aimed at testing specific functional relations among emotional biases in 
attentional selection, sustained attention, and interpretation during 
incidental encoding of emotional material and how their interplay is 
reflected in memory. Healthy and subclinically depressed individuals 
completed a computerized version of the scrambled sentences test (to 
measure interpretation bias) while their eye movements were recorded 
(to measure overt attention biases). This task was followed by an 
incidental free recall test of previously constructed interpretations (to 
measure memory bias). The observations indicated that an emotional 
bias in memory can be explained by sustained attention bias and 
interpretative choices, with the latter being regulated by a bias in 
attentional selection. Emotional biases in distinct attentional 
mechanisms (attentional selection, sustained attention) during 
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encoding seem to regulate emotional memory in a direct and indirect 
manner. 
The findings from experiment 2 added further support for an 
indirect effect of attention bias on emotional memory via interpretation 
bias. In this study, healthy and subclinically depressed individuals 
completed a spatial cueing task (to measure covert attention bias), 
followed by a scrambled sentences test (to measure interpretation bias), 
and an incidental free recall task (to measure memory bias). The results 
revealed that an emotional bias in attention is related to a congruent 
bias in interpretative choices which are in turn reflected in memory. 
Emotional biases in attention and interpretation at encoding 
predict emotional biases in memory for encountered emotional 
material. However, still little is known about the role of such attentional 
biases during the process of emotional memory retrieval. Experiment 3 
was designed to investigate how emotional biases in memory are related 
to attentional mechanisms during retrieval. Participants encoded 
emotionally positive and negative meanings derived from ambiguous 
information (i.e., the items from a scrambled sentences test), and then 
searched their memory for encoded meanings in response to a set of 
retrieval cues (i.e., the disambiguating words from a scrambled 
sentence). The remember/know/new procedure was used to classify 
memories as recollection- or familiarity-based, and gaze behavior was 
monitored throughout the task to measure attentional allocation. The 
data showed that a bias in sustained attention during recollection-based 
and not during familiarity-based retrieval predicted subsequent 
memory bias toward positive versus negative material after controlling 
for encoding. Thus, during emotional memory retrieval, attention 
affects controlled forms of retrieval (i.e., recollection) and does not 
modulate relatively automatic, familiarity-based retrieval. 
In a subsequent series of experiments, we sought to model how 
emotional memory associations could in turn guide attention (chapter 
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3). In an initial encoding phase, distinct colors were consistently paired 
with faces depicting either happy, neutral, or angry expressions while 
participants performed a cover task. The colors were presented as task-
irrelevant stimuli in a subsequent visual search (experiment 1) or cueing 
(experiment 2) task. Both studies revealed that emotional memory 
associations contribute to attention such that individuals show greater 
attentional guidance by positive associations and attentional avoidance 
from negative memory associations. However, no double biases were 
found in a single study suggesting a dissociation between memory-
guided attention effects of positive versus negative associations in 
memory. Memory-based attention biases to stimuli with positive 
associations were related to memory accuracy while this was not true 
for negative memory associations. This suggests that different memory 
systems may contribute to attention. Regarding the temporal profile, 
the negative memory associations modulated attentional capture at 
short stimulus exposure durations without altering attentional 
disengagement. Taken together, these experiments provide some 
evidence that based on prior affective learning, attention can be biased 
toward stimuli with positive associations and away from stimuli with 
negative memory associations. 
In conclusion, the cross-sectional research shows that attention 
and memory biases are interdependent processes with interactions at 
several processing stages. Emotional biases in distinct attentional 
operations regulate the emotional content of memories at encoding and 
retrieval. Depending on the attentional mechanisms (attentional 
selection, sustained attention), the processing stage (encoding, 
retrieval), and the retrieval process (controlled, automatic), attention 
may regulate what is remembered. Emotional memory may in turn 
control attention such that emotional memory associations guide 
attention toward or away from stimuli with positive or negative 
associations. The memory-guided attention effect may depend on the 
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attentional mechanism (attentional capture, attentional 
disengagement), stimulus exposure duration, and the emotional 
valence of the associations in memory. 
Causal Questions 
The temporal sequence of the experimental tasks tapping into 
different cognitive biases and the similar stimulus materials presented 
across tasks are design features that optimize conditions to test the 
effect of one cognitive bias on another process. Consequently, we can 
have some confidence in the modeled direction of effects in these 
studies. Direct proof of causality, however, still requires experimental 
manipulation of one bias to investigate effects on other processes. 
The goal of first three experiments presented in chapter 4 was 
to examine the influence of emotional biases in attention on other 
cognitive processes using single-session attention bias modification 
with a training variant of the dot-probe task. In experiment 1, 
participants received training either toward or away from negative 
images or no-training, and transfer to an affective task-switching task 
was examined. In experiments 2 and 3, participants were trained to 
orient attention toward either positive or negative words or facial 
expressions, and transfer to an interpretation bias task was examined. 
In all experiments, the dot-probe training procedure did not effectively 
modify biases in attention allocation at the training condition level and 
produced large variability in individual attention bias acquisition 
within and across conditions. Individual differences in pre-training 
attention bias and attention bias acquisition were also not related to 
performance on the affective task-switching task or the interpretation 
tests.  
The findings from the three experiments provided no evidence 
for single-session dot-probe attention bias modification procedures to 
effectively manipulate attention bias toward negative, away from 
negative, or toward positive stimuli at the training condition level. Also 
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at the individual differences level of analysis no evidence was found for 
transfer of attention training. As a result of the lack of effectiveness of 
the attention training procedure, we were not able to test the 
hypothesized causal influence of attention bias on interpretation nor on 
affective task-switching ability. 
To gain a better understanding of the nature of attention and 
interpretation biases that are typically targeted by cognitive bias 
modification procedures, we examined how processing tendency (i.e., 
driven by schemas or prior learning) or an ability-related process (i.e., 
dependent on attentional control) are involved in these cognitive biases. 
In experiment 4, participants completed two scrambled sentences tests 
in separate experimental sessions. Participants received standard task 
instructions in the first session, while in the second session they were 
required to unscramble the sentences into positive statements. These 
different versions respectively index tendency and ability processes 
involved in ambiguity resolution. Eye-tracking was used to assess 
attention bias during each task variant. The results showed that 
depressive symptom severity was correlated with attention bias under 
both tendency and ability conditions. Analyses showed that attention 
bias (i.e., the fixation time spent on positive versus negative words) 
acted as an intervening variable in the relation between depressive 
symptoms and interpretation bias only during ability processes. These 
findings suggest that depression-linked biases in attention reflect both 
processing tendencies and ability-related processes in attentional 
control, with attentional control as a relevant mechanism in the 
subsequent interpretation of emotional material. This pattern of 
findings imply that cognitive control training rather than cognitive bias 
modification methods are more suitable to investigate the influence of 
attentional biases on other cognitive processes. 
Taken together, the attempts to modify emotional attention 
biases via traditional experimental procedures were not successful at 
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inducing emotional biases in attention that transferred to 
interpretation or affective task-switching ability. As a result, we were 
not able to substantiate the hypothesized causal directions proposed by 
the cross-sectional research findings. One explanation for the limited 
effects of the attention training resides in the nature of the targeted 
cognitive bias itself. Depression-related biases in attention while 
making meaning may reflect processing ability deficits which are less 
susceptible to traditional attention bias modification procedures.  
Predictive Magnitude Questions 
The research presented in the chapters 2, 3, and 4, examined 
the interplay among multiple depression-linked cognitive biases within 
a proximal timeframe, leaving unanswered how emotionally biased 
cognitive processes in combination impact the longitudinal course of 
depressive symptoms. To address this open issue, the prospective study 
presented in chapter 5 tested the predictive magnitude of two 
integrative approaches that model relations between multiple biased 
cognitive processes in interaction with perceived stress. The combined 
impact of multiple cognitive biases was operationalized using additive 
(‘cognitive processes have a cumulative effect’) and weakest link (‘the 
dominant pathogenic process is important’) models. At Time 1, 
participants completed measures of depressive symptom severity and 
emotional biases in attention, interpretation, and memory. At Time 2, 
one year later, participants filled out questionnaires to assess 
depressive symptom severity levels and stress experienced shortly prior 
to follow-up. 
The data revealed that the weakest link model had incremental 
validity over the additive model in predicting prospective changes in 
depressive symptoms, even though both models explained a significant 
proportion of variance in the change in depression levels. Remarkably, 
none of the integrative models interacted with perceived stress to 
predict changes in depressive symptomatology. The observations 
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indicate that the best cognitive marker of the evolution in depressive 
symptoms is the cognitive process that is dominantly biased toward 
negative material, which could operate independent from experienced 
stress. This highlights the importance of considering idiographic 
cognitive profiles with multiple cognitive processes for understanding 
effects of cognitive biases in depression. 
Conclusion 
Depression-linked biases in attention, interpretation, and 
memory are highly interactive cognitive biases. Emotionally biased 
attentional mechanisms can regulate the emotional content of 
remembered interpretations via modulation of encoding and retrieval 
processes. Emotional memory associations can in turn guide attention 
allocation. Attention biases may also be controlled by deficient 
cognitive control processes. Via their interactions, cognitive biases have 
a combined effect on the longitudinal course of depressive symptoms, 
with the weakest link as the best cognitive marker. All together, these 
observations indicate that the impact of one cognitive bias cannot be 
fully understood except in the context of other biases. The knowledge 
gained here is important for characterizing the cognitive foundations of 
depression and has important theoretical and clinical implications. 
Implications For Theory, Research and Practice 
Cognitive Models of Depression 
Our findings provide evidence for several predictions by 
cognitive science approaches to depression. In line with theoretical 
hypotheses, attentional bias regulates interpretation of emotionally 
ambiguous material (Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007; Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988) and enhanced elaboration results 
in improved memory for the created interpretations (Ingram, 1984; 
Joormann et al., 2007; Williams et al., 1988; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). The products of the elaboration process 
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may serve a mnemonic cues that help to retrieve these emotional 
meanings from memory at later points in time (Williams et al., 1997). 
In line with the notion that negative memory schemas bias information 
processing (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999), we found that emotional 
associations in memory can guide attention toward emotionally 
congruent material. Moreover, we also found support for the role of 
attentional control difficulties during elaboration on emotional 
material (Hertel, 1997; Joormann et al., 2007). Attentional control may 
mediate the relation between depressive symptoms and interpretation. 
Both memory schemas and cognitive control difficulties may modulate 
attentional mechanisms (attentional capture, sustained attention) 
involved in biased elaboration on negative material. As predicted by 
some cognitive models (Ingram, 1984), emotionally biased cognitive 
processes combine in the prediction of future depressive symptoms. 
Different theoretical perspectives with their shared and unique 
predictions seem to provide complementary views on the processes 
involved in the interplay between emotionally biased cognitive 
processes (e.g., impaired cognitive control accounts vs. enhanced 
elaboration accounts; see also chapter 1). Although several theoretical 
hypotheses have not been confirmed (see chapter 1), our observations 
indicate that each of the cognitive models describes some aspects of the 
interactions that may occur between cognitive biases and may hold 
some truth. When putting theoretical predictions derived from different 
cognitive models to the empirical test, we should not approach these 
models as competing perspectives but as complementary explanations 
for the complex nature of interacting cognitive biases. Investigators 
may need to work toward a comprehensive theoretical framework 
integrating ideas from several cognitive models of depression to grasp 
the interactions that exist between cognitive biases. 
Despite frequent theoretical attempts to understand the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying depression, many cognitive accounts 
200  General discussion 
 
of depression do not integrate insights from basic cognitive and clinical 
science in an attempt to understand the interactions between 
emotionally biased cognitive processes. An update of depression 
models’ predictions with regard to their hypotheses relevant to the 
interplay between attention, interpretation, and memory seems 
necessary. It is remarkable that established as well as recently 
developed models (1) do typically not distinguish between distinct 
components of cognitive processes and (2) are underspecified with 
regard to possible interactions that may occur between these processes, 
and (3) how interactive cognitive biases exert a long-term impact on 
depression. These issues are discussed in turn. 
It is well-known that cognitive processes such as attention and 
memory are not unitary mechanisms. Attention involves selection and 
maintenance (also referred to as modulation) operations (Chun, 
Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Yiend, 2010) and memory comprises 
explicit and implicit systems (Hutchinson & Turk-Browne, 2012). Some 
theorists have argued that the process of interpretation also involves 
different mechanisms, including automatic and effortful activation as 
well as selection mechanisms (Wisco, 2009). Although many empirical 
studies on cognitive biases consider distinct components of the 
cognitive processes under investigation (Jermann, Van Der Linden, 
Laurençon, & Schmitt, 2009; Yiend, 2010), this complexity is rarely 
reflected in theoretical perspectives on depression-related processing 
biases. For example, cognitive models do frequently not consider 
emotional biases in attentional selection and sustained attention when 
explaining difficulties in withdrawing or disengaging attention from 
processing of negative material, which is regarded as characteristic for 
depressed people. Distinguishing between different components of 
cognitive processes seems important given the differential relations 
between specific processes. For example, attentional selection and 
sustained attention biases at encoding and retrieval have different 
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relations with later remembering of emotional material (e.g., controlled 
versus automatic retrieval). Also emotional memory may have in turn 
an impact only on specific attentional mechanisms such as attentional 
capture. Via such differential relations, distinct components or systems 
of attention and memory may play a different role in the maintenance 
of depressive symptoms. 
In addition to the low level of specificity in theoretical 
predictions regarding components of cognitive biases, many cognitive 
models also lack specificity in their predictions regarding the 
interactions that could occur between cognitive biases. The role of 
attention bias in explaining memory bias extends beyond its influence 
on the encoding of new, external information or on the elaboration of 
activated memories. The interplay between attention and long-term 
memory seems more complex than is currently assumed by many 
cognitive views on depression. The presented research suggests that 
biases in different attention operations can modulate emotional 
memory bias via their role in incidental encoding of new experiences as 
well as controlled, but not automatic, memory search to retrieve an 
emotional experience. The emotional memory content may have in turn 
the ability to guide attention such that emotionally congruent material 
captures attention. Attention and memory biases are thus overlapping 
processes during stimulus-based and memory-based processing of 
emotional material. In their interactions, cognitive biases may exert a 
combined influence on the course of depressive symptoms. Based on 
current models, however, it is difficult to point down a theoretical 
explanation for the finding that a weakest link represented the best 
marker of future increases in depressive symptom severity. Here, an 
integration of cognitive and affective processes, such as emotion 
regulation strategies, may help to explain this finding (see ‘emotion 
regulation strategies’). 
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Future updates of the contemporary theoretical perspectives on 
processing abnormalities in depression need to incorporate a more 
fine-grained set of predictions regarding the interplay between 
cognitive biases. This seems essential given that a lack of specific 
predictions limits theory-based generation of falsifiable hypotheses and 
may impede future efforts to grasp depressive cognitive functioning as 
well as therapeutic strategies inspired by these models. Research should 
not be restricted to predictions set out by established or recently 
formulated theoretical models, but it should strive to extend 
contemporary views beyond their current boundaries. 
Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Insight into the interactions between biased cognitive processes 
is not only relevant to our theoretical understanding of the cognitive 
foundations of depression, it also provides a framework to understand 
healthy and disordered emotional functioning. Recent cognitive models 
of depression have hypothesized that individual differences in cognitive 
biases affect the use and effectiveness of regulating strategies to repair 
or reverse a mood state, maintaining cardinal symptoms of depression 
such as persistent negative affect (Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010; 
Joormann, 2010; Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). 
Considerable research has shown that depression is 
characterized by difficulties in emotion regulation. Depressed 
individuals tend to ruminate more in response to sad mood or stress, 
reappraise a situation’s meaning less frequently relative to healthy 
people, and have difficulties using mood-incongruent recall to repair 
negative mood (Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). The findings of the 
presented doctoral research may cast light on the cognitive processes 
underlying difficulties in emotion regulation and may explain why 
depressed people initiate a malicious cycle of negative thinking and 
increasing negative mood. 
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When people are exposed to ambiguous, stressful situations 
(e.g., a job interview), individuals with higher depressive symptom 
levels tend to orient attention more frequently toward negative than 
positive stimuli (e.g., a frowning versus a smiling interviewer) and dwell 
longer on this negative material. Difficulties in attentional control to 
disengage  from processing negative material may prevent reorienting 
of attention to positive or neutral stimuli as an anticipatory emotion 
regulation strategy (e.g., focusing on the other assessors) and endorse 
negative interpretations of a particular situation (e.g., “I am making a 
bad impression”, “they think I am not capable for the job”). Initial 
interpretations could be maintained by sustained attention toward 
negative material and a rigid interpretation tendency, hindering 
reappraisal of the situation that could lead to more balanced 
interpretations (e.g., “it was not that bad at all”). This process may 
consolidate dysfunctional memory representations (e.g., “I am 
worthless”) and activate mood-congruent memories (e.g., broken 
relationship) that may fuel negative thoughts (i.e., rumination). Biased 
encoding of negative material sets the stage for mood-congruent 
memory biases and may jeopardize the use of mood-incongruent recall 
to repair negative mood in the future.  
Negative cues in the particular situation may be used to guide 
memory search in an attempt to retrieve prior experiences, which is 
likely to result in retrieval of mood-congruent memories that could 
worsen the distressed mood (e.g., “last time I also did a bad job on the 
interview: I’m a loser”). The negative experiences that are retrieved may 
not only fuel negative thinking, but may also guide attention toward 
other negative cues, reinforcing initial negative interpretations and 
preventing reappraisal. Furthermore, the flexibility in using mood-
congruent and incongruent memories to regulate mood may decrease 
over time because selectively retrieving a memory increases the 
likelihood of later forgetting a un-retrieved memory (e.g., “last time I 
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did well on an interview: I’m a winner”) that shares associative links 
(Anderson et al., 2004). This is because retrieval strengthens memory 
associations and weakens associations for not-retrieved memories, 
which could result in relatively stable tendencies to retrieve memories 
from a particular emotional category. 
Through the constant interaction between cognitive biases, 
depressed individuals may become locked into a vicious circle of 
negative thinking with an inability to regulate negative thoughts and 
emotions. Particular emotion regulation strategies preferred by an 
individual (e.g., unsuccessful reappraisal, mood-incongruent retrieval) 
may become habitual tendencies which could in turn aggravate negative 
biases in basic cognitive processes. This reciprocal process may 
differentially impair certain negative cognitive biases within individuals, 
such that one particular cognitive bias becomes an individual’s weakest 
link that best predicts future symptoms of depression. 
It is clear that cognitive biases and their interactions are 
instrumental in explaining difficulties in the selection and effectiveness 
of emotion regulation strategies and the consequences for experienced 
mood states. To date, however, studies have only demonstrated that 
healthy people differ from depressed people in their cognitive biases 
and emotion regulation. Very few studies have explicitly linked 
depression-related cognitive biases, emotional experience and 
regulation within proximal or distal timeframes. Integrating cognitive 
and affective processes underlying depression presents an important 
goal for future research to improve our understanding of hallmark 
symptoms of depression. 
Cognitive Training 
Insights gained from basic research examining interactions 
between cognitive biases and their combined impact on depressive 
symptoms has implications for the development and implementation of 
cognitive training methods. The presented research findings may 
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inform strategies to more effectively target cognitive vulnerability 
factors and to prevent future depressive symptoms. 
Reducing cognitive vulnerability 
Cognitive training could take advantage of the role of 
attentional mechanisms in regulating memory encoding and retrieval. 
The cross-sectional research findings suggest that modifying attention 
bias may alter later processing of the emotional material (e.g., 
interpretation, memory bias) and could modulate controlled retrieval 
of emotional memories. If a negative bias occurring at the early stages 
of processing new material could be effectively reduced, this may 
normalize later information processing and may reduce vulnerability to 
depression in that dysfunctional beliefs (memory representations) 
about the self and others are modified into more adaptive views. 
While it seems logical to target emotional biases at the attention 
level to alter maladaptive cognitions, current meta-analytic evidence 
has yielded only modest effect sizes for current attention training 
procedures in terms of clinical outcomes (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; 
Mogoașe, David, & Koster, 2014) and also our experiments have 
indicated that training biases in attention transfer neither to 
interpretation nor to affective task-switching ability. The latter finding 
suggests that even if trained individuals were able to reallocate 
attention from negative to positive aspects of an ambiguous situation 
(e.g., a smiling interviewer during a job interview), they do not 
necessarily interpret the incoming material in a positive manner (e.g., 
“This does not apply to me, I don’t believe I’m making a good 
impression”). A lack of transfer of training to critical cognitive processes 
obviously limits the application of attention bias modification as a tool 
to reduce cognitive vulnerability to depression. 
One possible factor that could (partly) explain the lack of 
training effects and transfer to interpretation may reside in emotional 
memory. The support we found for memory-based biases in attention 
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allocation suggests that emotional memory contents may hinder 
effective implementation of attention training by interfering with 
training effects on attention and its transfer to interpretation. That is, 
while cognitive training may direct one’s attention toward positive and 
away from negative stimuli, memory may guide attention away from 
stimuli with positive associations in depressed individuals. Moreover, it 
is likely that memory serves as a source from which past experiences 
are retrieved and used to interpret an ambiguous situation, in that way 
interfering with potential transfer of a positive attention bias to 
interpretation. 
To obtain clinically significant and relatively stable effects of 
training on attention, training procedures may not only have to target 
attention bias such that individuals can more swiftly reallocate 
attention from negative to positive material in contexts relevant to an 
individual’s concerns, but training procedures may also have to boost 
transfer of training to memory such that it results in new or modified 
memory representations. This is to reduce the memory-based 
influences on attention and potentially also on interpretation which 
could compromise the delivery of attention training. Indeed, there is 
some evidence for effects of single-session dot probe attention training 
on memory in individuals with higher depression levels (Blaut, 
Paulewicz, Szastok, Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013), but further research 
that aims at illuminating learning and memory process involved in 
attention training to boost such transfer of training is required (Abend, 
Pine, Fox, & Bar-Haim, 2014). Attention training studies may consider 
proof of transfer of training to cognitive processes such as 
interpretation and memory as a criterion to assess the effectiveness of 
a training procedure. 
A way to enhance effects of attention bias training, and 
potentially transfer to memory, can be derived from our observations 
suggesting that emotional biases in attention when elaborating on 
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emotional material may reflect processing ability deficits. In addition to 
memory-based effects, ability-based deficits in attention allocation may 
be a factor accounting for the large inter-individual variability in the 
effectiveness of attention bias modification. Traditional attention bias 
modification techniques may not be optimal for individuals who have 
pronounced deficits in cognitive control while processing negative 
material. This group of individuals may take more advantage of 
cognitive control training procedures that directly target ability 
dysfunctions (Calkins, McMorran, Siegle, & Otto, 2014; Schweizer, 
Grahn, Hampshire, Mobbs, & Dalgleish, 2013; Siegle, Ghinassi, & 
Thase, 2007). Therefore, identification of the factor(s) that drive 
attentional biases within individuals may reveal the most effective 
training procedure to target attention bias in order to reduce 
vulnerability to depression. This could be either attention bias 
modification or cognitive control training or a combination of these 
training methods. 
Preventing depressive symptoms 
Cognitive training techniques could be used as an efficient tool 
to prevent future depressive symptoms if such procedures target the 
best marker for future depressive symptoms (Browning, Holmes, 
Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012). Our findings suggest that such 
practices may benefit from pre-training assessments of an individual’s 
cognitive profile to identify the weakest link, instead of delivering 
cognitive training to whole groups without prior assessment. Multiple 
cognitive biases may need to be considered within individuals to 
identify and target the cognitive bias with the greatest predictive 
magnitude of the depression course. This implies that the targeted 
cognitive biases are not necessarily attentional processes as proposed 
in the previous paragraph. However, targeting an individual’s weakest 
link (e.g., interpretation bias) may also influence other biases (e.g., 
memory) which could have in turn an impact attentional biases. 
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Although speculative, a combined cognitive training approach targeting 
early processing biases (e.g., attention) and an individual’s weakest link 
may hold most promise to reduce cognitive vulnerability and to prevent 
future depressive symptoms. 
Limitations 
There are a number of general limitations to the research in this 
doctoral dissertation. First, the studies were conducted in nonclinical 
samples of undergraduate students which may limit the generalizability 
of the findings to clinical depression. It is frequently assumed that 
cognitive biases observed in such convenient samples of individuals 
with subclinical symptom levels differ from clinical samples in terms of 
degree rather than kind (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Yiend, 2010). However, 
few studies have directly compared emotional biases in cognition in 
subclinically versus clinically depressed samples to identify possible 
differences and/or similarities. One study that compared the strength 
of attention biases in individuals with minimal, mild, and moderate to 
severe depressive symptoms found that maintained attention toward 
negative information was associated with moderate to severe 
depressive symptom levels (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2010). Despite 
this limitation, the reported findings remain of importance because 
individuals with subclinical symptom levels experience significant 
suffering and are at risk to develop clinical depression. The emotional 
biases in attention, interpretation, and memory are likely to contribute 
to this pathogenesis (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Second, the specificity of our findings to depression may be 
limited by the high correlations between trait anxiety and depressive 
symptom severity we observed in most studies. Indeed, anxiety and 
depression frequently co-occur (Kessler & Wang, 2009) which could be 
explained by the substantial symptom overlap (e.g., rumination versus 
worry, poor sleep quality) and the shared environmental (e.g., loss), 
biological, and cognitive factors that may underlie symptoms of anxiety 
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and depression (Hong & Cheung, 2014; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 
1998). Although high comorbidity rates are widely acknowledged, few 
studies have investigated its impact on emotional processing biases. 
While comorbidity may not play a major role in threat-related attention 
bias (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van 
IJzendoorn, 2007), there is evidence that emotional memory biases 
differ in anxious versus depressed individuals (Mitte, 2008). The little 
research that has tested effects of the comorbidity of anxiety and 
depressive disorders observed that the attention biases for subliminally 
presented stimuli predicted recognition of emotional material only for 
socially anxious individuals with comorbid major depression (LeMoult 
& Joormann, 2012). These results suggest that the presence of 
comorbidity affects the interplay between attention and memory biases. 
Further research needs to elucidate the role of comorbidity in the 
interplay between emotional biases in attention, interpretation, and 
memory. Regardless of the limited depression specificity, our findings 
inform on naturally occurring interactions between cognitive biases 
that may cut across common mental disorders. 
Third, as is noted throughout different chapters of this doctoral 
dissertation, direct proof of the causal direction of effects requires 
experimental manipulation of one cognitive bias to examine its effects 
on other cognitive processes. Certain features of the developed study 
designs may have the optimized conditions to test the effect of one 
cognitive bias on another process (e.g., instructions, temporal order of 
tasks, and the use of similar stimulus materials across tasks) and allow 
some confidence in the modeled relations between biases. However, 
possible third variables may account for the observed relations in the 
cross-sectional studies and caution is warranted with regard to our 
conclusions about the direction of effects. Future research will need to 
provide a formal test of the assumed direction of effects using cognitive 
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bias modification or cognitive training methods (see ‘triangulating 
research findings’). 
A last limitation concerns the measures of attention bias (e.g., 
eye movement registration, performance-based measures such as RTs) 
employed in this doctoral dissertation research which solely relied on 
visual attention. As a consequence, our findings shed light on how 
external attention is related to internal cognitive processes, and provide 
limited insight into internal attention mechanisms. Although there may 
be a high correspondence between overt (e.g., assessed by eye tracking) 
and covert (e.g., assessed by a Posner cueing task) attentional shifts and 
their relation with other cognitive processes (e.g., interpretation), 
covert shifts in attention can occur without overt attentional shifts 
(Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008). This issue seems particularly 
important to interpret the results regarding the role of sustained 
(external) attention during memory retrieval, which provide limited 
insight into internal attention processes that could be involved in 
memory search. Although external attentional mechanisms are likely to 
regulate the focus of internal attention, further research should address 
whether the relations between cognitive biases reported here generalize 
to the internal attention domain (see ‘unravelling interactions between 
cognitive biases’). 
Future Directions and Challenges 
Unravelling Interactions Between Cognitive Biases 
Although research on interactive cognitive biases has made 
considerable progress, several aspects of attention – memory bias 
interactions have not received much empirical attention yet. In addition 
to previously outlined recommendations (Everaert, Koster, & 
Derakshan, 2012) and the abovementioned open issues, below we 
delineate four exciting lines of research to invite further empirical 
scrutiny in order to gain a fuller understanding of how emotional 
attention controls and is controlled by memory biases in depression. 
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A first line of for future research should continue efforts to 
understand how attentional biases during encoding modulate the 
formation of emotional memories. Present research has improved our 
understanding of how emotionally biased attentional mechanisms 
during encoding of emotional interpretations are related to consciously 
retrieved experiences probed by explicit memory tasks (see chapters 1 
and 2). As a result, much less is known about the interplay between 
emotional biases in attention at encoding and implicit memory. It is not 
clear, for example, whether emotional biases in attentional selection 
versus sustained attention during encoding contribute to implicit 
memory in a similar or different manner as the attentional mechanisms 
that modulate encoding into explicit memory. It seems plausible that 
aspects of an emotional experience must be selected from other 
competing stimuli to be encoded into implicit memory (Chun & Turk-
Browne, 2007), but the modulatory role of sustained attention bias 
during encoding in explicit memory may be different for implicit 
remembering. Moreover, most studies have examined memory bias in 
terms of the content that is retrieved without investigating how 
encoding alters the associations between memories. This would cast 
light on how new emotional material is integrated into existing 
associative memory networks. Recent innovations in network analysis 
may provide ways to test how attention biases impact associative 
memory networks (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013). 
A second important avenue for future study is to elucidate the 
role of attention during retrieval of emotional memories. Investigators 
have recently started to investigate interactions between visual 
attention and memory retrieval of emotional items, yielding support for 
the role of sustained attention bias toward external cues in guiding the 
internal process of controlled retrieval (see chapter 2). Although a close 
relation seems likely, the interactions between external and internal 
attention biases during conscious memory retrieval of emotional 
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material are not well understood. It is not clear, for example, how 
external cues impact internal processes (e.g., is external input used to 
generate internal search cues?) and if these in turn shape external 
attention (e.g., selection of relevant visual input to further guide 
retrieval). More research that manipulates external visual input and 
internal attentional resources is needed to disentangle the role of 
external and internal attention in guiding memory retrieval. While 
controlled retrieval may involve sustained attentional mechanisms, the 
regulating factors in automatic emotional memory retrieval are 
currently not known. It is plausible, for example, that the external 
stimuli that capture attention may directly activate a memory trace 
without requiring an elaborative search process. Further empirical 
study could examine eye-tracking parameters such as first fixation 
locations and durations in relation to familiarity-based memory biases 
to cast light on the necessity of attention for automatic memory 
retrieval. 
A third line of research needs to consider how explicit and 
implicit memory systems contribute to emotional attention. Initial 
experiments have reported encouraging evidence for memory-guided 
attention effects that depend on the attentional mechanism, the 
stimulus exposure duration, and the valence of the emotional memory 
associations (see chapter 3). Still, many open questions need to be 
addressed to understand how emotional memory shapes attention. For 
instance, it has not yet been explored how emotionally positive versus 
negative knowledge stored in long-term memory can be used to guide 
attention in controlled, goal-directed search for certain emotional 
information. Also not much is known about whether implicitly acquired 
knowledge (e.g., via statistical learning) has the ability to guide 
attention toward regularities in emotionally positive versus negative 
material. Moreover, it remains uninvestigated whether implicit 
knowledge hinders explicit memory-based effects on goal-directed 
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attention. Here, a comparison of the temporal profile of implicit versus 
explicit memory-based effects on attention bias would be highly 
informative. These open issues currently challenge our understanding 
of emotional memory-guided attention effects and this provides an 
interesting direction for further research. 
A fourth line of studies should identify the role of cognitive 
control in regulating emotional biases in attention, interpretation, and 
memory. Difficulties in inhibition, shifting, and updating are thought to 
operate as overarching mechanisms across depression-related biases in 
attention, interpretation, and memory (Joormann et al., 2007). Studies 
have confirmed the link between aspects of cognitive control and 
depression (De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Derakshan, Salt, & Koster, 2009; 
Goeleven, De Raedt, Baert, & Koster, 2006), but the hypothesis that 
cognitive control deficits explain emotional biases in cognitive 
processes has yet to be tested. It is currently unclear whether distinct 
control processes have differential relations with attention, 
interpretation, and memory biases. Research needs to address whether 
aspects of cognitive control have direct or indirect (e.g., via attention) 
relations with interpretation and memory biases. The role of cognitive 
control deficits in relation to cognitive biases should be considered in 
both encoding and retrieval contexts when differentiating between 
explicit and implicit memory systems. Furthermore, future studies also 
need to examine how cognitive control processes are involved in 
implicit versus explicit memory-guided attention effects (e.g., can 
control processes override implicit guidance effects?). These 
unanswered questions present important goals for future research. 
The insights gained as a result of empirical efforts to address 
the lingering issues in research on attention – memory bias interactions 
will inform the development of more sophisticated theoretical models 
of depression. While contemporary clinical theories do often not have 
the level of specificity in their predictions to guide research on this 
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topic, future work may be inspired by more basic science models and 
tools to investigate internal versus external attention (Chun et al., 2011), 
factors during encoding and retrieval (Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007; 
Talmi, 2013), as well as memory-guided attention effects (Hutchinson 
& Turk-Browne, 2012). More cross-talk between the research domains 
of cognitive science, neuroscience, emotion science, and clinical 
cognition may provide opportunities for cross-fertilization such that 
clinical research can benefit from validated cognitive models and 
cutting-edge experimental paradigms, and basic, theoretical research 
may in turn find clinically relevant applications. 
Triangulating Research Findings 
The majority of investigations testing relations between 
attention, interpretation, and memory has been conducted in samples 
of healthy or subclinically depressed people delivering findings that 
may not describe well the interplay between cognitive biases occurring 
in non-depressed at-risk, currently, or formerly depressed people. This 
prompts researchers to address the outlined research questions that 
emerge from the combined cognitive biases hypothesis in the different 
groups of healthy and depressed individuals. Increasing the diversity in 
study samples seems important because the interplay among 
emotionally biased cognitive processes may change as a function of the 
experience of being depressed (e.g., intensifying sad affect and negative 
thinking), potentially affecting the strength of one or more negative 
cognitive biases (e.g., memory) and its relations with other processes 
(e.g., memory-based effects on attention). If more research considers 
the interplay among cognitive biases in samples drawn from non-
depressed and formerly depressed at-risk populations as well as 
currently depressed populations, investigators can learn about 
potential similarities and differences in the interactions across sample 
types, the interconnectivity among cognitive biases (i.e., the strength of 
the relations), and their relations with depressive symptom severity. 
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To uncover interactions between emotionally biased cognitive 
processes within the different sample types, investigators have various 
research designs at their disposal. At present, most studies adopted a 
cross-sectional design to test associations between cognitive biases, few 
studies used cognitive training methods to investigate the direction of 
the observed effects, and even fewer studies employed longitudinal 
designs to examine combined effects of multiple biases. Yet, a thorough 
examination of the combined cognitive biases hypothesis requires a 
methodological approach that implements each of these 
complementary research designs to tackle association, causal, and 
predictive magnitude questions (Everaert et al., 2012).  
Cross-sectional research methodologies can be designed to test 
specific relations between multiple cognitive biases during specific 
mental operations such as encoding and retrieval of emotional material. 
This type of study design, however, precludes conclusions regarding 
causality because third unknown variables could account for the 
observed relations. This issue of cause-and-effect can be solved by 
applying cognitive training methods that manipulate emotional biases 
in targeted processes in an experimental manner (Koster, Fox, & 
MacLeod, 2009). Although existing training methodologies are useful, 
the mechanisms underlying training procedures are currently not well 
understood and many of the available procedures are not able to target 
a very specific set of cognitive processes. For example, there are no 
methods to manipulate an emotional bias in explicit or implicit memory 
to examine its effects on attention. Both cross-sectional and cognitive 
training study designs inform on the interplay between cognitive biases 
in relation to depressive symptoms at a specific point in time, leaving 
unaddressed how cognitive biases develop and change over time to 
impact depressive symptoms. Longitudinal study designs extend 
beyond a single moment in time and are able to cast light on each of 
these issues. As cognitive training methods, findings from longitudinal 
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research provide some indication about cause-and-effect relations that 
may exist between cognitive biases. 
Cross-sectional, cognitive training, and longitudinal research 
designs have their own strengths and pitfalls, but if combined, they 
provide complementary approaches to examine the interplay between 
cognitive biases in relation to emotional well-being. Advanced 
knowledge about the interplay between cognitive processing biases 
gained from cross-sectional and cognitive training methods may help to 
explain findings from longitudinal research (e.g., the best cognitive 
marker is the weakest link), which may in turn guide research within 
proximal timeframes (e.g., by pointing to the importance of mapping 
out individual cognitive profiles for cognitive training purposes). In 
order to gain a comprehensive understanding of interactive cognitive 
biases in depression, we argue for an approach that triangulates 
research findings from cross-sectional, cognitive training, and 
longitudinal research methodologies and samples including healthy, 
non-depressed at-risk, currently, and formerly depressed people. 
Recent Research Advances in Clinical Cognition 
Several recent conceptual and methodological innovations in 
research on cognitive processing biases hold great potential to further 
our understanding of the interplay among emotionally biased cognitive 
processes and their impact depressive symptoms. Two promising 
trends are discussed in turn. 
The dynamic expression of psychological processes 
Investigators increasingly conceptualize cognitive biases and 
emotional responding as context-dependent and time-sensitive 
psychological phenomena. Indeed, the context and timing when 
cognitive biases operate and emotional responses are elicited differs 
within and across individuals (Koval et al., 2013; Zvielli, Bernstein, & 
Koster, 2014). However, the complexity of the nature of the phenomena 
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under study is rarely acknowledged in investigations of depression-
related biases in cognitive processes.  
Modeling fluctuations in between cognitive biases in time may 
provide better insights into the dynamic expression of cognitive biases 
and their interactions. Here, the trial-level bias score approach provides 
several novel parameters to quantify the expression of attention bias in 
time (Zvielli et al., 2014). It allows investigation of attentional biases at 
the trial level by visualizing the degree to which the average trial-level 
bias score is greater than zero, the phasic expression of attention bias, 
as well as the stability or variability in the expression of attention bias. 
This analytical strategy holds great potential as a tool to further our 
insight into relations between cognitive biases. More specifically, if we 
can link such time-sensitive indices to performance on interpretation 
and memory tasks, we may gain a better understanding of the 
attentional mechanisms that regulate which stimuli are encoded and 
remembered as well as memory-guided attention effects. 
Not only may cognitive biases and their mutual influences 
fluctuate in time, they are also likely to be context-dependent. 
Depending on an individual’s personal concerns, the negative bias in 
basic cognitive processes and the strength of their relations may be 
variable. For instance, a depressed individual may recall examples why 
he/she is a failure at work while he/she is able to remember prior 
situations when being a good partner. These concern-related memory 
biases may change in function of mood states or distressing events (e.g., 
when having problems in the romantic relationship or when being 
flooded with work). Also in the lab very few depressed individuals solely 
process negative material in the presence of positive or neutral stimuli 
when performing cognitive-experimental tasks. This suggests that some 
stimuli may not tap into an individual’s personal concerns at that time. 
A majority of these cognitive tasks present participants with a series 
self-referent words (e.g., winner, loser) they need to process 
218  General discussion 
 
(un)intentionally. Although this provides some information on general 
tendencies in attention allocation or encoding/retrieval at the time of 
measurement, it provides suboptimal insight into how people process 
emotional material that is relevant to them at a certain moment (e.g., ‘I 
am a loser in my job’, ‘I am a winner at doing sports’). In this regard, we 
think that some of the paradigms used in this doctoral dissertation 
provide a way to address this lack-of-context issue. Combining eye 
movement registration with a scrambled sentences test as an 
elaborative encoding task provides attentional bias measures that are 
sensitive to the context as set out by the individual scrambled sentences 
(e.g., born I winner am loser a). This type of study designs may provide 
a more accurate estimation of cognitive biases and their relations. We 
hope that this approach may inspire the future development of new 
experimental tasks to test core aspects of the combined cognitive biases 
hypothesis. 
Online measurement of psychological processes 
Researchers are also increasingly using online measures of 
cognitive processing biases (e.g., attention) while participants are 
performing a targeted mental operation, such as encoding (see chapter 
1), reappraisal (Manera, Samson, Pehrs, Lee, & Gross, 2014), or 
retrieval (see chapter 1) of emotional material. In contrast to traditional 
approaches that measure attention bias in a separate task, the emerging 
ways to measure attention allocation during an assigned task (e.g., 
scrambled sentences test) are likely to capture more of the action. 
Indeed, individuals actively select competing positive and negative 
information to guide the active process of interpretation, reappraisal, 
or retrieval. Measures of attentional mechanisms (e.g., obtained via eye 
tracking) when participants are actively engaged in a task may better 
reflect the nature of the cognitive bias compared to measures drawn 
from a separate attentional bias task in which individuals passively view 
task-(ir)relevant stimuli. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Attention, interpretation, and memory biases are overlapping 
processes that operate continuously and with mutual relations to 
predict prospective changes in depressive symptoms. Our work has 
unlocked some parts of the complex interplay between emotionally 
biased cognitive processes. Yet, much remains to be discovered about 
how attention biases control and are controlled by emotional memory 
representations. Only by improving our understanding of the proximal 
and distal relations among cognitive biases in attention, interpretation, 
and memory, we can gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
cognitive foundations of healthy and disordered emotional functioning. 
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3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] 
NO, if NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
- [x] researcher PC 
- [ ] research group file server 
- [x] other (specify): responsible ZAP PC, collaborators (prof. dr. 
Nicholas Turk-Browne, drs. Judith E. Fan) 
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238  Data storage fact sheets 
 
- [x] responsible ZAP 
- [ ] all members of the research group 
- [ ] all members of UGent 
- [x] other (specify): collaborating researchers prof. dr. Nicholas Turk-
Browne and drs. Judith E. Fan (Princeton University). 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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- [x] file(s) containing analyses and results. Specify: 
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- [x] main researcher 
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- [ ] all members of the research group 
- [ ] all members of UGent 
- [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
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* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
- name: 
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- affiliation: 
- e-mail: 
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================================================ 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Jonas Everaert 
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1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP) 
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- name: Ernst H.W. Koster 
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- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
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please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data 
Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
================================================ 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Everaert, J., Mogoase, C., David, D., & Koster, E.H.W. (in press). 
Attention bias modification via single-session dot-probe training: 
Failures to replicate. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2014.10.011. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: Data 
from three studies is described in this article. There is one dataset for 
each experiment. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
================================================ 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] 
NO, if NO, please justify: 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
- [x] researcher PC 
- [ ] research group file server 
- [x] other (specify): responsible ZAP PC and Cristina Mogoase 
(collaborator) 
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* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)? 
- [x] main researchers 
- [x] responsible ZAP 
- [ ] all members of the research group 
- [ ] all members of UGent 
- [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
Specify: A detailed description can be found in the article. 
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: processed data for exp1 
is with Cristina Mogoase, "processing_ABM_RTsheet_exp2.xlsx", 
"Final_dataset_JBTEP2015_exp2.sav", 
"Final_dataset_JBTEP2015_exp3.sav",  
- [x] file(s) containing analyses and results. Specify: 
"Output1_exp2.spv", "Output1_exp3.spv", for experiment 1 contact 
Cristina Mogoase. 
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent 
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions 
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. Specify: ... 
- [ ] other files. Specify: 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored? 
- [x] individual PC 
- [ ] research group file server 
- [x] other: Responsible ZAP 
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* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention 
of another person)? 
- [x] main researcher 
- [x] responsible ZAP 
- [ ] all members of the research group 
- [ ] all members of UGent 
- [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
================================================ 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
- name: 
- address: 
- affiliation: 
- e-mail: 
 
% Emotional attention during instructed and uninstructed 
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% Author: Jonas Everaert 
% Date: 19/02/15 
 
1. Contact details 
================================================ 
1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Alvaro Sanchez, Jonas Everaert 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
- e-mail: alvaro.sanchezlopez@UGent.be; jonas.everaert@ugent.be 
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1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Ernst H.W. Koster 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, 
please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data 
Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
================================================ 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Sanchez, A., Everaert, J., De Putter, L., Mueller, S., & Koster, E.H.W. 
Life is…great! Emotional attention during instructed and uninstructed 
ambiguity resolution in relation to depressive symptoms. Biological 
Psychology. doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2015.04.007 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: This 
sheet applies to the only dataset described in the article. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
================================================ 
3a. Raw data 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] 
NO, if NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
- [x] researcher PC 
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- [ ] research group file server 
- [x] other (specify): responsible ZAP PC 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)? 
- [x] main researchers 
- [x] responsible ZAP 
- [ ] all members of the research group 
- [ ] all members of UGent 
- [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
Specify: A detailed description can be found in the article. 
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: "+DataSet SST study 1 
final.sav" 
- [x] file(s) containing analyses and results. Specify: "1.Output Model 
Ability Dep_Att_Int.spv", "1.Output Model Tendency 
Dep_Att_Int.spv", "2.Output Model Ability Dep_Int_Att.spv", 
"2.Output Model Tendency Dep_Int_Att.spv", "3.Output Model 
Ability Att_Int_Dep.spv", "3.Output Model Tendency 
Att_Int_Dep.spv", "4.Output Model Ability Int_Att_Dep.spv", 
"4.Output Model Tendency Int_Att_Dep.spv","5. Output Correlations 
(included RTs).spv" 
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent 
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions 
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. Specify: ... 
- [ ] other files. Specify: 
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* On which platform are these other files stored? 
- [x] individual PC 
- [ ] research group file server 
- [x] other: Responsible ZAP 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention 
of another person)? 
- [x] main researchers 
- [x] responsible ZAP 
- [ ] all members of the research group 
- [ ] all members of UGent 
- [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
================================================ 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
- name: 
- address: 
- affiliation: 
- e-mail: 
 
% Emotionally biased cognitive processes: The weakest link 
predicts prospective changes in depressive symptoms 
% Author: Jonas Everaert 
% Date: 10/04/15 
 
1. Contact details 
================================================ 
1a. Main researcher 
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- name: Jonas Everaert 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
- e-mail: jonas.everaert@ugent.be 
 
1b. Responsible Staff Member (ZAP) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Ernst H.W. Koster 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, B-9000 Gent 
- e-mail: ernst.koster@ugent.be 
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, 
please send an email to data.pp@ugent.be or contact Data 
Management, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri 
Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
================================================ 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Everaert, J., Duyck, W., & Koster, E.H.W. (2015). Emotionally biased 
cognitive processes: The weakest link predicts prospective changes in 
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sheet applies to the only data described in the article. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
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3a. Raw data 
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* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] 
NO, if NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
- [x] researcher PC 
- [ ] research group file server 
- [x] other (specify): responsible ZAP PC, the data is available on 
figshare (doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1340003) 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of 
another person)? 
- [x] main researcher 
- [x] responsible ZAP 
- [x] all members of the research group 
- [x] all members of UGent 
- [x] other (specify): there are no access restrictions. The data is 
available on figshare http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1340003 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
- [x] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. 
Specify: A detailed description can be found in the article. 
- [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: 
"final_dataset_PlosOne2015.sav" 
- [x] file(s) containing analyses and results. Specify: 
"HLRanalyses.spv" 
- [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent 
- [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions 
- [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this 
content should be interpreted. Specify: ... 
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Stel je voor: je bevindt je in een sollicitatiegesprek voor een 
felbegeerde baan. Terwijl je op de vragen van de commissieleden 
antwoordt, merk je dat het ene commissielid glimlacht en knikkend 
luistert en een ander commissielid fronsend naar achteren leunt. 
Afhankelijk van waar je aandacht naar toe wordt getrokken zal je 
andere interpretaties als aannemelijk beschouwen. Indien aandacht 
zich selectief richt op het glimlachende commissielid zullen 
interpretaties als “ik maak een goede indruk en heb kans op de baan” 
waarschijnlijk zijn, terwijl interpretaties als “ik maak er helemaal niets 
van en kan het wel vergeten” eerder geloofwaardig zijn wanneer 
aandacht zich selectief richt op het fronsende commissielid. De 
ervaren emoties zullen bijgevolg zeer verschillend zijn. Op deze manier 
zijn aandachtsprocessen eveneens bepalend bij de wijze waarop de 
ervaring van het sollicitatiegesprek in het geheugen zal worden 
opgeslagen en herinnerd zal worden als een positieve of negatieve 
gebeurtenis. Dit voorbeeld illustreert dat aandacht, interpretatie en 
geheugen nauw gerelateerd zijn aan allerlei emoties. Hoe emotionele 
vertekeningen in deze cognitieve processen gerelateerd zijn aan 
veelvoorkomende psychiatrische stoornissen zoals depressie werd dan 
ook uitvoerig wetenschappelijk onderzocht. 
                                                             
1 Based on Everaert, J., & Koster, E.H.W. (in press). Vastzitten in depressie: De vicieuze 
cirkel van informatieverwerking. De Psycholoog. 
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Kwetsbaarheidsfactoren Voor Depressie 
Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat emotionele vertekeningen in 
aandacht, interpretatie en geheugen van belang zijn bij het ontstaan 
en voortbestaan van depressieve klachten (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Studies hebben uitgewezen dat er bij depressieve personen negatieve 
vertekeningen voorkomen in deze cognitieve processen. Concreet wil 
dit zeggen dat personen die kampen met depressie moeilijkheden 
ervaren bij het loskoppelen van hun aandacht voor negatieve aspecten 
uit de omgeving en minder aandacht hebben voor positieve aspecten 
(vb.: het fronsende vs. het glimlachende commissielid) (De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Verder zullen 
depressieve personen ook vaker ambigue situaties op een negatieve 
wijze interpreteren (vb.: door de houding van het fronsende en niet 
het glimlachende commissielid te betrekken op de eigen prestatie) 
(Wisco, 2009) en zich meer negatieve dan positieve gebeurtenissen 
herinneren (vb.: tijdens het sollicitatiegesprek kan men zich een vorige 
faalervaring en geen succeservaring herinneren) (Gaddy & Ingram, 
2014; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992). Figuur 1 illustreert deze 
cognitieve vertekeningen.  
Vertekende cognitieve processen verlopen betrekkelijk 
automatisch en komen zowel voor bij subklinisch, klinisch als bij 
voorheen depressieve personen (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009; Hedlund & 
Rude, 1995; Kujawa et al., 2011). Daarenboven voorspellen deze 
processen de emotionele reactie op stressvolle gebeurtenissen (Clasen, 
Wells, Ellis, & Beevers, 2013; Ellenbogen, Schwartzman, Stewart, & 
Walker, 2002; Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, & Joormann, 
2013) en de toename in depressieve symptomen (Beevers & Carver, 
2003; Johnson, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2007; Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, 
Vane, & Whitney, 2002). Emotionele vertekeningen in aandacht, 
interpretatie en geheugen kunnen daarom beschouwd worden als 
kwetsbaarheidsfactoren voor de stoornis. 
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Ondanks een sleutelrol voor cognitieve vertekeningen bij het 
begrijpen en verklaren van depressie bevindt het wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek naar de relaties tussen deze processen zich in een vroeg 
stadium (Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). Het huidige 
onderzoek richt zich voornamelijk op het aantonen van emotionele 
vertekeningen waarbij er meestal onderzoek werd gevoerd naar de 
invloed van één proces, hetzij aandacht, interpretatie of geheugen. Het 
lijkt echter noodzakelijk om na te gaan hoe deze cognitieve 
vertekeningen elkaar beïnvloeden om tot een grondig begrip te komen 
van de cognitieve basis van depressie. 
Cognitieve Vertekeningen: Communicerende Vaten? 
Enkele belangrijke vragen over de wisselwerking tussen 
cognitieve vertekeningen die tot op heden onbeantwoord bleven zijn 
immers: (1) hoe zorgen negatieve aandachts- en 
interpretatievertekeningen ervoor dat stemmingscongruente 
informatie wordt opgeslagen in het geheugen, (2) spelen 
aandachtsvertekeningen een rol bij het selectief herinneren van 
emotionele ervaringen, (3) kunnen emotionele herinneringen de 
aandacht richten naar stemmingscongruente informatie in de 
omgeving, en (4) hoe voorspellen aandachts-, interpretatie- en 
geheugenvertekeningen in combinatie het verdere verloop van 
depressiesymptomen. Deze vragen hebben we bestudeerd met een 
reeks wetenschappelijke experimenten en hieronder zullen we de 
belangrijkste bevindingen bespreken. 
Aandachtsvertekeningen Bepalen Emotionele Interpretaties 
en Herinneringen 
In een eerste studie (Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014) voerden 
personen met minimale en ernstige depressiesymptomen een 
computertaak uit waarbij ze vervormde zinnen (vb.: “ben verliezer ik 
geboren winnaar een”) hervormden naar goed lopende zinnen door 
het positieve of negatieve woord weg te laten. De oplossing kon telkens 
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leiden tot een positieve of een negatieve betekenis (vb.: “ik ben een 
geboren winnaar” vs. “ik ben een geboren verliezer”). Telkens dienden 
de deelnemers de eerste oplossing te rapporteren die in hun gedachten 
opkwam. Dit leverde een maat voor interpretatievertekening. Om 
aandachtsvertekeningen te meten werden oogbewegingen van de 
deelnemers geregistreerd tijdens het uitvoeren van de 
interpretatietaak. We registreerden hoe lang (maat voor volgehouden 
aandacht) en hoe vaak (maat voor aandachtsselectie) ze keken naar 
positieve (vb.: winnaar) en negatieve (vb.: verliezer) woorden. Na deze 
taak werden de deelnemers gevraagd om zoveel mogelijk zinnen te 
herinneren die men had gevormd. Dit leverde een maat voor 
geheugenvertekening. Figuur 2 toont een schematische weergave van 
de interpretatietaak. 
De analyse toonde aan dat de manier waarop iemand 
aandacht richtte naar emotionele woorden de aard van de 
interpretaties voorspelde. Personen die vaker hun aandacht richtten 
naar negatieve woorden in vergelijking met positieve woorden 
(aandachtselectie), maakten meer negatieve interpretaties en 
rapporteerden vervolgens ook meer negatieve herinneringen. Ook 
naarmate iemand langer keek naar de negatieve woorden 
(volgehouden aandacht) tijdens het interpreteren herinnerde men zich 
meer negatieve betekenissen. In overeenkomst met vorig onderzoek 
vonden we dat negatieve vertekeningen in aandacht, interpretatie en 
geheugen gerelateerd zijn aan depressiesymptomen (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010). Hoe ernstiger de symptomen, hoe sterker de 
negatieve vertekening.  
Negatieve aandachtsvertekeningen spelen dus een rol bij het 
selectief interpreteren van nieuwe informatie wat vervolgens bepaalt 
wat iemand zich herinnert. Deze bevinding werd bevestigd in een 
replicatieonderzoek (Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013) en is 
in overeenstemming met vorig onderzoek naar de link tussen 
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geheugen en interpretatie, en tussen geheugen en aandacht (Blaut, 
Paulewicz, Szastok, Prochwicz, & Koster, 2013; Everaert et al., 2012; 
Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015).  
Als aandachtsvertekeningen de verwerking van nieuwe 
emotionele interpretaties in het geheugen kunnen beïnvloeden, dan is 
een logische volgende vraag wat hun rol is tijdens het herinneren van 
oude, voordien opgeslagen emotionele interpretaties. Dit hebben we 
onderzocht in een experiment bij een gezonde steekproef (Everaert & 
Koster, 2015). Tijdens een eerste taak hervormden de deelnemers 
opnieuw vervormde zinnen naar goed lopende zinnen (zie figuur 2). In 
een daaropvolgende geheugentaak werd een reeks woordparen 
getoond waarbij deelnemers telkens bepaalden of de gepresenteerde 
woorden in de vorige taak werden gebruikt om een zin te maken. De 
helft van de woordparen was eerder gezien ‘oud’ (vb.: winnaar – 
verliezer), de andere helft was ‘nieuw’ (vb.: depressief – opgewekt). 
Via een specifieke antwoordprocedure was het mogelijk om een 
onderscheid te maken tussen automatische, onbewuste en 
gecontroleerde, bewuste processen die betrokken kunnen zijn bij het 
herinneren van emotionele informatie (Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, Aly, 
Wang, & Koen, 2010). Om de rol van vertekeningen in 
aandachtsselectie en volgehouden aandacht na te gaan werden 
oogbewegingen van de deelnemers geregistreerd tijdens de presentatie 
van de woordparen. 
De resultaten toonden aan dat emotionele vertekeningen in 
volgehouden aandacht, niet in aandachtsselectie, naar de negatieve 
woorden uit de woordparen gerelateerd waren aan vertekeningen in 
de herinnering van de emotionele betekenissen. Dit betekent dat 
naarmate men langer keek naar negatieve woorden, men zich meer 
negatieve interpretaties herinnerde. Dit resultaat werd gevonden ook 
na controle voor de initiële vertekeningen in de interpretatie (de 
geselecteerde betekenis) en was specifiek voor gecontroleerde, 
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bewuste en niet voor automatische, onbewuste geheugenprocessen. 
Emotionele vertekeningen in de aandacht spelen dus niet enkel een rol 
bij het interpreteren van nieuwe emotionele informatie maar ook bij 
het bewust, gericht zoeken naar emotionele herinneringen. 
Emotionele Herinneringen Sturen de Aandacht 
Terwijl het merendeel van het onderzoek naar relaties tussen 
cognitieve vertekeningen zich toegelegd heeft op het bestuderen van 
hoe vertekeningen in de aandacht of interpretatie tijdens vroege stadia 
van informatieverwerking een invloed hebben op het geheugen, is er 
tot op heden weinig bekend over het omgekeerde effect. Het is 
onduidelijk of het emotionele geheugen de aandacht kan sturen. Aan 
deze leemte wilden we tegemoet komen. 
In een eerste studie voltooiden deelnemers een aandachtstaak 
na een leer fase waarbij ze willekeurig gegenereerde kleuren leerden 
associëren met blije, neutrale of boze gelaatsexpressies. Tijdens de 
aandachtstaak werden paren van gekleurde cirkels gepresenteerd 
waarvan één cirkel met neutrale associaties en de andere met 
emotionele (negatieve of positieve) associaties. In elke cirkel werd een 
lijnstuk met een verticale of geroteerde oriëntatie gepresenteerd. De 
deelnemers dienden zo snel mogelijk het geroteerde lijnstuk te vinden. 
De aanwezigheid van de gekleurde cirkels was dus irrelevant voor het 
correct uitvoeren van de taak. We kunnen stellen dat wanneer 
emotionele associaties de aandacht trekken, de deelnemers het 
geroteerde lijnstuk sneller zouden vinden wanneer het verschijnt in de 
cirkel met emotionele associaties dan wanneer het geroteerde lijnstuk 
zou verschijnen in de cirkel met neutrale associaties. Figuur 3 toont de 
experimentele procedure. 
We vonden een algemeen effect waarbij deelnemers het 
geroteerde lijnstuk sneller detecteerden wanneer het werd 
gepresenteerd binnen een gekleurde cirkel met positieve associaties. 
Dit geeft aan dat aandacht wordt gericht naar stimuli met positieve 
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associaties. Deze bevinding is in overeenstemming met onderzoek 
waarin gevonden werd dat aandacht vertekend is naar stimuli die 
geassocieerd werden met beloning (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; 
Hickey & van Zoest, 2013). Het algemene effect hing samen met 
depressiesymptomen. De positieve aandachtsvertekening was sterker 
bij personen met lage depressiesymptomen en zwakker bij personen 
met verhoogde depressiesymptomen. 
In een tweede experiment bij gezonde deelnemers werden 
specifieke componenten van de aandachtstaak gemanipuleerd om te 
onderzoeken welke aandachtsprocessen werden beïnvloedt en wat het 
tijdsverloop was van de geheugeneffecten op aandacht. Hier vonden 
we dat negatieve geheugenassociaties een invloed hadden op 
aandachtsselectie en niet op volgehouden aandacht bij een korte 
presentatieduur van de gekleurde cirkels. Aandacht was minder 
vertekend naar stimuli met negatieve associaties. Er werden geen 
effecten gevonden bij de verwerking van positieve informatie. 
Deze studies tonen aan dat dat eerder geleerde emotionele 
associaties de aandacht kunnen sturen. Dit effect blijkt afhankelijk te 
zijn van de valentie van de geheugenassociaties, presentatieduur van 
de stimulus en specifieke aandachtsprocessen. Belangrijk is dat in elk 
van de experimenten de effecten gedreven werden door de associaties 
met de kleuren en niet door een positieve of negatieve evaluatie van de 
gekleurde cirkels. 
De Zwakste Schakel Voorspelt Depressiesymptomen 
Studies hebben uitgewezen dat vertekeningen in aandacht, 
interpretatie en geheugen symptomen van depressie voorspellen 
(Beevers & Carver, 2003; Johnson et al., 2007; Rude et al., 2002). Het 
blijft echter onduidelijk hoe combinaties van cognitieve vertekeningen 
het verloop van depressie beïnvloeden. Om dit te onderzoeken werden 
de deelnemers uit een eerder onderzoek na één jaar opnieuw 
gecontacteerd (Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2015). Bij deze follow-up 
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werd de ernst van depressiesymptomen opnieuw gemeten alsook de 
stress ervaren tijdens de laatste maand voor de meting. 
Om de gezamenlijke impact van cognitieve vertekeningen te 
modelleren werd gebruik gemaakt van verschillende conceptuele 
modellen die relaties tussen de processen specifiëren (Abela & 
Hankin, 2008). Een eerste model, het additieve model, verondersteld 
dat cognitieve vertekeningen een cumulatieve invloed hebben. Dit wil 
zeggen dat de kans op depressie toeneemt naarmate iemand meer 
negatieve cognitieve vertekeningen heeft. Een tweede model, het 
zwakste schakel model, stelt dat het meest negatief vertekende proces 
de beste voorspeller is voor depressie. Deze studie testte of deze 
modellen, afzonderlijk en in wisselwerking met ervaren stress, 
longitudinale veranderingen in depressiesymptomen konden 
voorspellen.  
We vonden dat zowel het additieve als het zwakste schakel 
model veranderingen in de ernst van depressiesymptomen na één jaar 
konden voorspellen. Bij een rechtstreekse vergelijking van de 
modellen bleek dat het zwakste schakel model een betere voorspeller 
was. Voor beide modellen was de wisselwerking met stress niet 
significant. Deze resultaten geven aan dat de beste cognitieve 
predictor van symptomen van depressie dat proces is met de sterkste 
vertekening naar negatieve informatie. De aard van dit proces (hetzij 
aandacht, interpretatie of geheugen) kan per individu verschillend 
zijn.  
Conclusie 
Onderzoek toont aan dat negatieve vertekeningen in aandacht, 
interpretatie en geheugen gerelateerde cognitieve processen zijn. 
Aandachtsvertekeningen beïnvloeden de emotionele inhoud van 
herinnerde interpretaties via hun rol bij het opslaan en ophalen van 
informatie uit het geheugen. Op hun beurt kunnen emotionele 
associaties in het geheugen de aandacht naar aspecten uit de 
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omgeving sturen. Aandachts-, interpretatie- en 
geheugenvertekeningen hebben in combinatie een impact op het 
verloop van depressiesymptomen waarbij de zwakste schakel de beste 
voorspeller is.  
Klinische Implicaties 
Emotie(dis)regulatie 
Kennis over de wisselwerking tussen cognitieve vertekeningen 
werpt licht op de mechanismen die aan de basis liggen van problemen 
bij de emotieregulatie die kenmerkend zijn voor depressie. 
Depressieve personen zullen vaker rumineren of stilstaan bij de 
oorzaken en gevolgen van depressieve gevoelens, minder vaak hun 
negatieve interpretaties herzien noch positieve herinneringen ophalen 
om hun negatieve stemming te doorbreken (Joormann & D’Avanzato, 
2010).  
Wanneer men zich in een stressvolle situatie bevindt (vb.: een 
sollicitatiegesprek), zullen depressieve personen vaker en langer hun 
aandacht richten naar negatieve aspecten uit de omgeving (vb.: het 
fronsende commissielid). De moeilijkheden bij het loskoppelen van 
aandacht naar negatieve informatie ondermijnen het heroriënteren 
van aandacht naar positieve signalen (vb.: het glimlachende 
commissielid) als een emotieregulatie strategie en zal veelal leiden tot 
negatieve interpretaties van de situatie (vb.: “ze zullen denken dat ik 
niet geschikt ben voor de baan”). Negatieve vertekeningen in de 
aandacht en interpretatiestijl kunnen verhinderen dat men de situatie 
opnieuw gaat herinterpreteren op een minder negatieve wijze (vb.: 
“het was zo slecht nog niet”). Dit proces kan disfunctionele 
opvattingen in het geheugen of schema’s bekrachtigen (vb.: “ik ben 
waardeloos”) en andere, gerelateerde herinneringen activeren (vb.: 
herinneringen aan een stukgelopen relatie) die het negatieve denken 
(rumineren) kunnen versterken. Door deze negatief vertekende 
verwerking van emotionele informatie worden er ook meer negatieve 
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ervaringen in het geheugen opgeslagen, wat het gebruik van positieve 
herinneringen om de negatieve stemming te reguleren in de toekomst 
ondermijnt. Daarnaast kunnen negatieve signalen uit de situatie ook 
gemakkelijk negatieve herinneringen activeren (vb.: “mijn laatste 
interview ging ook helemaal mis”), wat op zijn beurt de aandacht kan 
sturen naar andere negatieve signalen. Dit kan de negatieve 
interpretaties bevestigen en herinterpretatie bemoeilijken. Hierdoor is 
de cirkel rond. 
Door de wisselwerking tussen cognitieve vertekeningen en 
emotieregulatie strategieën kunnen depressieve personen vastzitten in 
een vicieuze cirkel van toenemend negatief denken en negatief affect. 
Het stelselmatig gebruik van specifieke emotieregulatie strategieën 
zoals ruminatie (voortdurend piekeren over de oorzaken en gevolgen 
van de negatieve gevoelens: “hoe komt het dat ik ongelukkig ben”) kan 
op termijn specifieke cognitieve vertekeningen versterken (vb.: 
aandacht voor negatieve informatie). Door dit wederkerig proces kan 
er zich een zwakke cognitieve schakel ontwikkelen die een voorspeller 
is van depressieve symptomen. 
Deze inzichten zijn niet louter van theoretisch belang omdat 
therapeutische interventies (vb.: cognitief herstructureren) vaak een 
beroep doen op emotieregulatie vaardigheden bij patiënten (vb.: 
herinterpretatie, stemming incongruente herinnering). Uit het 
voorgaande blijkt dat het gebruik van emotieregulatie strategieën 
bemoeilijkt kan worden door de wisselwerking tussen cognitieve 
vertekeningen. Dit zou therapeutische vooruitgang kunnen 
ondermijnen. Het onderkennen van de aard van de wisselwerking 
tussen negatieve vertekeningen in aandacht, interpretatie en geheugen 
alsook hoe deze adaptieve emotieregulatie kunnen ondermijnen is van 
belang voor zowel therapeuten als patiënten die met cognitieve 
technieken aan de slag gaan. 
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Cognitieve Training 
In de afgelopen jaren werden er specifieke methoden 
ontwikkeld om negatieve vertekeningen in cognitieve processen te 
remediëren (voor een overzicht zie Koster, Everaert, Bruyneel, & 
Onraedt, 2013). Deze procedures kunnen negatieve vertekeningen 
reduceren in onder andere aandacht, interpretatie en geheugen en zijn 
potentieel klinisch interessant. Inzichten uit onderzoek naar relaties 
tussen cognitieve vertekeningen hebben implicaties voor de 
implementatie van dergelijke trainingsmethodieken. 
Ten eerste kan een gerichte trainingsaanpak zich baseren op 
bevindingen die aantonen dat aandachtsvertekeningen een rol spelen 
bij het interpreteren, opslaan en bewust herinneren van emotionele 
informatie. Dit suggereert dat wanneer men negatieve vertekeningen 
in de aandacht kan verminderen, dit kan leiden tot meer positieve en 
minder negatieve interpretaties die in het geheugen worden 
opgeslagen alsook meer positieve dan negatieve herinneringen die 
men uit het geheugen ophaalt. Bijgevolg zou de informatieverwerking 
minder negatief vertekend zijn waardoor disfunctionele opvattingen 
over het zelf, anderen en de wereld aangepast kunnen worden. Zo kan 
kwetsbaarheid voor depressie gereduceerd worden. 
Ondanks het potentieel van aandachtstraining bij depressie 
wijst onderzoek naar de effectiviteit van deze procedures op 
bescheiden resultaten. Initieel veelbelovende positieve effecten op 
depressiesymptomen tot drie maanden na de training (Wells & 
Beevers, 2010) werden niet gerepliceerd bij steekproeven van 
subklinisch en klinisch depressieve personen (Baert, De Raedt, 
Schacht, & Koster, 2010; Kruijt, Putman, & Van der Does, 2013). 
Echter, een studie naar aandachtstraining als een methode ter 
preventie van terugval bij voorheen depressieve personen vond wel dat 
training leidde tot minder ernstige depressieve symptomen bij follow-
up (Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012). Naast de 
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beperkte effecten van aandachtstraining op depressiesymptomen, zijn 
er gemengde bevindingen over de effecten van training op 
gerelateerde cognitieve processen. Zo hebben studies aangetoond dat 
het trainen van emotionele vertekeningen in de aandacht niet steeds 
leidt tot veranderingen in de interpretatie van emotionele informatie 
(Everaert, Mogoase, David, & Koster, 2014). Anderzijds hebben 
sommige onderzoekers wel gunstige effecten gevonden van 
aandachtstraining op het herinneren van emotionele informatie bij 
personen met verhoogde depressiesymptomen (Blaut et al., 2013). 
Momenteel zijn de condities voor een optimale implementatie van 
aandachtstraining bij depressie nog onbekend. Dit vormt een 
belangrijke uitdaging voor toekomstige studies.  
Ten tweede kunnen cognitieve trainingsprocedures gericht 
worden op de zwakste schakel van de cognitieve vertekeningen als een 
middel om een toename in depressieve symptomen te voorkomen. Dit 
houdt in dat men eerst op individueel niveau een grondige assessment 
dient uit te voeren om negatieve vertekeningen in aandacht, 
interpretatie en geheugen te identificeren. Vervolgens kan men een de 
training richten op het meest negatief vertekende proces om op 
individueel niveau de zwakste schakel bij te sturen (vb.: interpretatie). 
Dergelijke training kan vervolgens een impact hebben op andere 
cognitieve vertekeningen (vb.: geheugen). We kunnen speculeren dat 
een gecombineerde aanpak waarbij negatieve vertekeningen in 
aandacht en de zwakste schakel worden gereduceerd een beloftevolle 
methode kan vormen om cognitieve kwetsbaarheid te reduceren en 
depressiesymptomen te voorkomen. 
Toekomstmuziek 
De laatste jaren heeft het onderzoek naar relaties tussen 
cognitieve vertekeningen een grote vooruitgang geboekt. Toch blijven 
er belangrijke vragen onbeantwoord. Ten eerste is het onduidelijk in 
welke mate de huidige bevindingen van toepassing zijn op klinisch 
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depressieve personen. De meeste studies werden uitgevoerd in 
steekproeven met subklinisch depressieve individuen en slechts enkele 
studies onderzochten de wisselwerking tussen cognitieve processen in 
een klinische steekproef. Hoewel overeenkomsten waarschijnlijk 
lijken, zal verder onderzoek moeten uitwijzen in welke mate de 
samenhang tussen cognitieve vertekeningen in subklinische 
steekproeven voorkomen bij klinisch depressieve personen. Ten 
tweede zullen studies verder relaties tussen cognitieve vertekeningen 
moeten exploreren. Zo is er weinig bekend over hoe emotionele 
vertekeningen in het impliciete geheugen beïnvloedt worden door 
aandachtsvertekeningen tijdens het opslaan van emotionele 
informatie. Ook is het onduidelijk of impliciete 
geheugenvertekeningen de aandacht kunnen sturen. Dit vormt een 
boeiende uitdaging voor verder onderzoek. Tot slot heeft nog maar 
weinig onderzoek zich toegelegd op de link tussen cognitieve 
processen en moeilijkheden bij het reguleren van negatieve emoties bij 
depressie. De besproken relaties tussen cognitieve vertekeningen en 
emotieregulatie strategieën zijn waarschijnlijk maar studies dienen de 
veronderstelde verbanden te objectiveren. 
Algemeen Besluit 
Emotionele vertekeningen in aandacht, interpretatie en 
geheugen zijn gerelateerde, deels overlappende, cognitieve processen 
die mede het verloop van depressiesymptomen bepalen. Het huidige 
onderzoek heeft al enkele aspecten van de complexe wisselwerking 
tussen deze processen blootgelegd, maar verder onderzoek naar deze 
processen is nodig om de kennis over deze cognitieve mechanismen 
uit te breiden. Enkel door het bestuderen van de relaties tussen deze 
processen kunnen we tot een omvattend begrip komen van cognitieve 
kwetsbaarheid voor depressie. Op zijn beurt kan dit de verdere 
ontwikkeling van behandelingsstrategieën inspireren. 
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